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The continuous upward trend in health spending and the perpetual rise in the demand for 
healthcare underlines the importance of designing efficient resource allocation mechanisms. In 
the healthcare sector, physicians play a crucial role in directing resources. This thesis analyses 
the design of primary care incentive contracts in presence of two complicating issues. From 
society’s perspective, the physician may provide an inefficient amount of treatment (“moral 
hazard”) or be offered a sub-optimal contract (“adverse selection”), as neither the physician’s 
knowledge about patients’ health nor his personal characteristics be perfectly observed. This 
thesis is structured into three essays.  
The first essay discusses theory and evidence related to physician altruism. It also 
comprehensively surveys optimal incentive contracting when physicians have private 
information about their characteristics (e.g. costs, abilities), their patients’ health, or their actions 
(efforts, service qualities). The impact of using different types of restrictions for controlling the 
cost of physician services are also reviewed. Finally, research gaps in the literature are identified 
and the context of subsequent analysis is established. 
The second essay studies the optimal design of publicly funded health insurance schemes when 
physicians have private knowledge about their preferences and patients’ health as well as being 
paid on a price per service basis (“fee-for-service”). This is formalised in a math model, where 
the regulator chooses a policy vector of price, insurance premium and cost-control policies, 
while physicians subsequently choose medical service quantities. In this setup, it is shown that 
the welfare-maximizing price system fails to align different providers’ objectives and major 
trends such as population ageing further exacerbates this distortion. Widely applied physician 
cost-control restrictions, such as maximal amount of service, fixed budgets or a payment per 
patient (“capitation”), can be imposed on the price system to improve efficiency. In particular, 
capitation performs better than other restrictions.  
The last essay extends the analysis by letting primary care physicians select their practice sizes. 
The optimal payment must ensure that the entire population has access to healthcare. It is shown 
that the welfare-maximizing price system induces medical service overproduction and distorts 
physicians’ incentives. Nevertheless, physician cost-control restrictions are still efficiency 
enhancing while the highest welfare level is generated by using a capitation. Overall, the thesis 
provides a framework which not only captures key features of the health market but also can be 
used to analyse the impact of using different physician cost-control policies.
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
The continuous upward trend in healthcare expenditure around the world has 
emphasised the importance of using health resources efficiently. Focusing on a policy 
problem that originates from healthcare market failure, this dissertation examines the 
design and implementation of a primary care provider remuneration mechanism that 
could be used as a regulatory policy tool to improve cost-efficiency and quality 
improvement outcomes. Combining cross-disciplinary theories drawn from health 
economics, contract design and public administration, this thesis begins with a 
comprehensive review of the optimal design of primary care incentives, including both 
theory and evidence. The review is documented in the form of a literature survey in the 
first essay (Chapter 2). The next two essays (Chapters 3 and 4) are theoretical works 
which extend the analysis from the literature review and proposes both qualitative and 
quantitative recommendations for the future reform of health insurance schemes in 
developed countries. 
This chapter provides a broad and contextualised background to the three ensuing essays 
that form the substance of this thesis. It begins with the discussion of healthcare 
expenditure trends and the major challenges faced by health authorities in developed 
countries in Section 1.1. Major factors that lead to health market failures and subsequent 
resource allocation inefficiencies are addressed in Section 1.2. This is followed by 
Section 1.3, which discusses the essential roles that primary care providers perform and 
the importance of their regulation. Section 1.4 reviews the main theories and the 
empirical evidence related to primary care provider payment methods in developed 
countries. In particular, Section 1.5 discusses one of the predominant provider payment 
systems, namely fee-for-service. Section 1.6 introduces the major cost control 
instruments that have been widely applied in these economies. Finally, Section 1.7 
summarises the major results from the following three essays (Chapters 2-4) and 




1.1 The Rising Government Share of Total Health Expenditure  
Total health expenditure – usually measured in terms of total health spending as a 
percentage of GDP – has always been higher in developed than in developing countries 
(Dieleman et al., 2016; French and Kelly, 2016), with the United States (US) acting as 
an outlier, spending significantly more than its counterparts in the same income group 
(i.e. the UK, Canada, Germany, France, etc.) (Anderson et al., 2012; Chen and Goldman, 
2016). Moreover, with rapid economic development, increases in national incomes, 
rising longevity and medical innovations, a substantial increase in health spending has 
been witnessed over the past decades. For instance, total health expenditure as a fraction 
of GDP across OECD countries has increased from 5% in 1970 to 9% in 2017, while 
doubling in high income economies such as Japan, the United Kingdom, France, and 
Germany (see Table 1). Total health spending as a percentage of GDP in the US has 
almost trebled over the past 50 years, rising from 6.2% in 1970 to 17.9% in 2017 
(Sawyer, 2018). The real annual growth rate of health expenditure per capita across 
OECD countries was about 3.2% over 1990-2000, which is about 1.1% higher than per 
capita GDP growth (OECD, 2003 p. 69). During 2000-2009, average annual growth in 
health spending in real terms increased to 4.1% compared to GDP growth of only 1.5% 
(OECD, 2013 p. 156). However, from 2010 onwards, growth in health spending has 
been extremely gradual and often in line with overall economic growth. Annual health 
spending growth across the OECD between 2009 and 2016 was 1.4% compared to GDP 
growth of about 1.38% (OECD, 2017, p. 132). 
In the major developing countries, the main driver of health spending growth has been 
the expansion of healthcare coverage as part of the move towards universal health care 
(UHC) over the last twenty years (OECD, 2015). In China, health expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP has increased from 4.6% in 2000 to 5.6% in 2014, while real health 
expenditure per capita increased 11% per annum during 2009-2012 compared to per 
capita GDP growth of around 9% (OECD, 2015 p.7). Meanwhile, Brazil, spending a 
similar proportion of its GDP on health as OECD countries, experienced a continued 
growth in healthcare spending from 2009-2011, averaging 6% per year (OECD, 2015). 
South Africa also saw an increase in health spending, ranging from 2% to 6% from 2009 
to 2013 (OECD, 2015). 
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Rising government expenditure on health has led to solvency issues for governments as 
they struggle with inadequate resources to finance healthcare. These predicaments are 
compounded by a larger share of informal sector employees in the workforce (especially 
in developing countries), thereby making direct contributions to healthcare become 
extremely difficult (Durairaj and Evans, 2010). With the population’s increasing 
demand for health services becoming inevitable in both developed and developing 
countries, ensuring the financial sustainability of health systems is an essential task for 














1970 1980 1990 2000 2009 2016 
France 5.2% 6.7% 8.0% 9.5% 10.7% 11% 
Germany 5.7 8.1 8.0 9.8 11 11.3 
Netherlands N/A 6.6 7.1 7.1 10.4 10.5 
UK 4.0 5.1 5.1 6.0 8.5 9.7 
US 6.2 8.2 11.3 12.5 16.4 17.2 
Japan 4.4 6.3 5.7 7.2 9.2 10.9 
OECD 5.3 7.0 7.6 8.4 8.6 9 
Table 1. Healthcare expenditure as a percentage of GDP1 
 
1.2 Sources of Healthcare Market Failures  
The first fundamental theorem of welfare economics states that the equilibrium of an 
ideal market system (i.e. perfect information, no transaction costs, and perfect 
competition) yields a Pareto-efficient allocation of resources (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 
1986). Market failures, accordingly, refer to a situation where a market violates the 
                                                 
1 See Huber and Orosz (2003) and OECD (2003, 2017). 
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conditions necessary for a perfect market and does not organise production or goods 
allocation efficiently (Cunningham, 2011). Perfect market conditions are rarely met with 
in reality, common types of market failure include returns to scale, asymmetric 
information, public goods and externalities. 
This thesis focuses on understanding one of the above issues that leads to healthcare 
market failure−information asymmetries. In particular, I discuss two specific types of 
problems that arise from information asymmetries, namely moral hazard and adverse 
selection. Since the aim of this thesis is to understand the design of a physician payment 
system that induces the efficient allocation of health resources,2 I review related theories 
and evidence in the environment with the aforementioned two problems.3  
Information asymmetries and different incentives across major parties in a health 
insurance scheme, including the payer (benevolent regulator), providers and users, 
constitute multiple principal-agent problems. In this triad, the regulator wants to 
maximize social well-being and control financial risks, thereby ensuring financial 
sustainability. Providers, on the other hand, have a propensity to conceal their real costs 
in order to maximise their claims from users who have health insurance. Consequently, 
providers might induce excessive healthcare supply, resulting in an overpayment of 
medical expenses. Meanwhile, health service users are intent on making the most use of 
their health plans or coverage. Since both patients and healthcare providers have an 
incentive to maximize their own benefits, it has been argued that they might collude to 
drive up service provision, potentially resulting in causing unnecessary health service 
                                                 
2 To avoid confusion, efficiency/optimality is used to represent the “constrained” efficiency/optimality 
hereafter. This refers to an allocation or a payment that maximizes social benefits net of costs in the 
presence of market failures. In contrast, the allocation or a payment that would be chosen under complete 
information, is denoted afterwards by first best or Pareto-efficiency. 
3 Information asymmetries also create difficulties in writing complete contracts, which results in the well-
known hold-up problem. This problem refers to “a situation when one party makes a sunk, relationship-
specific investment and then engages in bargaining with an economic trading partner (Hermalin and Katz, 
2009). That partner may be able to appropriate some of the gains from the sunk investment, thus distorting 
investment incentives, either towards too little investment or toward investments that are less subject to 
appropriation” (Hermalin and Katz, 2009, p. 405). For instance, the UK NHS (a dominant area-based 
purchaser) must negotiate terms with individual health suppliers. If the NHS commits to not recouping 
any of the return on suppliers’ investment, then the supplier will invest efficiently. However, setting the 
contractual terms in a way in which the NHS never recoups any of the return on suppliers’ investment is 
complex, particularly if: (1) the precise details of the investment cannot be specified in advance; or (2) in 
the time between the investment and provision of the service being made, unverifiable random events 
occur that affect service delivery. In such situations, the individual supplier may need to bargain with the 
NHS and reduce the efficient investment. 
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consumption and escalated health expenditure (Culyer, 1989; Cutler and Zeckhauser, 
2000).  
Information asymmetry among multiple players in the private health insurance is a 
classic example of market failure in healthcare (Bloom et al., 2008). More recently, it 
has been identified that information asymmetry between providers and payers in 
provider financing (in both private and public health insurance schemes) has also led to 
market failures. For instance, Makris and Siciliani (2013) and Barham and Milliken 
(2015) show that physicians do not select the first best practice sizes or service quality 
if their production efficiencies or concerns for patients cannot be observed by payers (i.e. 
insurance companies or the regulator). Kantarevic and Kralj (2016) and Jack (2005), on 
the other hand, show healthcare providers would not provide the first best level of 
service quality if the purchaser (i.e. the health authority) could neither observe their 
characteristics (i.e. concern for patients, marginal production costs), nor monitor their 
efforts. In the following section, I define alternative types of information asymmetries, 
provide examples, and explain their links to my thesis. 
 
1.2.1 Adverse Selection 
‘Adverse selection’ – also known as ‘hidden information’ – describes the situation where 
some partners in a contract have information about a given characteristic that is already 
known to them prior to contracting with other partners (Milgrom, 1987). In the private 
health insurance field, for instance, a higher proportion of people with known health 
risks will decide to enrol in health insurance while people with relatively better health 
voluntarily opt out from the same health insurance (Morris et al., 2012). To avoid 
incurring losses, insurance companies have an incentive to raise premiums which will 
further discourage additional individuals from purchasing health insurance, with only 
the extremely ill buying insurance. Insurance companies, as a result, suffer a financial 
loss, eventually leading to the demise of the health insurance market (Mwachofi and Al-
Assaf, 2011).  
Adverse selection also makes the payer (i.e. insurance firms in private health insurance 
or the benevolent regulator in public health insurance) unable to induce the first-best 
level of patient enrolment and medical service provision. Since a given the payer does 
not know their provider’s specific characteristics (i.e. ability, background and 
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experience, concerns for patients), the single payment contract fails to align different 
preferences across providers while the contract menu leaves an information rent to make 
providers reveal their types (Baron and Myerson, 1982). In this thesis, I review the 
design of provider payment mechanism in the presence of different types of adverse 
selection problems. My analysis captures this adverse selection as unknown physicians’ 
concerns for patients’ health benefits, and shows how it prevents the regulator using a 
single pricing system to induce welfare maximizing patient enrolment or health service 
provision. 
 
1.2.2 Moral Hazard 
‘Moral hazard’ or a hidden action generally refers to a situation in which one or both 
parties in a contract are required to undertake non-verifiable action after contracting 
(Bowles, 2009). In healthcare, moral hazard occurs in many forms. For instance, 
between an insurance firm and a patient with low-deductible or co-payment, the latter 
will demand any pharmaceuticals and other treatments promising any benefit at all, net 
of the risks and side effects of the treatment and without regard to cost. Consequently, 
patients will over-consume treatments but the insurer will bear the extra cost incurred.  
Another example of moral hazard is when neither the regulator nor the patient can fully 
evaluate the action of the healthcare provider. As a result, the provider may not act in 
the interests of the patient. For instance, the provider may degrade quality, offer 
unnecessary treatments or skim off low risk patients. In this thesis, I review the design 
of a physician payment system in the presence of different types of moral hazard. To 
capture the moral hazard problem, I introduce a stochastic component of receiving 
treatment. 4  The introduction of this stochastic element prevents the regulator from 
perfectly inferring patient initial health by evaluating the patient’s health after treatment 
and the quantity of service provided. In other words, the regulator is unable to observe 
the provider’s “action” (i.e. health benefits produced per patient) because of the 
existence of the stochastic factor. In presence of moral hazard, I show that the 
                                                 
4 This stochastic component can be understood as the exogenous factors which would affect patient health 




conventional fee-for-service system fails to induce the Pareto-efficient provision of 
health services. 
In short, the unique features and information issues associated with healthcare markets 
makes it impossible to rely on market mechanisms alone to enhance the efficiency of 
allocating healthcare resources, hence, a diversity of cost control policies in the literature 
have been employed to address aforementioned sources of market failure (Bali and 
Ramesh, 2017; Leonard et al., 2013). For instance, Neudeck (1991) discusses using 
quantity rationing to reduce the oversupply of doctors and health service whereas Fan et 
al. (1998) and Benstetter and Wambach (2006) compare the effect of using a quota or a 
budget constraint to contain health expenditures and improve social well-being. 
Similarly, this thesis discusses the impact of introducing three cost-control instruments, 
namely quantity rationing, revenue cap and a capitation on physicians’ behaviour. 
Furthermore, the thesis evaluates these cost control policies by comparing their total 
health benefits, total costs, and the social well-being generated. 
 
1.3 Supply-side Incentives for Primary Healthcare  
In the health sector, physicians as health service suppliers play a major role in directing 
health resources (i.e. ordering tests, prescribing therapies and procedures, and deciding 
hospital admissions). Moreover, they negotiate with insurers and regulators for their 
reimbursement (Ghali, 2016). The predominant role of healthcare providers suggests 
that provider-targeted regulation could be effective in containing healthcare spending. 
In practice, physicians have a lot of control over the type and quantity of medical 
services consumed, especially in an emergency setting. Doctors are also better at 
assessing the risks and benefits of various medical procedures. Furthermore, they are 
better able to bear financial risks, as they are often the dominant decision maker for 
certain types of care (i.e. dental or optometry services) and can pool risks across 
individuals. Finally, by shifting responsibilities and incentives to doctors, containing 
healthcare expenditure need not necessarily degrade patients’ insurance coverage (Léger, 
2008).  
Given the increasingly important roles that provider targeted policies play, 
understanding how healthcare providers respond to these policies is essential, especially 
in the primary care sector. Starfield (1991) in her landmark book Primary care: 
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Balancing health needs, services and technology, estimated that around 75-85% of the 
general population require primary care services in a particular year. In both developed 
and developing countries, primary healthcare has also been demonstrated to be 
associated with enhanced access to healthcare services, better health outcomes, a 
decrease in hospitalisation and the use of emergency department visits (Shi, 2012) 
alongside a reduction in the costs of care provision.  
The main character in primary healthcare is its provider; primary care providers (PCPs) 
make up a significant proportion of total medical staff (e.g. on average 30% across 
OECD countries) while acting as the first contact and principal point of continuing care 
for patients within a given healthcare system (MedlinePlus, 2017). Moreover, they 
address a large majority of personal healthcare needs, developing a sustained partnership 
with patients while coordinating other specialist cares that a patient may need (Shi, 2012).  
Therefore, the reliance of healthcare performance on PCPs makes it essential to analyse 
the design of primary care incentives. This thesis examines the design of PCP incentives 
from the perspective of remuneration schemes. More specifically, I look at how 
traditional payment mechanisms structure PCPs’ incentives and how different cost 
control policies can be applied in order to improve social well-being. This is achieved 
by characterising physician decisions in terms of the number of patients enrolled and the 
intensity of service provided as a function of a particular payment and a cost control 
policy in a model that captures the main features of healthcare market. More detail about 
this approach is provided in Section 1.7. 
 
1.4 Typologies of PCP Payments 
The majority of OECD countries have a partial or fully publicly-funded health insurance 
scheme that collects insurance premiums from individuals and uses them to reimburse 
healthcare providers (Colombo and Tapay, 2004). In general, PCP payment systems can 
be categorised as either fixed or variable and as either prospective or retrospective. As 
illustrated in Figure 2, a system is fixed or variable depending on the relationship 
between activities and payment. A payment system is considered as ‘fixed’ when the 
reimbursed amount does not vary as activities (per treatment) increase or decrease. In 
contrast, a system is regarded as ‘variable’ if variations in activities induce changes in 
payment (Jegers et al., 2002).  
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A PCP payment can also be classified as prospective or retrospective. This feature of a 
system concerns the relation between the provider's income and his costs for providing 
the service. In a retrospective payment system, the provider’s costs incurred are fully (or 
partially in certain systems) reimbursed ex post (i.e. after the delivery of the treatment 
and the verification of costs incurred). The commonly used retrospective payment 
reimburses PCP practices on the basis of per diem or historical budgets (Gosden et al., 
2000). As the retrospective payment pays the provider according to the volume of 
service provided, it promotes a tendency to overprescribe treatment, therefore resulting 
in cost escalation and welfare loss.  
On the contrary in a prospective payment system, the reimbursement does not link to the 
individual costs of the provider (Jegers et al., 2002). Accordingly, the provider’s 
payment rates or budgets are determined ex ante (i.e. before the delivery of the 
treatment). The frequently used prospective payment mechanisms include capitation and 
case-based (or diagnostic-related group) payment. Prospective payment, in general, is 
believed to be better at reducing costs and improving the efficiency of healthcare 
delivery. However, research shows that providers under this system have incentives to 
stint on quality (Porter and Kaplan, 2016) and avoid treating excessively costly patients 
(Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998; Ma, 1994).  
In short, the fixed/variable dimension describes the presence/absence of a link between 
the payment for the provider and his activities. On the other hand, the 
retrospective/prospective dimension refers to the presence/absence of a link between the 
reimbursement for the provider and his costs. While activities and costs are related (the 
amount and the type of activities determines the provider’s cost), they are not the same.   
In retrospective systems, providers’ real costs and extra production are fully (or partially) 
reimbursed. Since expenditures cannot be forecasted ex ante, the sponsor bears the 
financial risks. Accordingly, a fully retrospective payment system is always variable. 
However, the reverse does not always hold, i.e. not every variable system is retrospective. 
The provider under a variable system earns revenues for extra production, but there is 
no guarantee that these financial flows are sufficient to cover the provider’s real costs. 
A variable system can also be prospective; the well-known examples include Medicare 
Diagnostic Related Group (DRG) payments and fee-for-service. On the other hand, fully 
fixed systems are always prospective but prospective systems can be both fixed (i.e. 
10 
 
global budget, salary, capitation) and variable (case-based payment). Figure 2 
summarizes characteristics and incentives in payment systems according to the 
retrospective/prospective and variable/fixed dimensions. 
 
Figure 2. Characteristics and Incentives in Provider Payment Systems5  
To conclude, the design of a provider payment system has important implications in 
terms of shaping the healthcare suppliers’ incentives and behaviours. Besides 
understanding incentives created by different payment system, performance 
measurement and activity monitoring becomes increasingly important (Tan, 2018). The 
extent to which market and institutional management are mediating the effects of 
provider payment systems, is an important question to be answered in the governance of 
health insurance schemes. 
 
                                                 
5 See Jegers et al. (2002), p.263. 
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1.5 Fee-for-Service Payment Systems 
This thesis focuses on analysing incentives embedded in a fee-for-service payment 
system under a publicly financed HI scheme. Under this remuneration, the HI scheme 
pays the provider a predetermined rate for each service they render such as an office 
visit, test, or procedure. The most recent review of the impact of different payment 
mechanisms shows that FFS remains the predominant PCP payment mechanism in the 
US6 and many other OECD countries (Porter and Kaplan, 2014). According to OECD 
(2016), 25 out of 34 OECD countries use FFS as the main method of primary care 
physician payment. In the US, Denmark and France, in particular, over two thirds of 
GPs’ income stems from FFS in 2012. 
FFS payment system has been used widely as it directly matches the interests of both 
providers and patients (Ginsburg, 2015); patients under such a system are likely to 
receive the level of treatment that maximizes their health benefits and are rarely 
excluded on the basis of complex treatment requests. Moreover, patients have rapid 
access to non-emergency appointments and can see any specialist whenever they like 
(OECD, 2016, p. 42). On the other hand, physicians’ incomes increase with their clinical 
activity and decrease with the time spent on patients. As a result, FFS embeds an 
incentive for physicians to treat patients effectively and provide them with the required 
level of treatment.  
Despite these advantages, the literature on provider payment has argued that the FFS 
system induces treatment overprovision and drives up healthcare expenditure (Léger, 
2008). The increased costs will finally be passed on to patients through increased 
premiums and lower social welfare. “The phenomenon that doctors use their 
‘discretionary power’ to engage in demand-shifting or inducement activities such that 
their recommended care differs from that which an informed patient would deem 
appropriate” is known as supplier-induced-demand (Bickerdyke et al., 2002).  
 
                                                 
6 Rama (2017) has reported that an average of 69 percent of physician practice’s revenue in the US coming 
from fee-for-service in 2012 and an average of 71.6 percent in 2014. In 2015 this share reduced to 62 
percent (Nehk, 2018).  
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1.6 Major Cost Control Instruments 
In order to address the multiple causes that have led to aforementioned health market 
failures as well as to curb the ensuing excessive increase in health expenditure, a 
diversity of cost-containing instruments have been introduced by many developed 
countries over the last decades. Of all these different methods, this section focuses on 
three most commonly used instruments; quantity rationing, budget caps and capitation.  
 
1.6.1 Quantity Rationing 
Healthcare regulators attempt to contain costs or to reduce patients’ reliance on and 
overuse of certain types of medical resources. To do these, regulators have introduced 
limitations on the volume of service supplied by healthcare providers. The restrictions 
can be direct, in the form of rules or regulations, or indirect, such as practice guidelines 
that are not mandatory (Stabile et al., 2013). In 2011, family doctors in the UK were 
asked to ration the number of patients they sent for life-saving cancer scans; they were 
required to slash the number of patients referred to hospital for tests including 
ultrasounds, MRIs and CT scans (Borland, 2011). Moreover, GPs’ prescribing of certain 
drugs, including over the counter medications, has been restricted by local healthcare 
commissioners in order to save on costs (Iacobucci, 2017). For instance, patients’ usual 
56 days’ supply of controlled drugs (i.e. heroin, morphine, remifentanil, pethidine, 
secobarbital, glutethimide, amphetamine, and cocaine) has been reduced to 28 with the 
maximum quantity be limited to 30 days from 2005 onwards (Knott, 2019). In 2017, 
NHS England also consulted nationally on plans to restrict GPs’ prescribing of 3,200 
products that are available without prescription, such as paracetamol, antifungal 
treatments, and eczema creams (Iacobucci, 2017, p.1).  
In the US, the health authorities have used quantity rationing to control the length of 
initial prescriptions of opioid pain medication – typically to fewer than seven days – 
which has been passed in states such as New York and Massachusetts in an attempt to 
reduce opioid abuse (Scully et al., 2018). Germany introduced restrictions on the volume 
of physicians’ prescription practices. For instance, a limit on the maximum number of 
antibiotic drugs per patient that can be prescribed was introduced in order to constraint 
overuse (Zweigner et al., 2018). Moreover, France has encouraged the early retirement 
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of self-employed physicians, and tightened the total volume of pharmaceutical 
prescriptions (Stabile et al., 2013). 
 
1.6.2 Revenue Restriction 
Revenue restrictions aim to create an upper limit on third-party player spending, 
typically at the level of the health sector as a whole or for specific service areas. One of 
the commonly used revenue restrictions is the expenditure cap, which refers to a fixed 
amount of money containing services delivered during the year (Glaser, 1993). If the 
organization/sector or individual has reached the limit toward the end of the year, it must 
either deny some additional service or reduce price for every service (Glaser, 1993). 
Caps imply strong control and are usually used by government authorities (e.g. a single 
centralized payer or a few highly coordinated payers). In this subsection, we look at the 
expenditure caps which have been imposed on an individual level. 
In the UK, the National Health Service (NHS) has imposed a strict annual expenditure 
cap on physicians’ spending. For instance, GPs are paid on a fixed budget per patient 
per annum (£156). As a result, total payment to GPs is predictable and stays within an 
annual budget except for their drug prescriptions. Individual GP practices have also been 
provided with a fixed prescribing budget from the Clinical Commissioning Group 
(British Medical Association, 2018).7  
Germany have also experimented with individual budgets, such as personal spending 
accounts, for long-term care. These budgets enable people to choose or purchase services 
to meet their care needs (Stabile et al., 2013). France introduced a national cap on 
statutory health insurance expenditure in 1997, which capped healthcare spending for 
six sectors (Stabile et al., 2013). In the US, a physician compensation cap has been 
introduced. Typically, the cap is set at the 90th percentile of national pay based on 
surveys, such as those from the Medical Group Management Association (MGMA), the 
American Medical Group Association, national consulting firms which specialize in 
healthcare compensation issues, and others (Medical Economics, 2015). 
                                                 
7  CCGs are assured by NHS England, which retains responsibility for commissioning primary care 
services such as GP and dental services, as well as some specialised hospital services. Many GP services 




Capitation refers to a payment system which reimburses providers with a per patient 
lump sum payment under their supervision during a certain period (Jegers et al., 2002).8 
This mechanism has been widely used for the reimbursement of primary care providers 
if patients are to be enrolled. Capitation takes two major forms: list capitation and 
geographic capitation. The former payment ties the aggregate income of the provider to 
the number of patients enrolled under his/her care while the latter ties reimbursement to 
the population living within a particular geographical area (Andoh-Adjei et al., 2016). 
Capitation incentivises profit-driven providers to reduce costs as the latter would not be 
rewarded additionally when a patient seeks care several times during a given period. 
Moreover, capitation motivates providers to pay attention to health literacy to keep their 
enrolees healthy in order to save costs (Andoh-Adjei et al., 2016). Some evidence 
suggests that blending capitation and fee-for-service payment is effective in eliminating 
the supplier-induced demand associated with fee-for-service (Rosen, 1989; Rudmik et 
al., 2014). By using capitation, the payers of health care services also have the benefit 
of knowing their budgets in advance. However, the capitation rate has to be risk-adjusted, 
at least by age and sex, as providers have an incentive to provide less care for perceived 
risk groups on their list (Park et al., 2007).  
Capitation has been widely used in developed countries but with variations. In the UK, 
GP practices are paid by a mixed system with the weighted capitation the largest element 
(52%), a significant pay-for-performance (14%) and some fee-for-service (Marshall et 
al., 2014). The capitation rate in this mixed payment is calculated by applying a full risk-
adjustment formula (Andoh-Adjei et al., 2016). In Spain, GPs receive a fixed salary and 
a capitation payment. The capitation rate depends either on the age of patients enrol or 
the nature of the population in the service area (e.g. the share of population over 65s). 
In countries that mainly pay primary or ambulatory care providers on a fee-for-service 
basis (the US, Germany, Canada, France), there have also been small shifts toward 
capitation payments (Stabile et al., 2013). In some other European countries such as 
Finland, Norway and Italy, primary care providers who were initially paid on the basis 
                                                 
8 In contrast to the expenditure cap imposed on an individual level, capitation does not restrict total 




of fee-for-service, have introduced a capitation in order to contain health expenditure 
and to reduce hospitals referrals (Park et al., 2007). In the US, capitation payments have 
been frequently used in both outpatient and inpatient care within the framework of 
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) or managed care plans (Carrin, 2012). In 
Canada Ontario, the ‘Primary Care Reform’ launched in late 1990s introduced a menu 
of primary care physician payments that has blended FFS, capitation and salary elements 
(Laberge et al., 2016).  
To summarize, all three cost-containing instruments have been widely used to align 
physicians’ incentives and control fast growing health spending. However, given the 
heterogeneous and complex nature of the healthcare market, comparing these 
instruments is difficult. In order to evaluate these methods, this thesis takes a 
representative form of publicly funded HI scheme from high-income countries and 
assumes that all physicians are paid on a FFS basis. Based on this setup, I compare the 
total welfare generated by introducing a simplified version of these instruments 
respectively. Specifically, I compare introducing per patient quantity rationing, per 
patient expenditure cap, and capitation. 
 
1.7 Thesis Outline 
This thesis investigates the design of an optimal primary care payment mechanism in 
the presence of moral hazard, adverse selection and altruistic providers. Specifically, I 
assume that physicians not only care about their financial returns, but also have concerns 
regarding their patients’ health benefits. This assumption has been used by Ellis and 
McGuire (1986), Ma (1998), Jack (2005), Choné and Ma (2011), Makris and Siciliani 
(2013), and Barham and Milliken (2015). I begin the analysis by providing a 
comprehensive review of the relevant literature. Next, in the presence of moral hazard 
and adverse selection, I investigate the design of an efficient health insurance scheme 
(HI) when physicians can select the quantity of medical service given one of the 
aforementioned cost control policies. I then extend the analysis to the design of efficient 
HI when physicians can also select patient numbers. Overall, this thesis enhances our 
understanding of how different types of physicians respond to changes in their financial 
remuneration, the exogenous factors (i.e. population ageing, technology improvement) 
and cost control policies. Moreover, it outlines the best adjustment plan of a welfare-
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maximizing health insurance scheme recalling current trends such as population ageing 
and technology advances. Finally, it provides a framework that can evaluate the 
performance of different cost control policies.   
Chapter 2 presents a comprehensive review of both theories and evidence relating to the 
design of optimal PCP payment schemes. The chapter aims to achieve four objectives. 
First, it provides an in-depth analysis of the similarities and differences between 
different moral hazard/adverse selection setups and their implications in relation to the 
design of PCP remuneration. I show that elements of an efficient PCP contract vary 
according to the models used, but the form of a contract (e.g. a menu or a single payment) 
remains unchanged. Second, since my formalisation of moral hazard and adverse 
selection shares similarities with these models, the literature review also establishes the 
context in which the analysis in the subsequent analysis is conducted. Third, it provides 
some empirical support for the theoretical results derived from my research. Finally, this 
literature survey points out some promising avenues for future research. 
Chapter 2 begins by reviewing the physician altruism model while highlighting the setup 
that will be used in the subsequent chapters. Next, an extensive review of the design of 
physician payment in the presence of moral hazard and/or adverse selection and key 
results is presented. I show that in an environment with moral hazard, the optimal 
payment is a single mixed system, and in an environment with adverse selection the 
optimal payment is often a contract menu. However, as the provision of a contract menu 
across physicians has been rarely supported in evidence, potential reasons that lead to 
this result are presented. This survey then considers the alternative, a blended single 
payment system and cost control policies. In particular, I review the impact of imposing 
quantity rationing, revenue cap or capitation on physicians paid on a fee-for-service 
system. Finally, empirical evidence relating to the aforementioned topics is provided. 
In Chapter 3, I present a stylised model in which altruistic physicians choose the quantity 
of medical services while a benevolent HI scheme select the fee-for-service price and 
insurance premium to maximize social well-being. This model attempts to capture the 
main difficulties in the design of an optimal payment scheme arising from the 
informational structure which characterises the primary healthcare environment. In this 
context, I derive the conditions which would characterize the constrained optimal HI 
scheme. Since the model is too demanding for a purely analytical inquiry (there are too 
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many variables in a non-linear system), the study proceeds by employing a numerical 
simulation. This simulation enables solving the constrained optimal price and insurance 
premium as a function of the system's exogenous parameters (i.e. the fraction of less 
healthy individuals, the factor of technology improvement.). As variations with respect 
to these parameters can be interpreted as the evolution of recent trends, I recommend the 
optimal adjustment in the HI scheme in accordance with these trends. Since the 
aforementioned trends drive health expenditure and further exacerbate resource 
allocation, I evaluate three potential cost-control methods: (1) a per patient quantity 
restriction; (2) a per patient expenditure cap; and (3) a capitation. I show that all of these 
instruments can be used to enhance efficiency while mixing fee-for-service with a 
capitation that does not fully cover per patient a fixed cost which dominates other 
instruments. 
In Chapter 4, I adjust the model presented in Chapter 3 by allowing physicians to choose 
the total number of patients. This feature is particularly prevalent in a healthcare system 
experiencing shortages of PCPs and difficulties recruiting new medical staff. I follow 
the approach developed in Chapter 3, that is, I characterize physicians’ decision 
regarding their practice sizes and service quantity as a function of price, capitation and 
exogenous parameters. Next, I derive the efficient but constrained pricing system given 
that the entire population has access. After that, I analyse the impact of introducing 
different cost control policies by employing a numerical simulation. Finally, I derive 
policy implication for the optimal design of PCP remuneration scheme and discuss 
intuitions. 
Chapter 5 summarizes key results of the thesis and discusses the contributions of 
theoretical models in the contexts of the wider literature. Moreover, it presents some 
limitations associated with my setups and outlines some possible alternative modelling 







Chapter 2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In the field of healthcare, ethical considerations are omnipresent (Batifourlier and Da 
Silva, 2014). Every medical-related profession has a system of morality supported by a 
“code of deontology”. For example, the American Medical Association’s Code of 
Medical Ethics stipulates the ethical attitude to be followed with a “Council of the Order” 
to enforce it (Batifourlier and Da Silva, 2014, p.241), while the “Hippocratic Oath” 
commits physicians to provide ‘appropriate’ amounts of care (Woodward and Warren-
Boulton, 1984). Medical ethical values such as beneficence, non-maleficence, justice 
and respect for autonomy induce special responsibilities for professionals (Gillon, 1994). 
Moreover, research reflects a strong belief that physicians perform ethically in their daily 
work (Glannon and Ross 2002). 
Given that medical ethics is an essential coordinating factor, it has to be included in 
standard health economics. To introduce professional ethics within the frontiers 
demarcated by economic rationality, economists have confined the professional ethics 
of doctors to economic calculus as this allows one to explain ethics using tools of 
mainstream economic theory. The ethical attitude of a doctor is thus formalised in terms 
of “medical altruism”. This concept is designed to consider the values of doctors by 
assuming that the paradigm of homo econmicus is a sufficient starting point (although it 
may have to be modified) (Batifourlier and Da Silva, 2014). These values are 
incorporated through the concept of utility. The individual is endowed with classic 
individual preferences to which are added social preferences. Drawing on the traditional 
definition of altruism in mainstream economics which is advocated by Harsanyi (1955), 
medical altruism is defined as the inclusion of the patient’s welfare in the doctor’s utility 
function. This representation of altruism consists of an internalisation of the patient’s 
utility function (or a proxy such as health status or income) into that of the doctor. An 
altruistic doctor remains a utility maximiser, whose utility function includes the well-
being of the patient (Batifourlier and Da Silva, 2014, p. 242). 
The aforementioned framework of physician altruism has been frequently applied in 
understanding physician behaviour and decision making (e.g. Chalkley and Malcomson, 
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1998b; Choné and Ma, 2011; Ellis and McGuire, 1986; Farley, 1986; Jack, 2005; 
Woodward and Warren-Boulton, 1984), which has a central and noble tradition in health 
economics (Galizzi et al., 2015). One of the significant topics here is the design of 
remuneration for primary care providers. In the healthcare market, physician payment 
systems are often designed by health authorities to influence doctors’ incentives for 
allocating health resources. Accordingly, it is important to investigate the impact of each 
payment on the behaviour of physicians and the optimal combination of physician 
payment mechanisms. The purpose of this chapter is to offer a survey of a particular 
subset of this literature. Specifically, I review optimal incentive contracting for altruistic 
healthcare providers in an environment with moral hazard or adverse selection. These 
information asymmetries are popular in healthcare markets and drive different types of 
health resource allocation inefficiencies (McGuire, 2000).  
The first type of information difficulty relates to moral hazard. In the contract theory 
literature, there is a wealth of theories that economic agents take non-verifiable actions 
after contracting (Laffont and Martimort, 2002b; Nyman, 1999; Rowell and Connelly, 
2012; Smelser and Baltes, 2001). In the current context (i.e. a publicly funded health 
system), the health care provider is the agent while the principal is some body of the 
state (e.g. the Centres for Medicare and Medicaid Service in United States, or Ministries 
of Health in Canada and the UK). Moral hazard, therefore, refers to a situation whereby 
the actions of physicians are difficult to write down in a complete contract. For instance, 
Ma (1994) has pointed out that neither the efforts of a physician to keep costs down nor 
the medical service quality they provide can be easily monitored. Moreover, patients’ 
ultimate health can be affected by many random factors such as hygiene conditions, food 
consumed after their treatments etc. As a result, a physician’s performance measuring 
by total health benefits generated for his patients is also non-contractible. In the presence 
of moral hazard, standard contract theory suggests that the regulator faces many different 
types of trade-offs that prevents allocating resources efficiently (Demougin and Fluet, 
2001). These trade-offs include rent vs. efficiency (Demougin and Fluet, 1998, 2001), 
risk premium vs. efficiency (Holmström, 1979), and multi-tasking (Baker et al., 1994; 
Baker, 2002). For the sake of parsimony, I will only discuss rent vs. efficiency trade-off 
in the following chapters.  
The second type of information asymmetry is adverse selection, referring to a situation 
where some partners in a contract have information about a given characteristic that is 
20 
 
already known to them prior to contracting with other partners (Milgrom, 1987). In the 
current context, it describes a situation where some specific characteristics (i.e. ability, 
background and experience) of a healthcare provider are unknown. Chalkley and 
Malcomson (2002) claim that the regulator could not observe a patient’s severity of 
illness and the associated costs that might be incurred. Choné and Ma (2011), on the 
other hand, assume the physician has private information about his degree of concern 
for his patients. Allard et al. (2014) also state that physicians have unknown and 
heterogeneous abilities in terms of curing patients. In presence of adverse selection 
(hidden information), conventional studies suggest it is natural to propose a menu of 
physician remuneration schemes. However, using a menu of physician payment systems 
may distort some physicians’ quantities of service provided while leaving other 
physicians informational rents (Hart and Holmstrm, 1986; Laffont and Martimort, 2002a; 
Laffont and Tirole, 1986, 1993). Furthermore, the utilization of a menu of remuneration 
schemes may incentivise the health care authority to renegotiate the contract with 
respective types of physicians, as the latter would reveal their private information (i.e. 
their types) when selecting their contracts before providing health services (Demougin, 
1989; Maskin and Moore, 1999). 
Finally, I review information asymmetry which is comprised of both moral hazard and 
adverse selection. Since this information asymmetry is comprised of the previous two, 
the regulator may encounter all problems discussed above in the design of physician 
payment. The number of studies analysed incentive contracting in the presence of this 
information asymmetry has grown significantly over the past 40 years (Maréchal and 
Thomas, 2018). In relation to health economics, while the number of publications 
investigating this issue is small, it is still increasing (Barham and Milliken, 2015). For 
instance, Jack (2005) assumes that both physician altruism and their cost-reduction 
efforts are unknown whereas Kantarevic and Kralj (2016) regard physicians’ quality-
enhancing efforts and marginal costs of production as their private information. 
Moreover, Wu et al. (2018) assume physicians have unknown and heterogeneous 
abilities of curing patients while exerting non-contractible effort per patient (i.e. the 
proxy can be time spent or costly mental and manual work). 
It has been widely recognised that information asymmetries among regulators, providers 
and patients contribute to healthcare market failure and healthcare provision inefficiency 
(Tan, 2018). Furthermore, altruistic preferences of the physician, the information 
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advantages of the provider and the incentive offered by traditional payment systems 
have resulted in supplier-induced demand (Léger, 2008). Hence, this survey further 
reviews how cost-control instruments affect physicians’ behaviours and how the design 
of provider payment should be adjusted. 
In short, this chapter surveys how the design of primary care providers’ (i.e. physicians 
or abstract GP practices) incentive contracting has been affected by altruistic preferences, 
information asymmetries, and cost control policies. Besides discussing the theoretical 
findings, a wide variety of evidences show physicians care about their patients’ benefits 
(e.g. Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011; Hennig-Schmidt and Wiesen, 2014). For instance, 
empirical studies, including surveys, field studies and laboratory experiments have 
shown that physicians’ trade off patients’ health benefits and their financial income in 
the provision of medical service (e.g. Godager and Wiesen, 2011; Galizzi et al., 2015). 
These studies provide a basis for introducing altruistic preference in the analytical 
framework. Moreover, empirical observations of physicians’ response to different 
payment system and cost control policies are presented. The main purpose of reviewing 
this empirical literature is to highlight areas of similarities and departures among real 
world observations, assumptions and theoretical predictions. 
The chapter is organised as two distinctive section: Theory (Section 2.2) and Evidence 
(Section 2.3). The theoretical literature presented in Section 2.2 comprise three main 
streams; firstly, physician altruism is discussed in Section 2.2.1. Specifically, Section 
2.2.1.1 defines physician altruism and discusses the similarities and differences between 
altruism another related concept intrinsic motivation. Section 2.2.1.2 then presents the 
model of altruistic preferences and intrinsic motivation.  
Secondly, the optimal design of incentive contracting for physicians with altruistic 
preferences is discussed in Section 2.2.2. I begin with reviewing the physician payment 
design under complete information and the implications of altruism variations in Section 
2.2.2.1. Next, I extend the review to an environment with moral hazard (Section 2.2.2.2) 
and adverse selection (Section 2.2.2.3) respectively. In particular, I outline Barham and 
Milliken’s (2015) model and highlight some potential extensions. In Section 2.2.2.4, I 
discussed studies investigating physician incentive contracting when moral hazard and 
adverse selection co-exist. 
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Thirdly, Section 2.2.3 examines the impact of imposing different types of cost-control 
instruments on a fee-for-service system. To do this, I present different types of cost 
control policies and report their respective impacts on improving patients’ well-being as 
well as reducing total health expenditure. Moreover, I discuss the impact of introducing 
altruistic preferences on both physician behaviour and the implementation of cost 
control policies. I conclude this section by relating different setups used in this chapter 
and highlighting their major similarities and differences. Finally, Section 2.2.4 
summarize the main results, highlight similarities and differences between setups and 
addresses gaps. 
Section 2.3 reviews evidence relating to the design of the optimal physician payment. 
This strand of the literature is markedly less developed and has, in some cases, failed to 
maintain pace with the increasing theoretical interest in this research area. For instance, 
while the optimal forms of physician remuneration have been derived in many 
theoretical analyses, these results are rarely supported by real life observations. In 
Section 2.3.1, I provide different types of empirical analysis supporting the existence of 
medical altruism, including surveys (2.3.1.1), prescription records (2.3.1.2), field works 
(2.3.1.3) and laboratorial experiments (2.3.1.4). The next section, 2.3.2, compares 
observations of physicians’ decisions on medical service supply under fee-for-service 
and capitation. This is then followed by Section 2.3.3, which examines the evidence 
relating to the impact of imposing different cost control policies on a fee-for-service 
system. These policies include quantity rationing (Section 2.3.3.1) and revenue 
restriction (Section 2.3.3.2) 
In Section 2.4, I complete this review by linking the respective topics reviewed together, 
discussing the key results, highlighting major inconsistencies and offering some 
thoughts on future directions. First, this survey addresses differences in the design of the 
optimal agent incentive contracting between standard contract theory and health 
economics. Second, while the literature comparing physician behaviour under 
commonly used payment systems (e.g. a lump-sum transfer, fee-for-service, capitation) 
is well-established (McGuire, 2000; Léger, 2008), the commonly used single payment 
system fails to induce efficient healthcare provision in the presence of heterogeneous 
types of physicians and patients. This literature considers the main characteristics of 
healthcare markets, while the impact of using alternative approaches to modelling moral 
hazard or adverse selection have not been discussed. Moreover, the possibility of 
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imposing cost-control instruments and their impact on the design of an optimal form of 
payment under information asymmetry has been ignored. Third, there is a relatively 
small literature exploring the impact of introducing cost instruments on physicians’ 
behaviour under the fee-for-service payment system. However, studies on this topic 
often ignore some of the main features observed in the healthcare market; regulators, 
physicians and patients do not share information. In addition, healthcare providers are 
partially motivated by their patients’ well-being while restricted by non-negative profits. 
The aforementioned inconsistencies underline the need to construct a more sophisticated 
analytical framework to understand the impact of using respective physician cost control 
policies and therefore the optimal design of physician remuneration. This will be a 
central theme of this thesis and the motivation for the theoretical models outlined in 
Chapters 3 and 4. Overall, this literature review examines studies which discuss the 
design of optimal payment for primary care providers in the presence of moral hazard, 
adverse selection and medical altruism.  
While the majority of the existing literature is covered, the survey is not intended to be 
exhaustive as some papers that partially cover the aforementioned topics have been 
excluded. First, there are a large number of studies which analyse conceptualizations 
and empirical findings related to the notion of provider altruism. However, my review 
only covers theories and evidence in the context of health economics while research on 
other contexts is generally excluded. Second, while there is a rich and sophisticated 
literature discussing incentive contracting in the presence of different types of 
information asymmetry, this survey only includes healthcare studies which investigate 
payment design in a simplified environment where moral hazard, adverse selection and 
altruistic providers are present. Finally, there is a well-established literature studying the 
effect of introducing global budgets on physician behaviour in a fee-for-service system. 
In this survey I focus on reviewing the literature which uses setups to compare quantity 
restriction and budget. In particular, I only include evidence focussed on examining the 
effects of imposing quantity or revenue restriction at an individual level.  
 
2.2 Theory 
2.2.1 Altruism in Health Economics 
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2.2.1.1 Physician Altruism and Intrinsic Motivation 
As discussed in the introduction of this chapter, altruism has been believed to be an 
integral factor in medical professionalism (e.g. moral obligation) and has been applied 
operationally to the specific case of healthcare providers (Harris, 2018). Since Arrow 
(1963) which stressed that uncertainty and altruistic behaviour are two important aspects 
in the organization of healthcare (Martinsson and Persson, 2019), it has become popular 
to include patients’ welfare as an argument in a doctor’s utility function on the basis that 
the physician has an altruistic concern for the patient’s health and well-being (Farley, 
1986; Woodward and Warren-Boulton, 1984). In a more recent review of the 
conceptualizations and empirical findings related to altruistic preferences, physician 
altruism is defined as “the weight in the doctor’s utility function attached to the benefit 
of the patient’s health, besides the self-interested monetary considerations” (Galizzi et 
al., 2015, p. 3). This definition has been widely applied in the literature studying 
physician behaviour and physician incentive contracting while the degree of physician 
altruism has been measured in recent empirical studies (Brosig-Koch et al., 2016; 
Godager and Wiesen, 2013; Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011). In addition, the important 
roles that altruism plays make it an essential element in my subsequent analytical 
framework. 
In the parallel stream of the health economics literature, physicians are assumed to be 
intrinsically motivated, in which case they perform an activity for no purpose other than 
the activity itself (Galizzi et al., 2015). To illustrate this, a physician may be interested 
in providing a high-quality health service due to professional ambition and not because 
of her concern for patient welfare. Hence, Galizzi et al. (2015) concluded in their review 
that such intrinsic motivation is conceptually distinct but commonly associated with 
altruism (p. 17). Studies in this strand of the literature focus mainly on measuring the 
extent of intrinsic motivation or examining whether the introduction of financial 
incentives leads to the crowding out of intrinsic motivation (Galizzi et al., 2015; Sicsic 
et al., 2012). While discussing this crowding out effect is not the focus of my literature 
survey, physicians’ intrinsic motivation and altruism respectively has been used 
interchangeably in much of the literature (e.g. Ellis and McGuire, 1986; Ma, 1997; 
Chalkey and Malcomson, 1998; Jack, 2005). In the following section, I highlight the 
similarities and differences of modelling these concepts while selecting the modelling 
approach to follow in the Chapters 3 and 4. 
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2.2.1.2 Models of physician altruism and intrinsic motivation 
Ellis and McGuire (1986) were among the first to formalize the idea of physician 
altruism. They analysed the service supply decision of a doctor acting as an agent for 
both a patient and a hospital. The physician internalizes the external effect of his decision 
based on the hospital’s profit and the patient’s health. He cares about the profit of the 
hospital as his remuneration is positively related to the hospital’s income. Formally, Ellis 
and McGuire use 𝑈(𝐵(𝑞), 𝜋(𝑞)) as the utility function of the physician, where 𝜋(𝑞) 
represents the profit of the hospital and 𝐵(𝑞)  his patient’s benefit. The variable 𝑞 
measures the service provided to the patient during a hospital episode. In other studies, 
this variable also refers to the quality of health service provided (see, Ma, 1998; Kaarboe 
and Siciliani, 2011; Barham and Milliken, 2015). The authors also assume patients are 
fully insured, indicating that they passively accept the quantity of medical service 
provided by the doctor. Physician altruism is then defined as the doctor’s marginal rate 






As it measures the amount of profit the physician is willing to give up for a marginal 
increase in the consumer’s benefit, keeping the same level of utility.9 
Later studies studying the impact of altruism in healthcare have used this model but also 
deploy a linear and separable form of the physician’s utility function (e.g. Barham and 
Milliken, 2015; Godager and Wiesen, 2013; Makris and Siciliani, 2013). 
 𝑈 = 𝜋(𝑞) + 𝛼𝐵(𝑞) (2) 
where (𝑞) = 𝑅(𝑞) − 𝐶(𝑞). 𝑅 and 𝐶 refer to the provider's revenue and costs while the 
parameter 𝛼 ≥ 0 measures the degree of physician altruism towards his patient’s well-
being. This function is a particular form of utility function used by Ellis and McGuire 
(1986). Alternatively, Chalkley and Malcomson (1998a) as well as Jack (2005) apply 
the physician’s utility function: 
 𝑢 = 𝜋 + 𝜑(𝑞) (3) 
                                                 
9 Clearly, assuming the hospital’s profit and the health benefits provided to the patient are goods for the 
physician is natural (Ellis and McGuire, 1986). 
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where 𝑞 is either health service quality or quantity and 𝜑(𝑞) the patient’s benefit as well 
as other elements. For example, it can be also interpreted as the level of a physician’s 
intrinsic motivation as the term 𝜑(𝑞) can be interpreted as the physician’s private value 
regarding the high-quality production of healthcare or any other utility obtained by 
providing medical services such as warm glow benefits derived from treating patients. 
As a result, the utility function (3) is more general than the linear utility function (2) 
with the altruistic component.  
Many observers have also noted that physicians have an interest improving their patients’ 
health (Godager and Wiesen, 2013; Galizzi et al., 2015). Hence, this thesis has followed 
the aforementioned literature, assuming part of physicians’ well-being is derived from 
improving their patients’ health benefits. Accordingly, the equation (2) is used as the 
physician’s utility function in my research while the physician altruism 𝛼 measures the 
marginal rate of substitution between the physician’s profit and his patients’ welfare.  
 
2.2.2 The Optimal Payment for Altruistic Physicians 
2.2.2.1 Optimal Physician Payment with Complete Information 
The benchmark physician incentive contracting model (Ellis and McGuire, 1986) 
features a doctor who is hired as an agent for a hospital to decide the quantity of service 
𝑞 to be provided in return for his financial income 𝑅 and the altruistic benefits 𝛼𝐵(𝑞) 
from serving patients. The doctor’s preferences in terms of his payment and altruistic 
benefits can therefore be expressed as a separable utility function  𝑈(𝑞) = 𝛼𝐵(𝑞) +
𝜋(𝑞) and 𝜋(𝑞) = 𝑅(𝑞) − 𝑐𝑞, where 𝛼 and 𝑐 represents the doctor’s degree of altruism 
and the marginal costs of providing medical service respectively. For the patient, he is 
fully insured, passive and his total benefits from health treatment 𝐵(𝑞) are assumed to 
be inversely 𝑈-shaped.10The social optimal quantity 𝑞∗  is defined implicitly by the 
equation: 
 𝐵′(𝑞) − 𝑐 = 0 (4) 
                                                 
10 Patients’ total health benefits would fall after being provided with a certain level of service, both 
because of “the time-price of receiving treatment and because of the risk of infection and other iatrogenic 
illness associated with a continued hospital stay” (Ellis and McGuire, 1986 p.132). 
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This means that the marginal benefit of providing medical service in the economy should 
be equal to the marginal cost. Since the quantity of medical service provided by the 
doctor 𝑞𝑚 is implicitly defined by the equation: 
 𝛼𝐵′(𝑞) + 𝑅′(𝑞) − 𝑐 = 0 (5) 
the cost-based payment such as full cost reimbursement (i.e.𝑅(𝑞) = 𝑐𝑞) or fee-for-
service payment (i.e.𝑅(𝑞) = 𝑝𝑞) with 𝑝 > 𝑐 indicates the service provided by the doctor 
satisfies: 
 𝐵′(𝑞𝑚) ≤ 0 < 𝑐 (6) 
The concavity of the health benefit function 𝐵(𝑞) therefore implies 𝑞𝑚 > 𝑞
∗. That is, 
the physician under the full cost reimbursement or fee-for-service system (with 𝑝 > 𝑐) 
overproduces.  
Under the fully prospective payment (i.e. 𝑅(𝑞) = 𝑇, 𝑅′(𝑞) = 0), the quantity of health 
service provided by the doctor 𝑞𝑚 is implicitly defined by: 
 𝛼𝐵′(𝑞) − 𝑐 = 0 (7) 
This equation implies that the fully prospective payment would be optimal if the 
physician trades off his net financial returns and the patient’s benefit in the same way 
the social planner does (i.e. the physician becomes a “perfect agent” with the degree of 
altruism 𝛼 = 1). Since the physician typically places a smaller weight (𝛼 < 1) on the 
health of patients than the social planner, it is natural to observe the physician under-
produce (𝑞𝑚 < 𝑞
∗.) as 𝐵′(𝑞𝑚) =
𝑐
𝛼
> 𝑐. As this study assumes a one-to-one relationship 
between costs and medical service quantity/quality (i.e.   𝑞𝑚  is a function of  𝑐 ), the 
physician’s under-provision can therefore be fixed by paying a fraction 𝑟 of incurred 
costs. In this case, the quantity of service provided by the physician 𝑞𝑀 is implicitly 
defined by: 
 𝛼𝐵′(𝑞) − (1 − 𝑟)𝑐 = 0 (8) 
To get  𝑞𝑀 = 𝑞
∗ , we require 𝐵′(𝑞) = 𝑐  which implies the cost reimbursement rate 
should be set at 𝑟∗ = 1 − 𝛼. Clearly, the optimal cost reimbursement rate reduces with 
the level of physician altruism. Intuitively, the physician increases both his supply of 
medical service with his degree of altruism and the cost reimbursed by the regulator 
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respectively. Hence, the degree of altruism and 𝛼  the cost-sharing rate 𝑟  are perfect 
substitutes in terms of inducing the physician’s production. Accordingly, the more 
altruistic or intrinsically motivated the physician is, the less financial or extrinsic reward 
is needed. Further, the authors extend the model and show that blending prospective and 
cost reimbursement payment also helps to reduce low-value admissions, patients’ 
reclassification and providers’ financial risk.  
While the authors assert that the mixed reimbursement system is optimal, this conclusion 
relies heavily on some of the assumptions imposed above. For instance, efficiency in 
their model is defined as a medical service quantity that equalizes marginal social 
benefits and marginal costs. In other words, Ellis and McGuire implicitly assumes 
patients’ total healthcare expenditure equals physicians’ total income. However, as 
Laffont and Tirole (1986) pointed out, collecting premiums is costly. As a result, the 
current mixed system may become inefficient when the shadow costs of collecting 
patients’ payment are introduced.  
Other important assumptions are that the marginal cost is constant and total costs are 
contractible. Hence, there exists a one-to-one relationship between cost reimbursement 
and quantity. If the physician’s costs are non-contractible, then the optimal form of 
payment has to be based on the physician’s actions that can be monitored. For instance, 
the regulator may consider blending prospective payment with fee-for-service rather 
than cost-sharing when only the quantity of medical service provided can be observed. 
Moreover, if physician heterogeneity is also considered, offering physicians a menu of 
contracts or introducing additional cost-control instruments might be a better option. 
Finally, the inversely U-shaped health benefit function 𝐵(𝑞) implies that the optimal 
level of healthcare provided to a patient is given exogenous. Endogenizing the level of 
the patient’s treatment may affect the social optimal level of healthcare required as well 
as the optimal contract offered to physicians. For instance, Ellis and McGuire (1990) 
find that the optimal payment for the physician depends on: (1) the bargaining power of 
the patient; (2) the patient risk preference; and (3) the degree of moral hazard. Lee (1995) 
also shows that the rates of a physician’s and a patient’s cost sharing have to be properly 
interrelated to induce the efficient provision of medical service. Later studies extend the 
model of Ellis and McGuire (1986) by relaxing some of the aforementioned assumptions 
in an environment where physicians’ characteristics or their actions are non-contractible. 
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Physicians make final decisions in relation to diagnosing illness, prescribing medicines, 
performing surgeries and so on. As they are at least partially self-interested and therefore 
have an incentive to improve their monetary payoff, compensation rules play a key role 
in inducing physicians to provide appropriate treatments. The design of optimal 
compensation depends on how much the regulator knows about the providers. As 
discussed in Section 2.1, the main information issues between the health authority and 
providers include: (1) moral hazard; (2) adverse selection; and (3) moral hazard and 
adverse selection. In the succeeding review, I divide all studies according to these three 
types of information asymmetries while examining their models. In addition, I address 
the assumptions that may change their results. Specifically, I explain the model and 
summarize the main results of each individual study. This is followed by an explanation 
of how these studies developed from each other. Finally, I discuss some gaps that these 
studies have not paid attention to. 
 
2.2.2.2 Optimal Physician Payment with Moral Hazard 
In this subsection, I review incentive contracting for an altruistic provider in the presence 
of moral hazard only. Rogerson (1994) has explored the optimal price regulation 
imposed on an altruistic healthcare provider (i.e. a non-profit hospital) in an environment 
where the provider’s service intensity cannot be observed by the regulator but can be 
seen by patients. In his model, the payer (a government or the private insurer) selects a 
price paid per patient treated in order to maximize social health benefits net of his 
payments. Next, the healthcare provider chooses a treatment intensity/quality (i.e. the 
level of resources a provider employs to treat a specific illness) to maximize patients’ 
health benefits subject to the constraint of non-negative profit. Finally, patients select a 
level of demand for the provider’s product,11 which increases with the service quality 
provided by the healthcare provider. Except for non-contractible medical service quality, 
the payer has both complete and symmetric information for all aspects.  
Rogerson shows that the regulator can use fixed price contracts12 to achieve the efficient 
provision of quality/intensity as long as patients can observe quality and use this to 
                                                 
11 Patients are assumed to be fully insured so that price does not affect demand. 
12 Fixed price contracts refer to the reimbursement that the regulator pays the healthcare provider, namely 
a fixed amount of money per treated individual. 
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choose whether or where they are to be treated. The intuition is that the regulator can 
observe patients’ demand and there is a positive demand response from care quality. 
Hence, by manipulation of the price paid per patient, the regulator can induce the 
efficient provision of quality.   
Ma (1998) compares alternative types of efforts induced by fixed-price and retrospective 
cost-based contracts. Specifically, he has adopted a multi-task agency approach13 where 
the regulator selects a payment policy to maximize social welfare measured by the sum 
of patients’ benefits net of total cost of production. The altruistic provider subsequently 
allocates his non-contractible efforts between (1) quality enhancement and (2) cost 
reduction. Similar to Rogerson (1994), quality is assumed to be a single dimension, 
cannot be contracted upon, and drives patient demand. Moreover, the healthcare 
provider has to meet all patient demands and his profit is assumed to be non-negative. 
The only difference, however, is that total costs of treatment are assumed to be verifiable 
ex-post.  
Based on this model, Ma (1998) shows that first best cost reduction and quality 
enhancing efforts can be induced by using a fixed price contract. Intuitively, the provider 
fully internalizes all production costs under the fixed payment contract, therefore the 
price can be selected to fully internalize the benefits of improving quality (Ma, 1994). 
In contrast, cost reimbursement provides no cost-reduction incentives but induces a 
constrained optimal level of quality efforts. Ma (1998) also shows that, when the 
provider’s profit is positive, the optimal price, the margin (i.e. the payment in addition 
to reimbursement of the provider’s costs) and the provider’s profit decreases with the 
degree of the provider’s altruism. When the provider’s profit is binding at zero, the price 
and the margin does not change in line with the level of physician altruism. Finally, 
when the provider is allowed to refuse patients, the optimal payment system should 
blend both prospective payment and cost reimbursement. 
Chalkley and Malcomson (1998b) find that the results from the previous two studies are 
satisfied only when quality has only a single dimension and it is efficient to treat all 
patients who demand treatment. The main departure from the previous model is that the 
healthcare provider can additionally select the number of patients to be treated, which 
differs from the number of patients demanding health service and the provider’s 
                                                 
13 To be clear, ‘multi-task’ means that the physician has to enhance quality and to reduce costs. 
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maximum capacity. When it is inefficient or impossible to treat all patients demanding 
medical service,14 they show that a price-quantity schedule15 induces a provider either 
to attract too many patients or to provide too low quality. This is because the fixed price 
contract which induces efficient quality would make the number of patients demanding 
treatment greater than either the efficient number of patients that can be treated or the 
provider’s maximum capacity. However, this inefficiency can be improved by 
introducing a payment based on a measure of patient demand, whenever such a measure 
is available. Further, they show that this result extends to any number of dimensions of 
quality when patients’ relative valuations of the different dimensions of quality are the 
same as the regulator’s (Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998a). 
Chalkley and Malcomson (1998a) further explore the case in which patient demand does 
not reflect quality.16 They show that a prospective payment will induce an optimal cost 
reducing effort while resulting in a sub-optimal level of quality if the provider places 
less than full weight on patients’ well-being. Hence, they find that adding a cost sharing 
component to a prospective payment system will improve efficiency. While introducing 
cost sharing has the positive impact of enhancing quality and the negative impact of 
raising costs, the former impact dominates the latter. In addition, they find that the 
optimal cost-sharing rate decreases in line with the degree of the provider’s benevolence, 
as the provider’s extrinsic motivation is substituted by his intrinsic concern for patients. 
Finally, as the provider’s total production costs in Chalkley and Malcomson (1998a) 
depends on the number of patients treated, the service quality provided and the cost 
reduction effort exerted, the one-to-one relationship between costs and quality does not 
hold. Hence, subsidizing costs is no longer a perfect substitute for subsidizing quality, 
thus, the corrective subsidy inherent in Ellis and McGuire’s (1986) cost sharing rule 
would not result in first-best efficiency.  
The previous three studies show that when the provider’s action(s) are unverifiable, cost 
reimbursement would induce the provider exert the lowest cost-reducing effort but 
provide a constrained optimal level of quality whereas prospective payment would 
induce the provider to offer the first-best cost reducing effort. Moreover, the provider 
                                                 
14 Hospitals are constrained by limited capacity for certain treatments or patients often do not pay full cost 
of treatment.  
15 Quantity in their paper refers to the number of patients who received medical treatment. 
16 Patients may not be aware of all aspects of the quality of service or may not know about the medical 
implications for their treatment (Arrow, 1963). 
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would improve service quality as they receive more reimbursement (i.e. get higher price 
per treatment or take lower cost sharing rate). The optimal contract for a partially 
benevolent provider is a prospective or mixed payment; the former induces first-best 
level of efforts when it is efficient to treat all patients demanding healthcare and patient 
demand reflects quality (e.g. Ma, 1998). The latter, however, becomes optimal when the 
quality is multi-dimensional; it is not able to treat all patients demanding healthcare 
(Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998b); patient demands does not reflect quality (Chalkley 
and Malcomson, 1998a) etc. The size of the cost reimbursement employed in the blended 
payment depends on the extent to which the provider values consumer benefits. In 
contrast to the standard contract theory literature, these studies analyse the effect of 
physician concerns for patients in the design of physician payment while comparing the 
physician’s efforts under prospective payment and cost-reimbursement. 
In reviewing the above studies, it is worth paying attention to the following aspects. First, 
the moral hazard problem of the physician could be modelled in different ways. In 
addition to non-contractible physician efforts, the health benefits that the physician 
generates for his patients are difficult to measure as a patient’s health after treatment can 
be affected by many factors such as his hygiene conditions or food consumed. These 
factors could be interpreted as the random shocks associated with the patient’s health, 
as shown in Kantarevic and Kralj (2016). The moral hazard problem can also be 
motivated by patients’ unknown severities of illness. Since neither the regulator nor 
patients have sufficient knowledge about their health, whether physicians produce 
appropriately could not be determined, even if the quantity of service provided is 
verifiable. 
Second, the above studies assume that the physician’s costs incurred can be verified, 
therefore cost-sharing is one of the recommended remuneration instruments. In reality, 
cost-sharing contracts have been used rarely and may lead to the problem of cost padding 
(i.e. charging non-allowable expenditures or costs for some patients). To avoid cost 
padding, the regulator has to monitor the physician’s costs sufficiently closely, which 
might be very expensive (Chalkey and Macomson, 2002). As implementing cost-sharing 
is problematic, the regulator often considers substituting cost-sharing by other 
remuneration instruments such as fee-for-service (Allard et al., 2014). Finally, and as 
will be discussed in the following review, the above studies do not discuss the optimal 
design of physicians’ contract in the presence of unknown heterogeneities. 
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2.2.2.3 Optimal Physician Payment with Adverse Selection 
More recent studies have considered adverse selection frameworks that focus on 
unobserved heterogeneity among physicians (i.e. ability, altruism, efficiency) or patients 
(i.e. severity of illness) (e.g. Chalkley and Malcomson, 2002; Choné and Ma, 2011; Liu 
and Ma, 2013). These studies can be divided into two categories: the first category 
examines the adverse selection between patient and regulator, in particular for the case 
that the former’s characteristics are unknown to the latter. The second category, which 
my research is closely related to, analyses adverse selection between provider and 
regulator mainly for the case that the provider’s characteristics could not be observed by 
the regulator. 
 
Patient type is unknown 
Chalkley and Malcomson (2002) analyse the optimal design of a remuneration scheme 
for each healthcare provider who performs non-contractible cost-reduction efforts and 
treats a patient with unknown health. The cost incurred by the patient is verifiable ex-
post and decreases with the provider’s effort as well as the patient’s initial health. Based 
on this model, Chalkley and Malcomson show that the regulator can reduce total 
expected payment to healthcare providers by introducing in the fixed price payment 
system a proportion of the realized costs when there are substantial variations in the cost 
of patient treatment unknown to the regulator. This contract reduces total expenditure 
since low cost patients would receive less reimbursement so that the supplier has lower 
informational rent. However, in reality cost-sharing requires a close monitoring of the 
provider’s production while the associated costs may dominate savings derived from the 
reduction of informational rent. As a result, cost sharing contracts are not frequently 
used in reality as the theory predicted. While Chalkley and Malcomson consider 
unknown heterogeneity among patients, it can be also regarded as modelling unknown 
heterogeneity among providers. To illustrate, the provider who is allocated a patient with 
high (or low) costs can be considered as the “high (low) costs” provider while the 
optimal contract is a menu with the cost reimbursement rate positively related to the 
actual costs incurred as shown in Laffont and Tirole (1993).  
Choné and Ma (2011) study the effect of unknown and heterogeneous physician altruism 
as well as patient health benefit on the design of payment and healthcare quantity. In 
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their model, the physician’s provision of healthcare to each individual patient is 
constrained by a minimum profit restriction. They show that the optimal payment 
depends only on the weighting of physician agency and exhibits extensive pooling, with 
the quantity and payment provided being insensitive to physician altruism or consumer 
benefit. The choice of pooling is an outcome of a tension caused by incentive 
compatibility between quantities and non-negative profit.17 This tension, according to 
the authors, is caused by the patients’ unobserved heterogeneity. The optimal choice of 
pooling system has also been discussed by Liu and Ma (2013), Allard et al. (2014), and 
Burani and Palestini (2016) etc. In addition to the reason highlighted in Choné and Ma 
(2011), other reasons support offering a single payment system for all physicians, and 
will be discussed in this subsection’s summary (p.21). 
Liu and Ma (2013) also analyse the process of the decision-making delegation to 
altruistic physicians. Physicians are paid to match patients with different illness 
severities to different treatment protocols, specifying recovery probabilities and costs. 
As in Choné and Ma (2011), providers possess private information about their degree of 
altruism and the severity of patients’ illnesses while having a non-negative restriction 
on their expected profit. However, they further model insurance, consumer risk aversion, 
treatment plans (i.e. sequences of treatments) and plans commitment. If the physician 
can commit to treatment plans before learning about the severity of the patient’s illness, 
the authors show that the first best can be implemented via a single contract (optimal for 
the least altruistic providers) and applying to all types of altruistic physicians. Intuitively, 
physicians tend to select the more generous treatment plans, however, they would not 
choose these plans as their profit would otherwise become negative. If physicians cannot 
commit to treatment plans, all healthcare providers (except the least altruistic one) earn 
positive profit and treatment decisions are deviated from the first-best.  
The above two studies analyse how a payer who operates in a competitive market should 
design the optimal contract for a physician who needs to treat different types of patients. 
Therefore, it will be interesting to see how their results would change if different 
assumptions are imposed. For instance, they assume that the physician requires to earn 
a non-negative profit from treating each individual. However, the physician in reality 
                                                 
17  In an incentive compatible mechanism, quantities must be non-decreasing while profits are non-
increasing in the physician’s concern for patients. Setting quantities for a range of degree of physician 
altruism implies the corresponding profits are zero. 
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often needs to treat many patients and is more likely to be constrained by a non-negative 
expected profit from treating all of his patients. Next, while these studies analyse the 
physician’s incentive to contract in the presence of adverse selection, they ignore the 
issue of the physicians’ unknown actions. The payer in their study could also be a 
centralised but benevolent health authority (e.g. the healthcare financing system of the 
UK, Germany), which cares about both patients’ total benefits and healthcare providers’ 
financial returns. Finally, in the situation that an individual physician knows the degree 
of his altruism and patients’ health status before accepting a contract while not 
performing a sequence of non-contractible actions, he accepts or rejects the contract 
provided. As a result, commitment in Liu and Ma (2013) becomes irrelevant. 
 
The provider’s type is unknown 
De Fraja (2000) studies incentive contracting for healthcare providers with unknown 
and heterogeneous costs. Each contract specifies the number of cases that a provider is 
required to treat, the payment per case and a lump-sum reimbursement. The healthcare 
provider’s costs depend on two parameters: (1) the provider’s intrinsic efficiency and (2) 
the treated patients’ life expectancy. In her model, it is assumed that the above two 
parameters are distributed independently. Moreover, the provider’s costs decrease with 
his intrinsic efficiency and patients’ life expectancy. After observing the contract being 
provided, the provider selects the type and number of patients to be treated. 
De Fraja (2000) shows that the optimal remuneration is a menu of contracts which 
reduces the payment per case but raises lump-sum reimbursement in line with the 
provider’s costs. As the provider with relatively lower costs would dump less but treat 
more expensive patients. While De Fraja does not consider physician altruism, decisions 
(i.e. service quantity provided or the number of cases to be treated) made by the less or 
more costly provider is similar to the decision made by the more or less altruistic 
provider. 
Makris (2009) further extends the study of incentive contracting for health providers 
with unknown and heterogeneous costs by introducing physician altruism, which is 
assumed to be a common knowledge.18 In contrast to De Fraja (2000) in which the 
                                                 
18 The preferences of civil servants are often regarded in the literature as common knowledge (see Wilson, 
1989; Delfgaauw and Dur, 2007). 
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physician selects the number and the type of patients to be treated, the physician in this 
framework decides the level of a verifiable performance (i.e. the quantity of service 
provided to a patient with a known disease). Furthermore, the physician is wealth 
constrained so that his incurred costs have to be borne by the payer.  
The introduction of altruism reduces the low-cost provider’s incentive to over-report his 
type whereas the administrative constraint limits the high-cost provider’s incentive to 
under-report. As a result, the author shows that altruism weakly reduces the power of 
optimal incentives while determining the type of equilibrium emerges; when the level 
of physician altruism is low, the health service quantity provided by the efficient (low-
cost) and inefficient (high-cost) provider is distorted upwards and downwards 
respectively. In this case, the inefficient provider makes a zero profit. When the level of 
altruism is intermediate, there is no distortion in quantities and both types of provider 
have a zero profit (i.e. first best). Makris and Siciliani (2013) further shows that when 
the degree of physician altruism is sufficiently high, the quantity of inefficient type is 
distorted upwards while the quantity of efficient types is distorted either downwards or 
upwards. In this case, the inefficient type makes a zero profit.  
Notice that Makris (2009) and Makris and Siciliani (2013) could also assume providers 
have unknown and heterogeneous degrees of altruism while having homogenous 
productivities. This may be the case when the healthcare provider is an individual 
primary healthcare physician rather than a civil service organization (i.e. a hospital or a 
group of physicians). Accordingly, it may be very difficult to measure each individual’s 
degree of altruism. It can be also argued that primary care physicians often provide 
standardized healthcare services and are allocated a fixed proportion of different type of 
patients. As a result, assuming they have the same cost function could be reasonable.  
Allard et al. (2014) analyse the optimal incentive contracting of GPs, when they are 
allowed self-selecting payment forms. In particular, this paper examines the role of 
multi-dimensional heterogeneity (abilities and concerns for patients’ health) on GPs’ 
choice of alternative payment forms (capitation and fee-for-service) and the subsequent 
implications for treatment and referral decisions to specialty care. They show that the 
optimal form of remuneration depends on the regulator’s objective. When the regulator’s 
main concern is to save the high costs of specialized care, it is optimal to pay GPs a fee-
for-service. Alternatively, if the main concern is to limit potential errors that can be made 
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by GPs, the optimal form of remuneration depends on the distribution of GPs’ profiles. 
If high ability GPs constitute a relatively large proportion, it is optimal to allow 
physicians to select their favourite payment systems. On the contrary, if low ability 
physicians constitute a relatively large proportion, then capitation is optimal. Capitation 
is also optimal when failures to identify severe conditions are extremely costly in terms 
of health losses.  
Barham and Milliken (2015) take a population-based approach to compare costs and 
treatment incentives embedded in different payment systems, including the choice of 
more than one. Similar to Choné and Ma (2011) and Liu and Ma (2013), a patient’s 
initial health and physician’s degree of altruism is assumed to be the latter’s private 
information. However, Barham and Milliken (2015) is the first study in the literature 
assuming physicians can choose both the number and type of patients as well as the 
intensity of treatment provided. Moreover, the optimal payment system trades off social 
benefits and costs while ensuring the entire population’s access to healthcare. 
To capture above features, Barham and Milliken (2015) assume a physician can be either 
altruistic (𝑗 = 1) or non-altruistic (𝑗 = 2).19 Patients are also of alternative types, namely 
frail (𝑖 = 𝐹) or healthy (𝑖 = 𝐻). The total number of frail and healthy patients is 𝑁𝐹 and 
𝑁𝐻 whereas the number of patients selected by an individual physician’s practice is 𝑛𝐹 
and 𝑛𝐻. The target level of service that the regulator wants to see is ?̅?𝐹 and ?̅?𝐻 where 
?̅?𝐹  > ?̅?𝐻.
20 Altruistic providers derive positive non-pecuniary benefits from the level of 
service provided to frail patients, however, they do not derive any non-pecuniary 
benefits from treating healthy patients. The physician’s utility is expressed as: 

















 the intensity of service provided to a 




 the number of the type 𝐹- and 
𝐻 -patients enrolled respectively. The cost function 𝐶(. )  is increasing, convex and 
depends only on the total caseload. In other words, costs associated with enrolling 
                                                 
19 Hereafter I use superscript and subscript to denote the physician and the patient respectively.  
20 The authors argue that the given targets reflect the consensus of medical opinion, namely that primary 
care doctors often refer to clinical practice guidelines which indicate the care that should be provided to 
patients with given sets of symptoms. Alternatively, they suggest the targets can be thought of as the levels 
of service that would be selected as the solution to the optimal contracting problem in a full information 
world (p.898).  
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additional patients are ignored. The altruism function is bell-shaped, that is, 𝐴1′|𝑞𝐹1<?̅?𝐹 >
0, 𝐴1′|𝑞𝐹1=?̅?𝐹 = 0, 𝐴
1′|𝑞𝐹1>?̅?𝐹 < 0, 𝐴
′′(0) > 0 and ∃?̂? < ?̅?𝐹  such that 𝐴
′′(𝑞) > 0  when 
𝑞 < ?̂? and 𝐴′′(𝑞) < 0 when ?̂? < 𝑞 < ?̅?𝐹. For the non-altruistic physicians, 𝐴
2′ = 0 for 
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Where the constraints reflect the contractual requirement to provide the service intensity 
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patients selected, and 𝑝 the price per unit of service provided. The Lagrange of the 
system (10) is: 
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respectively. The next four lines show the corresponding complementary slackness 
conditions associated with the inequalities in the optimization problem. The last line 
shows restrictions on the respective multipliers of the non-negative requirements for 
services. 
From the system (12), the non-altruistic physician (𝑗 = 2) would provide the quality of 
service 𝑞𝐹
2∗ = 𝑞𝐻
2∗ = ?̅?𝐻 and select the number of patients 𝑛𝐹
2∗ = 𝑛𝐻
2∗ which is implicitly 
defined by: 
 𝑘 + ?̅?𝐻(𝑝 − 𝐶′(𝑛𝐹
2∗?̅?𝐻)) = 0 (13) 
Accordingly, the non-altruistic provider increases his practice size and total caseload 
with price or capitation while providing the minimum quality of service for both types 
of patients. 
The altruistic physician (𝑗 = 1) would prefer to serve only frail patients and to provide 
the service 𝑞𝐹
1∗ ≥ 𝑞𝐻
1∗ = ?̅?𝐻 (see the first and the third equation of the system (12). When 
𝑞𝐹
1∗ > ?̅?𝐻, 𝑛𝐹




1∗(𝑝 − 𝐶′) + 𝐴(𝑞𝐹
1∗) = 0




1∗ = ?̅?𝐻, 𝑛𝐹
1∗ and 𝑞𝐹
1∗ are implicitly determined by: 
 𝑘 + ?̅?𝐻(𝑝 − 𝐶′(𝑛𝐹
1∗?̅?𝐻)) + 𝐴(?̅?𝐻) = 0 (15) 
In the former case 𝑞𝐹
1∗ > ?̅?𝐻, by combining both equations in system (14), we have: 
 𝑘 + 𝐴(𝑞𝐹
1∗) − 𝑞𝐴′(𝑞𝐹
1∗) = 0 (16) 
Since 𝐴(𝑞𝐹
1∗) − 𝑞𝐴′(𝑞𝐹
1∗) < 0 , the curvature assumption of 𝐴  indicates 𝐴′′ < 0 . 













= 0 (18) 
Next, calculating the first order condition with respect to 𝑘 and 𝑝 on the first equation 




























> 0 (20) 






































> 0 (22) 
Equation (16) indicates that the frail patient will be provided a higher level of service 
quality under capitation (𝑘 > 0, 𝑝 = 0) than under fee-for-service (𝑘 = 0, 𝑝 > 0). Under 
both systems, however, the service quality provided is suboptimal (i.e. 𝑞𝐹
1∗ < ?̅?𝐹). The 
equations (17)-(22) characterize the altruistic physician’s decisions regarding the 
number of patients selected and the service quality as a function of price and capitation 
rate. These functions show that the altruistic physician increases service quality and total 
caseload as the capitation rate goes up. However, the altruistic provider raises practice 
size and total caseload while the quality of service remains unchanged as price increases. 
Given this model, Barham and Milliken (2015) then compare FFS, capitation, mixed 
payment (capitation plus a partial reimbursement of costs incurred), a menu comprised 
of FFS and the mixed mechanism by the respective social welfare are provided with the 
whole population having access to health service. This welfare is measured as benefits 
of providing service net of social costs. Further, the authors show that physicians’ total 
caseload provided under a single payment can also be induced under a menu of menu of 
contracts, but at a relatively lower cost. Accordingly, they conclude that the optimal 
payment is a menu of contracts only when social benefits associated with providing a 
higher quality of care to frail patients (e.g. the improvement in frail patients’ health and 
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the non-pecuniary benefits obtained by altruistic physicians) are greater than the 
additional costs of providing this care. 
By reviewing the above analysis, a few adjustments or extensions should be considered. 
First, the authors assume that the optimal service quality to be provided to each type of 
patient is given exogenous. It would be interesting to see whether their results still hold 
if the optimal level of care provided to each type of patient depends on remuneration 
instruments and other exogenous parameters (endogenization). Second, the altruism 
function 𝐴(𝑞) in Barham and Milliken (2015) represents the physician’s concern for his 
patients’ welfare. In reality, the physician may care only about his patients’ health 
benefits rather than their welfare. For instance, while smoking maximizes a patient’s 
welfare (utility), the physician would not allow him to do so because smoking has a 
negative impact on the patient’s health. Third, the altruism function 𝐴(𝑞) is assumed to 
be “bell shaped” to ensure that the altruistic physician obtains an equilibrium between 
enrolling patients and producing quality.21 Given that there is neither theoretical nor 
empirical evidence to support this assumption, the alternative approach of modelling the 
physician’s choice of practice size and service quality should be considered. Further, the 
research does not consider an important element in that there is a cost associated with 
getting to know additional patients. Finally, their analysis can also be extended to the 
case where physicians are constrained by a non-negative profit constraint. 
Studies outside health economics that have investigated the selection of workers with 
intrinsic motivation are also relevant. For instance, Heyes (2005) and Delfgaauw and 
Dur (2007) have studied optimal wage schemes when workers are privately informed 
about their motivations. Burani and Palestini (2016) have analysed the screening 
problem of a firm hiring workers with unknown ability but an observed intrinsic 
motivation. Handy and Katz (1998), Delfgaauw and Dur (2007a, 2010), Barigozzi and 
Turati (2012), and Burani and Palestini (2016) have investigated optimal incentive 
schemes that sort motivated workers into different sectors. Common to these analyses is 
that the principal cannot observe his workers’ abilities or motivations. Moreover, under 
the optimal remuneration scheme physicians have access to self-selecting a menu of 
lump-sum reimbursements. 
                                                 
21 If the altruism function is strictly concave, there is an incentive to severely undertreat patients (but treat 
many patients); if it is strictly convex, there is an incentive to severely over treat patients (but treat a few 
patients) (Barham and Milliken, 2015, p.898). 
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To summarize, the heterogeneity of the physician population makes it natural to propose 
a menu of physician reimbursement schemes. This menu often increases the power of 
financial incentives with the physician’s productivity/altruism and therefore induces the 
more altruistic/productive physician to select the contract with higher payment and 
service provision. However, the exact form of the menu depends on the available 
payment mechanisms, the types of heterogeneity, and financial constraints imposed. The 
optimal payment system can also be a single payment system which comes from tensions 
caused by incentive capabilities between quantity and financial constraints (e.g. non-
negative profit) in the presence of multi-dimensional adverse selection.  
Before moving to the next part of this survey, there are a few points that need to be 
addressed. First, it may be impossible or very costly to offer physicians a menu of 
contracts. In addition to the reason discussed in Choné and Ma (2011), a primary care 
physician is often allocated many patients with different severities of illness. When 
physicians differ only in their degrees of concern for their patients, offering them a menu 
of contracts requires that the physicians’ altruism functions satisfy the single crossing 
property. As patients differ in their initial health and the marginal benefits of consuming 
medical service, there is no guarantee that the physicians’ altruism function only crosses 
once.  
Furthermore, providing physicians with a menu of contracts requires a strong 
commitment capability on the part of the payer (Hart and Moore, 1988).  After a 
physician selects a contract, she reports her type (i.e. ability, costs etc.) and her 
informational advantages are removed. At this stage, it would usually be to the 
advantage of both parties to renegotiate their initial agreement (Demougin, 1989). The 
possibility of renegotiation would therefore destroy the properties of the contract scheme. 
Allowing physicians to select their reimbursement schemes also makes the cream-
skimming of healthy patients feasible and financially lucrative, thus difficult to resist 
(Matsafanis and Glennerster, 1994). The above difficulties associated with using a menu 
of contracts suggest applying a single physician remuneration scheme might be a better 
option. In fact, it is possible to dispense a menu of contracts as the direct revealing 
mechanism can be indirectly implemented by a single linear/non-linear schedule which 
depends only on the outcome of the production process (i.e. the delegation principle) 
(Hart and Moore, 1988; Demougin, 1989).  
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Second, physicians are often constrained by a non-negative profit condition for treating 
his patients. Third, the studies discussed in the above subsection does not examine the 
problem associated with physicians’ non-contractible actions. Finally, the principal’s 
objective function might differ; if it concerns an insurance firm operating in a 
competitive market, the function sums up patients’ benefits only. If it is a centralised 
health authority, the objective function sums up both patients’ net benefits and providers’ 
net profits. 
 
2.2.2.4 Optimal physician payment with both moral hazard and adverse selection  
Studies analysing the optimal design of physician remuneration in an environment with 
both moral hazard and adverse selection are small but growing continuously. 
Jack (2005) was the first to study incentives for quality and cost choices by physicians 
with unknown altruism. He has assumed the healthcare provider’s utility increases with 
quality of health service, however, this utility is unknown to the regulator. Moreover, 
the regulator is not able to monitor the physician’s quality and cost-reducing efforts. 
Jack adopts a reservation utility constraint, allowing physicians to suffer financial losses 
from treating patients. Finally, he assumes collecting public funds is costly while the 
provider’s total costs incurred can be observed ex-post. 
Later studies analysing the design of physician remuneration capture adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems in different ways. For instance, Mougeot and Naegelen 
(2009) as well as Kantarevic and Kralj (2016) assume the healthcare provider has private 
information about his costs incurred per treatment and exerts a non-contractible effort. 
In the former paper, the unobservable effort reduces the cost of treatment while in the 
latter it enhances medical service intensity. The former paper also considers the effects 
of the provider’s degree of benevolence, which is assumed to be common knowledge. 
Moreover, the provider can select a cost threshold and refuse to treat patients whose cost 
is beyond (the outlier). The provider receives a fixed payment per case, however, an 
additional cost-sharing will be paid for when treating the outlier. 
Jelovac and Kembou Nzale (2017) as well as Wu et al. (2018) also capture moral hazard 
by assuming an unobservable effort on the part of the healthcare provider. While this 
effort contributes to patient health benefits increase in both papers, it improves the 
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benefits by providing input jointly with the regulator’s in the first paper and by raising 
the patient’s recover probability in the second paper. With respect to adverse selection, 
the former and the latter study assume the healthcare provider has private information 
about his altruistic preference and ability to cure the patient respectively. The healthcare 
provider only chooses the level of effort in the former study. However, he decides the 
level of effort, the quantity of health service and the size of practice simultaneously in 
the latter. In contrast to previous studies in this literature, the provider is constrained by 
a non-negative profit constraint. Finally, in addition to deciding the fixed payment, the 
regulator also determines the level of his input in the former while deciding the fee-for-
service and pay-for-performance price in the latter.  
The main conclusion from this literature is that the optimal physician remuneration 
scheme is a menu of contracts rather than a single payment system (Jack, 2005; 
Kantarevic and Kralj, 2016; Wu et al., 2018). This contract can be approximated by a 
menu of the linear contracts comprised of a fixed salary component and a variable 
payment.22  In particular, the rates of fixed payment and variable reimbursement are 
negatively related across contracts. Under this remuneration scheme, the more 
productive/altruistic physician would choose the contract with a higher fixed payment 
and lower cost/performance reimbursement. 
However, the single payment system can also be optimal in some specific contexts. For 
instance, Mougeot and Naegelen (2009) show that the optimal physician payment is a 
fixed price contract when the provider’s benevolence is high whereas a mixed system 
with fixed price per case and a cost sharing for the outlier (i.e. the patient whose cost is 
greater than the predetermined cost threshold), when the provider’s benevolence is low. 
On the other hand, Jelovac and Kembou Nzale (2017) argue that it is too costly to use a 
menu of contracts to extract providers’ private information if both the regulator and 
provider contribute to a non-contractible outcome. 
As shown in the discussions in the discussions in Sections 2.2.2.2 and 2.2.2.3, moral 
hazard can be captured not only by the physician’s unknown efforts but also the non-
contractible patients’ health as well their health benefits generated. Adverse selection 
                                                 
22 The exact form of the variable payment depends on the contractible outputs provided by the physician. 
In Jack (2005) and Kantarevic and Kralj (2016), it is regarded as the rate of cost-reimbursement. In Wu 
et al. (2018), it is the price paid per unit of service provided or the reimbursement rate per unit of an 




problem can also be modelled in different ways; it can be captured by the unknown and 
heterogeneous physicians’ ability, altruism, productivities or patients’ initial health, 
abilities to be cured from illness etc. I show that the degree of motivation/altruism tends 
to be a common knowledge when healthcare provider is a civil service organization 
while a private information when healthcare provider is an individual physician.  
Moreover, the objective function of the principle depends on its role and where it 
operates. Finally, the heterogeneity of physicians’ population or their patients’ severities 
of illness makes it natural to propose a menu of physician remuneration schemes. 
However, the tension caused by incentive capabilities between quantity and financial 
constraints (e.g. non-negative profit), the unachievable single crossing property, the 
incentives to renegotiate the initial contract and cream-skimming low-cost patients, 
make implementing contract menus impossible or inefficient. As a result, physicians are 
rarely offered a menu of contract in reality. 
 
2.2.3 The impact of cost control mechanisms on physician behaviour 
There are also studies that examine and compare incentives provided by different 
policies to control physicians’ costs. In this subsection I review how the introduction of 
these instruments alter physician incentives when they are paid on a fee-for-service basis.  
Neudeck (1991) considers an environment where the social insurance fund (SIF) 
chooses a price to maximize health output (i.e. efficiency generated per unit of service), 
assuming that there are enough doctors willing to accept the contracts offered. The 
selected level of price then determines the productivity and the quantity of service 
provided by each doctor. Similar to the result derived from efficiency wage model in the 
labour market, the author shows that the SIF should pay each physician a price above 
the market clearing level to induce the efficient provision of medical service. However, 
paying the price at such a level would create additional demands for physician contracts 
and result in medical service overprovision. As a consequence, rationing the number of 
contracts and service quantity is a rational strategy for the SIF. Finally, this paper further 
shows that the above result can be generalized in an environment with target 
caseload/income or adverse selection. 
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Notice that the analytical framework presented by Neudeck (1991) is one of the simplest 
representations of healthcare system which does not capture many essential health 
market characteristics. For instance, it does not consider the role of a patient in 
determining the level of medical service provided. It also does not consider physicians’ 
agency and their limited liabilities. Different issues regarding information asymmetries 
between the payer, providers and patients are also ignored. As shown in Neudeck (1991), 
SIF trades-off efficiency and the quantity of service to be provided. When the 
aforementioned health market characteristics are also taken into consideration, the SIF 
may face additional difficulties in terms of inducing the efficient provision of healthcare 
(e.g. moral hazard, externalities etc.). 
Fan et al. (1998) have presented a model that compares two alternative methods of 
controlling the costs of physician service under a fee-for-service payment, namely, the 
expenditure target, which involves quantity control and the expenditure cap, which is a 
retrospective price-setting mechanism. To do this, they compare the total quantity of 
service that can be provided by different types of physicians under these alternative 
physician cost control policies, given the same level of health spending. A payment 
system is considered to be “better” if physicians can provide more services. Physicians 
in their model differ in their productivity (measured by marginal costs of providing 
healthcare) and decide the quantity of a single service 𝑞 to be provided at a given price 𝑝. 
Under expenditure target, each physician is given a quota ?̅?. If he produces over ?̅?, he 
receives only 𝛼𝑝 (𝛼 < 1).  Under the expenditure cap 𝐵, the price is determined as the 
budget divided by total quantity provided by all physician (i.e. 𝑝 =
𝐵
∑𝑞𝑖
), where 𝑞𝑖 is 
health service provided to each patient. 
The authors show that the expenditure cap induces physicians to produce a larger 
quantity of medical service than the expenditure target given the same budget under the 
symmetric Nash equilibrium. It follows that, by introducing an expenditure cap, the 
retrospective price setting mechanism introduces competition into the environment, 
which raises efficiency. This theoretical result is also supported by laboratory-controlled 
experiments, where subject behaviour is well captured by individual profit maximization 
and symmetric Nash equilibrium predictions.  
Benstetter and Wambach (2006) compare the physician supply of medical service under 
a price system (i.e. FFS system) and under a point system (the retrospective payment of 
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a fixed budget). Their key assumption is that the individual physician has to borrow a 
certain amount of money and would bear bankruptcy costs if he fails to pay back. 
Accordingly, they show that the physician may even raise the quantity of service 
provided as price decreases in order to avoid the high costs of bankruptcy. They find 
that a shift from a price to a point system may lead to a ‘treadmill effect’ where 
physicians increase total health service provision, receive less payment per service and 
even choose to exit the market. Similar to Fan et al. (1998), this effect is derived from 
the fact that physicians under FFS with a budget cap are induced to compete in order to 
increase their income. In order to moderate the treadmill effect, the authors further 
suggest introducing either a price floor or a maximum number of treatments can be 
provided per physician. 
Notice that the simple representations of alternative cost control instruments in this 
literature may not represent many widely used quantity or revenue restrictions in reality. 
For instance, in contrast to Fan et al. (1998) the service provided beyond the quota may 
not be reimbursed; during the German healthcare financing revolution in 1997, each 
individual physician was imposed a maximum amount of treatment to be claimed 
(Benstetter and Wambach, 2006). Moreover, expenditure caps have not only been 
imposed on the global level but also on the regional or individual level. For instance, 
Germany has introduced per surgery spending caps for pharmaceutical expenditure 
(Busse et al., 2005) whereas the Netherlands has imposed a ceiling on physicians’ 
income (Kroneman et al., 2009). Futures studies may also evaluate the impact of 
introducing these cost control restrictions while capturing essential features of 




The previous sections reviewed theories studying physicians’ responses to incentives 
embedded in different payment systems in the presence of respective types of 
information asymmetry. Given the physicians’ medical service supply decisions, the 
optimal design of physician incentive contracting mechanisms are analysed. After that, 
the effects of introducing alternative cost control policies to physicians paid on a fee-
for-service basis are discussed. 
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In the presence of moral hazard only, the cost-reimbursement payment often induces the 
provision of constrained optimal quality and zero cost-reduction efforts. Moreover, 
physicians increase their level of efforts and quantity of service as the rate of prospective 
or cost reimbursement increases. Prospective payment, however, may induce the first 
best levels of quality and cost reduction efforts if: (1) there is a single product; (2) quality 
reflects patient demand; and (3) physicians are unable to dump patients. When the above 
conditions do not hold, first best quality and cost reduction efforts can only be induced 
by mixing prospective payment and cost-reimbursement.  
I show that studies analysing the optimal design of physician payment often capture the 
moral hazard problem by physicians’ unknown efforts although an alternative modelling 
approach has rarely been applied.  While the optimal physician remuneration in the 
presence of moral hazard often has an element of cost sharing, implementing this 
remuneration requires a sufficiently close monitoring. As closely monitoring physicians’ 
costs may be very expensive and inefficient, later studies propose a fee-for-service 
system as one substitute for the cost-sharing mechanism (McGuire, 2000). 
In the presence of physician or patient heterogeneity, the optimal physician 
remuneration is often proposed as a menu with negatively related prospective and 
retrospective payments across contracts. Under this payment, the more 
productive/altruistic physician selects the contract with a higher fixed payment while the 
less productive/altruistic one selects the contract with a higher cost-reimbursement. The 
more productive/altruistic physician would have an informational rent whereas the less 
altruistic/productive doctor would underproduce. This survey also shows that a single 
physician remuneration system may perform better than a menu of remuneration 
schemes as the allocation under the latter system can be indirectly implemented by the 
former, which does not require type-reporting and truth-telling. Moreover, the tension 
caused by the incentive compatibility between quantities and non-negative profit, the 
difficulties to satisfy the single crossing property, and the incentives to renegotiate the 
current contract and cream-skim low costs patients, make single physician payment 
system a better option. 
Cost control instruments such as quantity restrictions (e.g. quotas) and revenue caps (e.g. 
individual, sectorial, regional and global budgets) are often imposed on a fee-for-service 
system to control physicians’ healthcare spending. The existing literature provides a 
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theoretical support in that quantity restriction could be effective in terms of improving 
efficiency while revenue restrictions may lead to a treadmill effect. Given the same level 
of expenditure, fee-for-service physicians under a global budget will provide more 
services but receive a lower payment per service than under a quota as the budget 
induces competition between physicians. This literature contains a limited number of 
studies, which focus on investigating FFS physicians’ supply of health service when a 
global budget cap is imposed. Only a few studies compare physicians’ supply decisions 
under a quota and an expenditure cap.  Moreover, the quantity and the revenue restriction 
fail to represent their applications in the real world. To make studies in this literature 
provide more valuable predictions and insights, it is also necessary for them to capture 
key characteristics of the healthcare market in their models. 
By reviewing the literature and addressing potential gaps, my thesis focuses on an area 
where less attention has been paid to-the design of more sophisticated physician 
incentive contracting (compared to a simple transfer) in the presence of moral hazard 
and adverse selection. Specifically, I investigate the optimal implementation of a fee-
for-service payment system and the most common cost control instruments (quantity 
rationing, revenue cap, capitation). Moreover, I characterize the physician’s choice of 
practice size or medical service intensities as a function of price, the respective cost 
control instrument, and other exogenous parameters. The moral hazard problem is 
captured by the fact that the regulator cannot determine whether the physician provide 
the optimal level of service for each patient, as the regulator does not know patients’ 
health. Since the healthcare provider in my analysis is a primary care provider, I capture 
adverse selection in terms of physicians’ unknown degrees of altruism rather than as 
productivities or abilities. Each physician is allocated many patients with different health 
statuses and is expected to earn non-negative profit. Facing the both theoretical and 
practical difficulties of implementing a menu of contracts as evident in the literature, my 
analysis will focus on designing a single payment system for all physicians. My research 
will also be compare the impact of introducing different types of cost control instruments 
on FFS physicians. In contrast to the existing literature, I will examine the cost control 




The foregoing section introduces physician altruism and discusses physicians’ 
incentives embedded in cost-reimbursement, prospective payment and different cost 
control policies. Moreover, it discusses the optimal design of physician incentive 
contracting. While the literature investigating physician altruism and physicians’ 
response to different payment systems is extensive (e.g. Galizzi et al., 2015; Ellis and 
McGuire, 1986; Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998; Ma, 1998; Chalkley and Malcomson, 
2002; Jack, 2005; Choné and Ma, 2011; Makris and Siciliani, 2013; Kantarevic and 
Kralj, 2016; Wu et al., 2018), the evidence regarding the optimal design of physician 
payment in practice is limited. One explanation is that the real-life design of a physician 
payment system depends on institution- and country-specific contexts (e.g., US 
physician group practice, the UK’s fund-holding system). As a result, it is difficult to 
achieve a consensus regarding which payment is optimal in general. In the ensuing 
chapter, I offer empirical observations of physician altruism and the impact of using 
different payment system and cost control policies. This range of evidence make it 
reasonable to assume altruistic physicians’ preferences and are shown to be consistent 
with the results I derived in Chapters 3 and 4. Section 2.3.1 surveys the existing 
empirical literature which discusses provider altruism. Specifically, it offers an overview 
of the existing evidence on healthcare provider altruism in different branches of the 
empirical literature. The evidence relating to physicians’ behaviour and the design of 
their payment is discussed in Section 2.3.2. Finally, Section 2.3.3 provides evidence 
regarding the impact of introducing physician cost control policies. 
 
2.3.1 Provider Altruism  
Galizzi et al. (2015) has grouped evidence of provider altruism into four main categories 
based on degrees of control applied in empirical strategies including: 1) survey and 







2.3.1.1 Survey and Interview  
Some systematic questionnaires have been designed to measure altruistic motivation in 
surveys. For example, the Prosocial Personality Battery developed by Penner et al. (1995) 
includes self-reporting of other-oriented empathy and participation in helpful behaviours 
or activities. The Penn State College of Medicine Professionalism Questionnaire by 
Blackall et al. (2007) considers altruism as one of seven elements of professionalism. 
Pawlikowski et al. (2012) assesses Scale of Attitudes towards the patient in his test 
which is based on respect for autonomy, altruism, empathy, and a holistic approach to 
the patient. Gutiérrez et al. (2006) developed the Nursing Motives for Helping scale, 
where altruism is identified by response to items such as the effort to identify patients’ 
needs, the level of support offered, and the level of attention paid to patients.  
Altruistic motivation among healthcare providers has also been identified by ad-hoc 
surveys and interviews. For instance, Allaby (2003) has analysed local doctors’ 
motivation to serve in charitable clinics in urban Nepal. He found the main reason that 
doctors decide to work in a charitable clinic is “a desire to serve the poor and improve 
society” (p.84). Siddiqi et al. (2011) found that the “opportunity to serve people” (p.1632) 
is important in both public and private setups in Pakistan after surveying 300 medical 
doctors. De Costa et al. (2008) has shown that altruism was one of two motivators for 
collaborating with a government scheme aimed at improving patient welfare. Meanwhile, 
Desquins et al. (2007) has predicted around 20 percent of doctors adopt altruistic 
behaviours.  
 
2.3.1.2 Prescription Records 
Empirical evidence of physician altruism can be found in studies investigating 
prescription choices in primary healthcare (e.g. Hellerstein, 1998; Lundin, 2000; Crea et 
al., 2015). In their models, physicians care about patients’ welfare and insurance 
expenditures. Given the model, the authors analyse the physician’s trade-off between 
marginal utility from patient welfare improvement and marginal disutility from 
insurance spending. For instance, Hellerstein (1998) used data from the 1989 National 
Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) to study physicians’ choice of drug 
prescription. He found that the majority of physicians in the survey prescribed both 
generic and trade-name drugs to their patients, but some physicians were more likely to 
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prescribe the less expensive generic drugs while others were more likely to prescribe 
trade-name drugs. In addition, Lundin (2000) has utilized data collected from two 
pharmacies in Sweden in 1992 and 1993 to analyse the role of health insurance in the 
drug prescription market. His probit estimates show that physicians weigh patients’ 
benefits from health insurance more than insurance expenditure. 
Crea et al. (2015) has analysed Finnish pharmaceutical prescriptions records from the 
Social Insurance Institution (2001-2011) to estimate the probability that doctors 
prescribe generic versus branded versions of statins to their patients, as a function of the 
shares of the difference in prices that patients have to pay out of their own pocket 
compared to what is covered by insurance. Results from their panel logit models provide 
strong support for the existence of physician altruism and moral hazard hypotheses in 
Finland. In these studies, the degree of physician altruism is estimated by comparing the 
variation of patients’ out-of-pocket payments and health benefits obtained from the 
consumption of healthcare (Galizzi et al., 2015, p.15). 
 
2.3.1.3 Field experiment 
Results from artefactual field experiments also provide evidence for physician altruism. 
For instance, Jacobsen et al. (2011) asked two samples of 88 nursing and 73 real-estate 
broker students in Norway to play a Dictator Game (DG) with Amnesty International as 
the recipient. They found nursing students donated about 75% of their endowments, 
compared to 61% of real-estate broker students, which implies that nursing students 
were more generous than real-estate broker students. 
Smith et al. (2012) asked 1,064 final year nursing students in Kenya, South Africa and 
Thailand to play a DG. In their experiment, nursing students decided the proportion of 
their endowment to be allocated to themselves, a fellow student, a patient or a poor 
person respectively. They found nursing students in three countries donated one third of 
their endowment and showed greater generosity to patients and the poor than to fellow 
students. Similar results are also supported by Kolstad and Lindkvist (2012), who asked 
two samples of medical and nursing students in Tanzania to play a DG game with 
medical or nursing students as recipients. They found that students who prefer to work 
in the public health sector have stronger pro-social preferences than those who prefer to 
work in the private for-profit sector. Meanwhile, Serra et al. (2011) asked 219 nursing 
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students and 90 medical students in Ethiopia to play a Generalized Trust Game (GTG). 
They found some correlation between their measure of generalized trustworthiness in 
GTG and the self-reported intention to work in the non-profit health sector.  
 
2.3.1.4 Laboratory experiments 
In comparison to the observational studies discussed above, laboratory experiments 
allow researchers to analyse trade-offs between patients’ health benefits and physician 
profit under controlled conditions using incentivized behavioural data (Galizzi, 2015). 
Another major advantage is that choice situations can be implemented with trade-offs 
that relate closely to theoretical models of physician behaviour. 
Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011) first used a controlled laboratory experiment to analyse 
the effect of variation in the payment system regarding physicians’ quantity choice. In 
their experiment, medical students (as representatives of physicians) chose the quantities 
of medical services to determine both their financial incomes and patients’ health benefit 
(measured in monetary terms) outside the laboratory. Subjects therefore face a trade-off 
as they were unable to maximize their own profit and patients’ welfare simultaneously. 
While this study does not discuss the impact physician altruism on physician behaviour, 
it provides useful data for later studies testing or measuring physician altruism. 
Godager and Wiesen (2013) used data provided by Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011) to 
estimate the degree of physician altruism. Specifically, the level of physician altruism is 
measured as the marginal rate of substitution between patient benefit and a physician’s 
profit. Their multinomial logit and mixed logit regressions results indicate that each 
medical student puts a positive weight on his patients’ health benefits though the weight 
differs. Substantial variations in physicians’ altruism were also observed in Godager et 
al. (2016), which investigated how physicians’ quantity choices were affected by 
disclosing outcome information. 
Brosig-Koch et al. (2017) have applied a laboratory experiment designed in the fashion 
of Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011) to identify physician altruism. They inferred physician 
altruism according to subjects’ decisions concerning service quantity, which determines 
profit and patient benefits. They found that patient benefits play an important role in 
subjects’ decision making. As in the previous study, they also report that physicians 
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differ significantly in their levels of altruism. Hennig-Schmidt and Wiesen (2014) have 
reported a considerable difference between medical students and students with other 
majors in terms of their altruistic motivation towards a patient, based on the set up 
developed by Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011).  
Finally, results from laboratory and artefactual field experiments by Brosig-Koch et al. 
(2016) show that physicians, medical students and students from other majors respond 
in a similar way to incentives embedded in fee-for-service and capitation. However, 
physicians were found to have the highest altruistic motivation in their medical service 
provision. Kesternich et al. (2015) show that when professional values are made more 
salient or when social incentives benefit actual patients (rather than students), medical 
students behave more altruistically. 
To summarize, studies based on surveys, interviews, prescription records, field and 
laboratory experiments all provide evidence of physician altruism. Accordingly, the 
assumption that physicians are concerned about patients’ benefits is well supported by 
both theory and empirical evidence. Moreover, recent studies have applied laboratory 
experimentation in order to analyse physicians’ choice of medical service quantity to 
maximize both profit and patient health benefits. These studies have not only measured 
physicians’ altruistic motivation but also show a substantial heterogeneity in the degree 
of physician altruism (Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011; Godager and Wiesen, 2013; Hennig-
Schmidt and Wiesen, 2014; Brosig-Koch et al., 2017). These observations support the 
assumptions made in Chapters 3 and 4, where physicians differ in their degree of 
altruism and they impose a positive weight on their patients’ health benefits. 
 
2.3.2 Physician behaviour and payment design 
In this subsection, I review the empirical studies analysing the number of primary care 
physicians’ office visits, the quantity and quality of service provided as well as referral 
rates under fee-for-service and capitation systems. Moreover, I discuss the impact of 
fee-for-service price or capitation variations on the above decisions made by patients’ 
or doctors. The main purpose, however, is to highlight those observations which relate 
to my results derived in Chapters 3 and 4.  
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Physician incentives embedded in standard remuneration rules have been well described 
in the literature (e.g. McGuire, 2000; Léger, 2008). However, testing the effect of 
doctors’ remuneration has been challenging as the data obtained is often biased due to 
the problem of self-selection or the confounding effects based on other contextual 
factors (Gosden et al., 1999; Scott et al., 2011). Furthermore, a provider’s performance 
is hard to measure (Lagarde and Blaauw, 2017). As a result, evidence of physicians’ 
decisions on the basis of the same remuneration rule are mixed (Hennig-Schmidt et al., 
2011).  
First, there is much evidence supporting physicians respond to different monetary 
incentives (Hemenway et al., 1990; Hillman et al., 1989). For instance, Gaynor and 
Gertler (1995) have showed that physicians reduce the number of weekly office visits 
when a fee-for-service payment system is substituted by capitation. A similar 
behavioural pattern has also been observed for US office-based primary care physicians 
who participated in a randomized controlled trial conducted by Davidson et al. (1992). 
They showed that physicians in an FFS group have a higher frequency of visits than in 
a CAP group.  
In the UK, Croxson et al. (2001) have found evidence that physicians respond to 
financial incentives embedded in the fund-holding system (a prospective payment 
system). Before getting involved, physicians increase their number of activities in order 
to be allocated a larger budget for the duration of the scheme. However, once they 
become fund-holders, they reduce activities to raise their fund surplus. Madden et al. 
(2005) have used a difference-in-difference methodology to analyse the effect of a 
change in financial incentives on Irish GPs’ behaviour. More specifically, all GPs were 
paid on a fee-for-service up to 1989, since when the state has started remunerating GPs 
on a capitation basis for low income patients (medical card holders). This study shows 
that a low-income patient has a higher rate of GP visits than other patients. However, 
the average visit rates of the medical card patient have fallen since GPs were paid by 
capitation. The rest of the population’s visit rates have fallen even more as they may 
decide to use other healthcare services.  
Krasnik et al. (1990) have reported that, based on their before-and-after study, GPs in 
Denmark raised diagnostic and curative services while decreasing referrals to secondary 
care when pure lump-sum payments were replaced by a CAP supplemented by a FFS 
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component. Iversen and Lurås (2000) have obtained similar results, finding that 
Norwegian GPs have more referrals under a CAP system with a low FFS component 
than under a capitation system complemented by a FFS payment. However, the increase 
in referral rates may not only be due to CAP payments but also the result of a low FFS 
payment. Meanwhile, Sørensen and Grytten (2003) have found that salaried physicians 
have fewer consultations and patient contacts but higher referral rates than FFS 
physicians.  
Dumont et al. (2008) have compared data on primary care services in a Canadian 
province in Quebec before and after a change from a FFS system to a mixed system with 
a fixed salary and a reduced FFS reimbursement. They found that physicians reduced 
quantity of service but increased the time spent per service and per non-clinical service 
under the mixed payment framework. Devlin and Sarma (2008) also found that FFS 
payments incentivised physicians to see many more patients per week than alternative 
payment systems such as CAP, after disentangling selection and incentive effects. 
However, they showed that physicians who do not select a FFS system appear to have 
characteristics that would result in them engaging in more patient visits per week than 
those who choose the FFS scheme. 
The aforementioned literature tends to use more traditional designs including surveys, 
controlled trails and field studies. However, these designs are usually expensive, time 
consuming and cannot avoid the self-selection bias of doctors in relation to payment 
systems Moreover, it is difficult to ensure that only one component of the payment 
system varies while patient characteristics remain comparable for the samples under 
study (Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011). Consequently, more recent studies (Lagarde and 
Blaauw, 2017; Brosig-Koch et al., 2017, 2016) have applied laboratory experiments. 
Such experiments allow researchers to: (1) compare physicians’ behaviour under ceteris 
paribus conditions (only the payment system varies); (2) conduct thorough robustness 
checks of the findings (e.g. it can be repeated by different scientists under the same 
conditions); and (3) offer a test-bed for large-scale studies or institutional revolutions 
(Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011). 
Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011) were among the first to conduct a lab experiment to 
compare physicians’ supply of medical services under FFS and capitation. They found 
that patients are overserved under FFS but underserved under CAP. Moreover, when 
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physicians are paid on a capitation basis at a uniform rate, more costly patients receive 
a diminished quantity of service compared to less costly patients. While their experiment 
design has been adopted by many later studies (Godager and Wiesen, 2013; Hennig-
Schmidt and Wiesen, 2014; Brosig-Koch et al., 2016; Brosig-Koch et al., 2017), their 
experiment failed to examine the effect of capitation on the number of patients treated 
and the impact of the multi-tasking environment faced by providers (Lagrade and 
Blaauw, 2017). 
The aforementioned gaps have been partially addressed by Green (2014), who first used 
a real effort experiment where the subjects are paid for reading and correcting spelling 
mistakes on the basis of salary, FFS, CAP, report cards with CAP and report cards with 
FFS respectively. He found that the highest quantity (the number of edits) is offered 
under FFS while the same quantity is produced under salary and CAP. Green also found 
that the quality of service (the number of correct edits) are the same under the three 
different payment systems. The real effort experiment has been considered as the better 
experimental approach as it better reproduce some aspects of real work that physicians’ 
efforts are not hypothetical and negative but may yield utilities (Lagrade and Blaauw, 
2017). 
Brosig-Koch et al. (2017) has extended Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011) by studying the 
effect of introducing blended payments; the results are consistent with Hennig-Schmidt 
et al. (2011), demonstrating that physicians significantly over-produce or under-produce 
under FFS and CAP while the quantity of service supplied increases with the severity of 
patient illness. Moreover, Brosig-Koch et al. have found that blending FFS and CAP 
significantly reduces deviations from patient-optimal treatments (i.e. the level of 
treatment which maximizes the patient’s welfare). This recall Ellis and McGuire (1986), 
which predicts that a mixed system can mitigate the incentives embedded in FFS and 
CAP.  
Brosig-Koch et al. (2016) have systematically analysed how different subject pools 
(non-medical students, medical students, physicians) respond to FFS and CAP. Their 
results show that subject pools react to monetary incentives consistently; all subjects 
provide significantly more service under FFS than under CAP. However, the extent to 
which subjects respond to financial incentives varies. Specifically, physicians’ supply 
of medical services is less affected by the change of financial incentives compared to 
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medical and non-medical students and the results are robust regarding subjects’ gender, 
age, and personality traits. 
Lagarde and Blaauw (2017) have compared physician incentive embedded in different 
compensation policies (i.e. FFS, CAP, salary) by conducting a real effort experiment 
where medical students are paid to enter patients’ blood test results into computers. Like 
Green (2014), this study has tested the impact of different payment systems on 
physicians’ performance in a multi-tasking environment, in which the physician decides 
both the quantity of output (the total number of blood tests entries) and the quality of 
output (the total number of correct entries). However, their experiment depends less on 
subjects’ prior knowledge and abilities, thereby making direct evaluation of the causal 
effect of incentives more reliable. Moreover, the experiment is closer to the health 
setting as it adopts a medical framing, uses medical students as subjects and social 
incentives are implemented to benefit real patients outside the lab. This study shows that 
FFS and salary yields the highest and lowest total number of entries respectively. 
However, the total number of correct entries is lowest under FFS but highest under salary. 
Finally, when quality benefits patients directly, research subjects improve their output 
quality without reducing their output quantity. 
There is also some evidence which shows that physician supply of medical services does 
not respond to financial incentives (Gosden et al., 2001; Sørensen and Grytten, 2003). 
Hurley and Labelle (1995) failed to find evidence of a clear-cut response to different 
payment incentives in health service provision among Canadian physicians. In Norway, 
Grytten and Sørensen (2003) have found that the impact of payment systems on 
physicians’ behaviour is not significant after controlling for patient and GP 
characteristics. These observations reflect that not all theoretical predictions can be 
supported by empirical evidence. 
Physician responses to service price or capitation rate changes have been widely studied. 
Since price variation has both income and substitution effects, evidence of physicians’ 
responses is often contradictory. For instance, Grytten et al. (2008) have found that a 
rise in fee-for-service price results in an increase in the total number of consultations 
and laboratory tests conducted. Kantarevic et al. (2011) have also found that primary 
care physician significantly increases the total number of services provided and patient 
visits after fee-for-service price increases. Clemens and Gottlieb (2014) also found that 
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the Medicare programme in the US increases healthcare supply as health service prices 
rise. Specifically, they estimated that a two percent increase in reimbursement rates leads 
to a three percent increase in the provision of healthcare service. 
However, there are studies which offer evidence contradicting these results. Some this 
evidence shows that fee changes do not have a significant effect on physicians’ supply 
of medical services whereas others illustrate that the effect of price changes will be 
partially countered by changes to medical service volume. For instance, Zuckerman et 
al. (1998) estimated that a 1% price reduction led to an increase in the provision of 
management services, tests and procedures of about 25%, 15% and 50% respectively. 
Yip (1998) also found that a price cut leads to a significant increase in the volume of 
coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgeries in both the Medicare and private markets. 
Carlsen and Grytten (1998), Grytten and Sørensen (2001), Grytten et al. (2001), and 
Madden et al. (2005) have found no evidence of supplier-induced demand under FFS 
regimes in countries with publicly funded healthcare systems.  
To summarize, evidence from field studies and surveys shows that the impact of 
financial incentives on physicians’ supply of medical service is mixed. While most of 
these studies have found that physicians under FFS have more patient 
visits/consultations, less quality of service supplied/time spend per patient, and lower 
referral rates than CAP, some evidence suggest that using different payment systems has 
little impact on physician behaviour. Since surveys or field studies face various 
methodological difficulties, recent studies have applied different types of laboratory 
experiments thereby offering more reliable results. The results from these experiments 
are similar and consistent; first, the total quantity of medical service provided is 
significantly higher under FFS than under CAP. Second, FFS induces a higher quantity 
of service provision while CAP induces a higher quality of service provision per patient. 
Third, blending FFS and CAP mitigates incentives embedded in the respective payment 
system while patients are more likely to be provided the optimal quantity of medical 
service. Finally, a physician’s supply of health service does not always increase with 
price. These observations will be used to echo some of the theoretical results derived in 





2.3.3 The impact of imposing cost-control instruments 
In this final subsection, I review the evidence examining how cost-containment 
mechanisms affect physicians’ behaviour. Specifically, the first part of this subsection 
reviews the impact of imposing expenditure caps while the second part surveys the 
influence of using quantity restrictions such as quotas. Finally, some evidence 
comparing the impact of using both revenue and quantity restrictions are provided. As 
in the previous subsection, the main purpose of this subsection is to highlight some 
evidence that will echo the theoretical results derived in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
2.3.3.1 Revenue Restriction 
Revenue restriction generally refers to the maximum amount of money that can be spent 
on a particular industry ex-ante for a specific time period (Vogler et al., 2009). Revenue 
restrictions differ in the level at which they have been implemented and in their specific 
design. Broadly speaking, the restriction can be imposed at a national level, at a regional 
level or at the level of an individual (Fischer et al., 2018). For instance, in Italy, France 
and Ireland the public system as a whole negotiated the level of healthcare budget with 
the pharmaceutical industries. In Sweden, the health authority negotiates or sets the level 
of health expenditure for all physicians in a given region. However, in most countries 
(e.g. Germany, the Czech Republic, the UK, etc.), individual-specific prescribing targets 
are imposed. In the ensuing discussion, I review the impact of introducing different types 
of revenue restrictions on total health spending, the total quantity of service provided 
and the quality of service provided.  
Poterba (1994) found that Germany, after adopting a global budget system in the mid-
1980s, experienced a reduction in the growth of real health spending per capita, from 
4.5% during the 1970s to 1.5% during the 1980s. This observation provides some 
support for the assertion that budget caps can hold costs. Poterba (1994), however, 
argues that the aforementioned observation only reflects that budget caps can be 
effective for one-time cost reduction but cannot guarantee a permanent reduction in the 
growth rate of health outlays. As a result, he concluded that global budgets are unlikely 
to reduce the share of national resources devoted to healthcare.  
61 
 
Benstetter and Wambach (2006) have analysed the impact of imposing administered 
caps on the total budget for German outpatient care. They found that the introduction of 
a budget cap system in 1992 resulted in a 25% medical service price reduction and a 16% 
decrease of real average physician income between 1993 and 1997 while a 8.9% increase 
of costs was incurred during 1993-1995. These stylized facts are consistent with the 
theoretical predictions highlighted in Section 2.3.3, which shows the introduction of an 
expenditure cap on a FFS system may lead to a severe coordination problem, namely a 
treadmill effect. 
Sood et al. (2009) have examined how revolutions in regulatory policies have influenced 
pharmacy has shown that physician budgets and global budgets together reduced total 
pharmaceutical spending by 6%. Furthermore, when disaggregating budget effects, they 
found that physician-specific budgets are more effective in controlling pharmaceutical 
spending than global budgets. This is because budgets are borne directly by prescribing 
doctors who are individually accountable, thereby creating stronger incentives for 
physicians to reduce their spending. 
Rashidian et al. (2015) have systematically reviewed the impact of pharmaceutical 
interventions using financial incentives on prescribers’ behaviour (i.e. drug use, 
healthcare utilisation and expenditure). After evaluating eighteen studies of 
pharmaceutical policies from six high-income economies, they found that the utilization 
of budget caps may lead to a modest reduction in overall drug use (item per patient or 
prescription) and an increase in the use of generic drugs. However, these effects are 
uncertain because of the limitations recognized in the studies included. The authors also 
found some evidence that using pharmaceutical budget caps resulted in a reduction in 
drug cost per item or per patient/prescription (e.g. UK fund-holding studies) and 
therefore a decrease in total drug expenditure.  
Fischer et al. (2018) have investigated the impact of physician-level drug budgets (i.e. a 
predetermined maximum level of spending on pharmaceuticals for a specific period) in 
relation to the cost and quality of prescriptions based on panel data from 440 German 
outpatient physicians over 2005-2011. They estimated that the mean utilization of drug 
budgets was 92.3 percent across all physicians and years. The results from their 
regression model provide evidence that drug budgets’ utilization affects the cost and 
quality of prescribing. By analysing indicators of prescribing costs, the authors found 
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that a rise in imposing drug budgets in the previous year leads to a significant increase 
in generic share and concentration among generic brands. However, the number of 
prescriptions per visit and the number of branded prescriptions remain unaffected. By 
examining the indicators of prescribing quality, they found an increase in drug budgets 
raises the share of prescriptions deemed inappropriate for the elderly while reducing the 
concentration among therapeutic substances. 
The above evidence shows that the utilization of revenue restrictions often leads to 
reductions in the volume of service prescribed and the total pharmaceutical industry 
spend. Physicians under such restrictions also tend to prescribe less expensive 
pharmaceuticals. Furthermore, the restrictions implemented at the individual level are 
more effective in controlling costs than those imposed at a global or regional level. 
However, some of the above evidence also shows that global budgets only reduce total 
healthcare expenditure in the short term and may lead to an increase in service provision 
as the revenue restriction drives competition between physicians. In Chapters 3 and 4 I 
show that my results are consistent with observations that imposing the physician 
specific budget restriction is effective in (1) limiting the growth of quantity of service 
provided per patient and total health spending and (2) improving the efficiency of 
healthcare system. 
 
2.3.3.2 Quantity Restriction 
Quantity restriction in this literature review refers to the maximum quantity of health 
service that a physician can prescribe to a given patient. The purpose of introducing a 
quantity restriction is to maintain patients’ health (e.g. to prevent addiction to or reliance 
on certain types of drugs) and to control costs. This type of restriction has been widely 
used in terms of limiting physician drug prescriptions (Stabile et al., 2013). In the 
following section I discuss some examples of implementing drug prescription limits and 
their impact. In Chapters 3 and 4, I show that my research findings reflect some of these 
results. 
Recently, the misuse of and addiction to opioids (e.g. pain relievers, heroin, and fentanyl) 
has become a national crisis impacting on public health and social welfare in developed 
countries such as the US and the UK (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2019). In the 
US, opioid-related deaths have increased nearly fourfold from 1999 to 2014 (Jones et 
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al., 2018). In 2018, opioids overdose increased a further 30% compared to 2017 while 
the country had already provided 30 times more opioid pain relief medication than 
necessary (BBC, 2018). In the UK, the NHS has been accused of fuelling a rise in opioid 
addiction; from 2007 to 2017, opioid prescriptions increased by 10 million and over 50% 
of drug overdose deaths were related to opioids (Rhodes, 2018). To counter the 
aforementioned adverse effects, states such as New York and Massachusetts limited the 
length of initial prescriptions of opioid pain medication – typically to fewer than seven 
days (Scully et al., 2018). Moreover, prescription drug monitoring programmes have 
been introduced on an increasingly common basis (Scully et al., 2018). 
There is some evidence that the utilization of opioid prescription limits has had a positive 
impact. For instance, Express Scripts launched a one-year pilot programme limiting new 
opioid users to seven-day prescriptions (Salter, 2017). The analysis of 106,000 patients 
in the pilot programme showed a 38% reduction in hospitalizations and a 40% reduction 
in emergency room visits compared to a control group (Chua, et al., 2019). Another 
research studying the impact of a similar programme by CVS Caremark also found that 
physicians have reduced opioid prescriptions by 17% a few years after the programme 
was initiated and directed patients to other forms of pain management, including 
physical and cognitive behavioural therapy (Chua et al., 2019). 
However, there is also some evidence showing that the utilization of opioid prescription 
limits has failed to achieve its intended effects (i.e. preventing excessive opioid 
prescribing and maintaining adequate pain control). For example, a recent report by the 
U.S. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration in 2014 found that 
about half of those who misused prescribed pain killers in the previous year obtained the 
pain relievers from a friend or relative for free. Moreover, around 10% frequent users of 
pain relievers said they have bought pain relievers from either friends or relatives. A 
total of 22% of patients said they obtained their drugs from one doctor. Finally, around 
4% of painkiller users indicated that they obtained their most recently misused pain 
relievers from sources other than their physicians (Lipari and Hughes, 2017). 
Chua et al. (2019) have also argued that imposing limits on opioid prescribing is unlikely 
to achieve its intended effects (i.e. preventing excessive opioid prescribing and 
maintaining adequate pain control) because a uniform restriction may not satisfy patients’ 
heterogeneous combinations of opioid use and pain needs. In the presence of this 
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heterogeneity, the restriction may either be set too high to reduce excessive prescribing 
or set too low to avoid the potential for inadequate pain control.  
When the regulator imposes a certain opioid prescribing limit (e.g. a 5-day supply 
restriction), Kao-Ping Chua et al. (2019) suggest that all patients can be roughly divided 
into three groups: (1) patients who would initially be provided an amount equal to or 
less than the given limit; (2) patients who would receive an amount that is more than the 
given limit but consume the given limited amount or less; (3) patients who would receive 
and consume an amount more than the given limit. The authors suggest that the 
utilization of a prescription limit would not affect the volume of opioid prescription and 
pain control in the first group but could prevent some excessive prescribing in the second 
group. In the last group, the restriction may prevent excessive prescribing but increase 
the potential for inadequate pain control. Overall, they conclude that imposing limits on 
opioid prescription will likely have some positive effects, particularly among physicians 
who would not change their practice in the absence of a mandate. However, this 
desirable effect tends to be small and may even be offset by undesirable effects in 
relation to pain control. 
Fan et al. (1998) have compared the quantity of service supplied by fee-for-service 
physicians under quotas and a global budget cap. They found in both symmetric (SNE) 
and strong symmetric Nash equilibrium (SSNE), physicians would provide a greater 
quantity of health service under a global expenditure cap than under a quantity restriction 
when physicians are reimbursed at the same budget level. Their experimental results 
show that physicians’ profit maximization prediction is well captured by subjects’ 
behaviour under the quantity restriction. However, under the expenditure cap only SNE 
predictions are supported.  
To conclude, this subsection provides some evidence regarding the impact of utilizing 
prescription limits (quantity restriction) to restrict excessive medical service provision. 
This evidence suggests that the implementation of a prescription limit does indeed 
incentivise physicians to reduce prescriptions. This decreases patients’ reliance on 
certain types of drugs and reduces their total costs incurred. However, given the 
heterogeneity of patient demands, a uniform limit may not always control excessive drug 
prescribing while lead to inadequate pain control for some patients. Moreover, given the 
same level of spending, laboratory experiments show physicians under an expenditure 
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cap would provide more service than under quantity restriction (Fan et al., 1998; 
Benstetter and Wambach, 2006).  
My numerical results are consistent with some of the aforementioned evidence. For 
instance, my numerical findings are in line with the findings that imposing quantity 
rationing (1) does not always help controlling excessive prescribing, (2) may control 
medical service provision and result in a social welfare improvement, and (3) may not 
be as effective as imposing revenue restrictions. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
In this survey of the literature, I have provided a comprehensive review of the theory 
and evidence relating to altruism, physician behaviour, the design of physician payment 
mechanisms and the various implementations of physician cost control restrictions. 
Several core themes emerged: First, scarcity plays a key role in allocating health 
resources. Consumers have unlimited demands but healthcare providers and social 
planners are restricted in their resources or inclination to engage with patients; Second, 
physicians are not solely extrinsically motivated but care about their patients’ welfare. 
This additional motivation has important implications in terms of the design of social 
objectives and physician remuneration. I show physician altruism has often been used 
in models analysing physician behaviour. This assumption has also been supported by 
different types of evidence; Third, information asymmetries lead to inefficiencies and 
these costs are borne by society. Information asymmetries can take varies forms and are 
associated with problems such as moral hazard and adverse selection. Fourth, commonly 
used physician remuneration scheme such as fee-for-service, capitation or cost-
reimbursement may fail to provide physicians with the correct incentives (McGuire, 
2000; Léger, 2008). This motivates a thorough understanding of physicians’ incentives 
under each individual payment system (McGuire, 2000). The literature shows that 
physicians increase quantities of service provided in line with price and may 
overproduce under the fee-for-service system (Léger, 2008). Under full cost-
reimbursement, physicians often provide the constrained optimal level of quality while 
exerting zero cost-reduction efforts (Ma, 1998; Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998a). In 
contrast, under the prospective/capitation system, physicians often under-produce 
(McGuire, 2000; Léger, 2008). Moreover, they provide the first best cost reduction 
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efforts and their quality of service provided increases with capitation rate when 
physicians do not select their practice sizes. 
Fifth, this survey discusses the optimal design of physician payment in an environment 
with respective types of information asymmetry. While a menu of contracts has often 
been proposed as the optimal physician remuneration scheme in the presence of adverse 
selection (Chalkley and Malcomson, 2002; Makris, 2009; Makris and Siciliani, 2013), 
the same allocation under this remuneration can be indirectly implemented by a single 
payment based on the outcome of physicians’ production. Moreover, the tension caused 
by incentive compatibility between quantities and non-negative profit (Choné and Ma, 
2011), the unachievable single crossing property, the incentive to renegotiate and select 
low costly patients indicate a single physician payment might be a better option. There 
is also limited evidence supporting the implementation of a menu of contracts.  
Since a single remuneration scheme may not be able to align all physicians’ incentives 
while a menu of contracts is difficult to implement, it is reasonable to consider an 
alternative method- introducing a single physician payment system some cost-control 
restrictions. In particular, I discussed a small literature analysing the impact of 
introducing alternative physician cost control restrictions on the most commonly used 
fee-for-service system (Neudeck, 1991; Fan, et al., 1998; Benstetter and Wambach, 
2006). This literature shows that introducing FFS system a quantity rationing maybe 
effective in improving patients’ health benefits. Moreover, imposing an expenditure cap 
on FFS system induce physicians to produce more service than imposing a quota, if 
physicians are provided with the same level of budget. These results are shown to be 
consistent with some empirical observations. However, this literature neither considers 
main features of the healthcare market nor does it recommend the optimal form of 
physician payment. As a result, the main objective of the ensuing chapters is to address 
this gap, analysing physicians’ behaviour under a mixture of standard remuneration and 
cost-containing instruments, while recommending the optimal payment system without 
assuming away key features of the healthcare market.  
Despite the aforementioned contributions, this literature survey has some limitations. 
First, while altruistic preference plays an essential role in modelling physician behaviour 
and the design of their payment, this review only highlights the main approach of 
modelling and provides some evidence regarding the existence of physician altruism. 
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Research on the modelling of altruism in non-health related fields and its impact on 
economic agents’ behaviour are largely ignored. Second, this literature review does not 
consider the emerging literature analysing physician behaviour under either pay-for-
performance or cost-sharing. The former system was proposed in recent years and has 
been shown to lack an empirical foundation and evaluation (Mannion and Davies, 2008). 
Developed countries have been reluctant to use the cost sharing system (e.g. the UK and 
US) as it may lead to cost padding and needs to be closely monitored (Chalkley and 
Malcomson, 2002). Finally, this chapter also does not discuss the effect of introducing 
cost-control mechanisms in a significant detail. The reason for delaying a systematic 
review of this literature is threefold: (1) There is little consensus on the definition of the 
cost-control instruments such as quantity rationing (Keliddar et al., 2017). For instance, 
quantity restriction not only means limiting the amount of services, equipment, and time 
provided to patients, but also reflects constraints regarding the number of contracts 
offered to doctors (Neudeck, 1991); (2) My study focuses exclusively on the quantity 
rationing or revenue cap imposed at per patient or physician level. As a result, studies 
analysing the effect of introducing cost containing instruments at a regional or global 
level are largely excluded; (3) Cost control instruments have been imposed worldwide 
and under different health insurance schemes. In this survey, I mainly consider those 
instruments that have been imposed on fee-for-service systems.  
In addition to the above limitations, there are several interesting questions which have 
received relatively little attention, or have yet to be studied. These include whether the 
theoretical evaluation of cost control policies can be more inclusive? Could models in 
the literature extend to the environment with multi-dimensional adverse selection and 
moral hazard? How would results be changed if patients can negotiate with their 
physician about the quantity of service to be supplied or if either providers or the 
regulator are risk-averse? 
Most studies only analyse the FFS physician behaviour under one cost control policy 
(e.g. Neudeck, 1991; Mougeot and Naegelen, 2005; Benstetter and Wambach, 2006). 
Fan et al. (1998) have compared the physician’s supply of medical service under a quota 
and an expenditure cap. The most recent study, Wu et al. (2018), has investigated the 
optimal design of a menu of contracts when the regulator can use fee-for-service, 
capitation and pay-for-performance. Hence, it would be interesting to see a model which 
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is able to compare the impact of introducing the FFS system capitation, salary, pay-for-
performance, cost-sharing, quantity and revenue rationing simultaneously.  
Ma and McGuire (1997) have derived the optimal insurance for patients and the optimal 
remuneration method for physicians when neither the patient selected medical service 
quantity nor the physician decided effort are contractible. Lien et al. (2004) then 
generalized this analysis by introducing the possibility of persuasion, the physician-set 
quantity ceiling and unknown patients’ preferences. While these studies consider patient 
decisions regarding the quantity of service supplied and the design of their payment, 
their design of physician payment only includes fee-for-service and a lump sum payment. 
The impact of introducing different types of cost control policies are ignored. Moreover, 
their models do not consider essential features of the healthcare market such as physician 
altruism and unknown heterogeneity. Hence, it will be interesting to see how the optimal 
design of patient insurance and physician payment should be adjusted if the above 
characteristics are considered. 
The contract theory of economics shows that risk preferences influence a variety of 
behaviours under the condition of uncertainty (Holmstrom, 1979). Given the prevalence 
of such conditions regarding questions of health care provision, there is a rich literature 
on risk attitudes in the health sector, focused on measuring patient preferences and 
propensity towards risk (Arrieta et al., 2017; Liu and Ma, 2013). While physicians’ risk 
attitudes also play an essential role in determining health service provision, this issue 
has received comparatively little attention (Arrieta et al., 2017; Galizzi et al., 2013). 
Eeckhoudt et al. (1985) first developed a simple model analysing how a physician’s 
decision concerning the provision of treatment intensity is affected by his level of risk 
aversion and technological innovations. However, their setup did not consider many 
essential features of the healthcare market such as asymmetric information, physician 
altruism, physician and patient heterogeneities, as well as cost-control policies. Recent 
studies such as Arrieta et al. (2017), Bories et al. (2018) and Lawton et al. (2019) have 
discussed how physicians’ risk attitudes affect their diagnostic and therapeutic patient 
decisions. However, these studies and the literature cited in these papers are mainly 
empirical or experimental. Accordingly, it would be interesting to develop analytical 
frameworks that can analyse how physicians’ decisions regarding their practice size, 
effort, quantity or the quality of service provided is affected by asymmetric information 
as well as altruistic and risk-averse preferences.  
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Chapter 3. The Optimal Design of Fee-for-Service Contract 1 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the first chapter of the thesis I emphasise that the importance of improving health 
resource usage efficiency as health expenditure has already constituted a significant 
proportion of GDP and the trend is continuously upward. It is shown that primary care 
physicians (PCPs) play a vital role in directing health resource allocation, therefore, it is 
important to investigate the design of physicians’ incentive contracting. In particular, I 
focus on analysing incentive contracting on the basis of fee-for-service, which is one of 
the most commonly used PCP payment systems in the US, Canada, Belgium and many 
other countries (Emery et al., 1999; Kringos et al., 2015; Porter and Kaplan, 2014). 
The second chapter discusses the literature, which analyses physician altruism and the 
optimal design of physician incentives. This literature provides a strong support for the 
existence of provider altruism;23 as a result, I follow the well-established approach by 
Ellis and McGuire (1986) and introduce physician altruism in the setup in this chapter. 
This literature survey also shows that it is natural to propose a menu of contract across 
physicians if they have private knowledge about their degree of altruism and patients’ 
illness severity. However, as discussed in the survey, the allocation of a menu of 
contracts can be indirectly implemented by a single payment system depending on an 
output of the production process and there are many difficulties associated with 
implementing a menu of contracts directly. Hence, this chapter focuses on the design of 
an optimal single health insurance scheme. 
While providing heterogeneous physicians with a single payment is popular among 
developed economies, results from the survey suggest that it fails to align different 
providers’ incentives and drives up health expenditure. As a result, cost control 
policies24 should be introduced to enhance efficiency. In the literature review, I find that 
analytical frameworks used in these studies do not consider some of the key features of 
health insurance systems. In this chapter, however, I analyse the optimal design of a 
                                                 
23 ‘Provider altruism’ refers to physicians not only caring about financial returns but also having concerns 
about their patients’ health benefits (Ellis and McGuire, 1986, p.131). 
24 I also refer to these cost-control policies as “cost-controlling” or “cost-containing” instruments hereafter. 
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single compensation scheme given that physicians are paid on a FFS basis while 
analysing the impact of information asymmetry and the utilization of physician cost 
control restrictions. Intuitively, in the presence of unknown and heterogeneous types of 
PCPs, not all physicians’ incentives will be affected by the introduction of cost-
containing instruments. As a result, social planners can align incentives of different 
types of physicians by using cost-controlling methods and price respectively. 
This chapter makes three distinctive contributions: First, my setup captures the key 
features of health insurance schemes in developed countries. For instance, I have 
modelled patient insurance, physician altruism and issues relating to information 
asymmetry; Second, comparative static analysis based on a numerical exercise allows 
us to recommend the optimal adjustment of the HI scheme to current trends such as 
ageing populations, declining medical altruism and technological advances; Finally, my 
analysis provides a framework for comparing different healthcare expenditure control 
instruments.  
In line with the results obtained from my literature survey, this chapter shows that an 
optimal pricing system is not able to align physicians’ incentives and therefore fails to 
achieve Pareto-efficiency. This study also shows that current trends such as ageing 
populations, the increase in the proportion of the less altruistic doctors and medical 
innovations have further distorted physicians’ incentives and driven up total healthcare 
expenditures. In addition, I find in my numerical analysis that the commonly used cost 
control policies such as quantity rationing, expenditure caps and capitation can be 
imposed on FFS payment systems to improve social well-being as measured by the sum 
of patients’ health benefits and the costs associated with running a healthcare system. In 
particular, it is shown that introducing a negative capitation25 to pricing system yields 
the highest social well-being.  
The main implication of this result is that the regulator can use the “bonding contract” 
or the “franchise agreement” to contain healthcare spending and to align different types 
of doctor incentives. Specifically, the negative reimbursement per patient is used to limit 
high intrinsically motivated physicians’ overproduction and to extract informational rent 
                                                 
25 I obtain this result since I do not consider the administrative/fixed costs of treating patients. Once these 
costs are introduced, it can be shown that the optimal payment system requires a positive capitation that 
does not fully cover the fixed/administrative costs associated with enrolling an additional patient. 
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from extrinsically motivated doctors. On the other hand, the price per unit of service is 
raised to incentivise medical service production by low intrinsically motivated doctors. 
To capture these notions, I developed a model in which the regulator (the principal) 
chooses a per patient insurance premium and reimbursement price per unit of service 
provided to maximize social welfare measured by summing up all individuals’ utilities. 
Physicians subsequently decide the quantity of medical service provided per patient to 
maximize their weighted sum of treated patients’ health benefits and their financial 
returns under the constraint that their profit is non-negative. A degree of the physician’s 
altruism is represented by the weight in the doctor’s utility function attached to his 
patients’ health benefits (Galizzi et al., 2015). This approach is applied in the study not 
only because it has been well-established in theory, but also because fieldwork and 
laboratory experiments have provided evidence for physician altruism. For instance, 
Jacobsen et al. (2011), Smith et al. (2012) and Kolstad and Lindkvist (2012) found that 
medical students tend to donate significantly more of their endowments than students 
from other subjects. Brosig‐Koch et al. (2017), Godager and Wiesen (2013), and 
Godager et al. (2016) show in their laboratory experiments that physicians’ decisions on 
medical service quantity is affected significantly by information regarding patients’ 
health benefits. Finally, based on physicians’ response to price variations, the regulator 
selects an optimal price (insurance premium) and decides whether cost-control 
instruments should be used to further enhance efficiency. While the cost containing 
instruments analysed in this chapter are relatively crude, they represent some important 
applications in reality. For instance, the quantity rationing and expenditure restriction 
can be respectively interpreted as the current drug/pain killer prescription limit imposed 
per patient, as well as the expenditure ceiling introduced in quality adjusted life years 
(QALY) or diagnosis-related groups (DRG). 
In the first part of this chapter, I solve the physician’s optimization problem and 
characterize his supply of medical service per type of patient as a function of price. 
Specifically, these supply curves are solved when the number of patients allocated is 
fixed,26 while the fraction of alternative types of patients and the degree of physician 
altruism are assumed exogenously given. I find that the physician increases his medical 
                                                 
26 To make the analysis tractable, I first ignore the fact that physicians in reality may be able to select their 
roster sizes. I also ignore competition between physicians for patients. As a result, the number of patients 
allocated per physician does not depend on the intensity of medical service provided by a given physician. 
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service provided per patient in line with price but at a different rate depending on 
whether his profit is binding. Less healthy individuals are always provided with a higher 
intensity of medical service. Finally, the medical service provided per patient is 
increasing whereas the profit is non-increasing in relation to the degree of physician 
altruism. 
Next, given the physician’s supply functions to alternative types of patient, I derive the 
welfare-maximizing price and insurance premium in the presence of moral hazard and 
adverse selection. The former issue is captured by randomized patient health benefits 
whereas the latter is represented by an unknown degree of physician altruism. For the 
sake of simplicity, only two types of physicians are introduced – namely, more or less 
altruistic – while their fractions are also assumed to be fixed. Because of moral hazard 
and adverse selection, the optimal pricing scheme is incapable of bridging the difference 
in intrinsic and extrinsic motivation across medical staff, resulting in medical service 
over- and underproduction by strongly (H-) and weakly (L-) motivated doctors 
respectively. The over (and under) production is defined by comparing the current 
production of H(L)- type physicians with what would be produced if there are only H(L-) 
type doctors in the economy. 
In the third part of this study I present a detailed comparative static analysis of an optimal 
HI scheme by employing a numerical simulation (due to the large system and non-
differentiable physician supply functions), which enables a solution of the optimal price 
and insurance premium as a function of the system’s exogenous parameters (i.e. patients’ 
initial health level, the proportion of the less altruistic physicians etc.). As variations 
with respect to some of these parameters can be interpreted as the evolution of recent 
trends (e.g. ageing or scientific progress etc.), the study recommends the best response 
of the HI scheme to these trends. My numerical analysis suggests that the optimal HI 
scheme would raise the price and insurance premium per person as population ages, as 
the proportion of less altruistic doctors increases, and as technology advances 27 . 
However, the optimal HI scheme would reduce the price and insurance premium as 
healthy life-styles such as eating vegetables and walking 10,000 steps every day are 
                                                 
27 In the model these are formally captured by an increase in the share of the less healthy patients, the 
proportion of less altruistic providers, and a technology parameter. 
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promoted. These predictions are found to match related trends in reality (Bauchner and 
Fontanarosa, 2018; Papanicolas et al., 2018). 
In the last part of this chapter, I evaluate three simple cost-control instruments – per 
patient quantity rationing, per patient expenditure caps, and capitation that might be 
imposed on the pricing system – to further improve efficiency. My result shows that all 
three instruments can be imposed on the optimal pricing system to enhance efficiency, 
but to different extents; I found that blending price system with “negative capitation” as 
a bonding contract dominates the other instruments, as the payment by doctors helps to 
align physicians’ incentives and extract their informational rent. Moreover, imposing a 
per patient revenue cap is superior to per patient quantity restriction, as the latter is not 
able to react to providers’ local knowledge.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides a short 
summary of the most relevant studies while Section 3.3 introduces the model. Section 
3.4 solves the physician’s constrained optimization problem as a function of a price set 
by the regulator. Section 3.5 sets up the optimization of the HI scheme and proves the 
existence of the solution while providing a comparative static analysis of the optimal HI 
scheme as a function of exogenous parameters based on numerical experiments. Finally, 
Section 3.6 evaluates different cost control instruments and derives the optimal form of 
a HI scheme. Sections 3.7 and 3.8 conclude the chapter and outlining some potential 
ways of extending this analysis. Section 3.9 provides all proofs. 
 
3.2 Related Literature 
This study is closely related to the literature which analyses the impact of introducing 
cost-controlling methods in a fee-for-service system (Benstetter and Wambach, 2006; 
Fan et al., 1998). As discussed in the previous survey, major issues discussed in this 
literature are (1) how physicians’ incentives are affected, and (2) how is the impact of 
using cost-contain instruments measured? Most papers from this literature have 
investigated the effect of cost-control methods on a self-interested physician’s decision 
on medical service quantity and the overall impact on society, which are measured 
respectively as: the total quantity of medical service produced under the same budget 
level (Fan et al. 1998; Benstetter and Wambach, 2006); patients’ total health benefits 
(Neudeck, 1991); and the sum of both patients and providers’ well-being (Mougeot and 
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Naegelen, 2005). However, these studies have ignored some main features of the 
primary healthcare market such as the application of health insurance schemes, 
information asymmetries, as well as physician altruism.  
Altogether, this chapter contributes to the literature by introducing in the existing setups 
moral hazard and adverse selection problems between the regulator and PCPs, patient 
heterogeneity, physician altruism and the publicly financed health insurance system. 
This is important because the above extensions help us to understand FFS-based PCPs’ 
decisions concerning the supply of medical service and their incentive contracting in a 
more realistic manner. My contributions also enable us to evaluate different cost-control 
mechanisms by comparing their respective generation of social well-being. This allows 
us to make both qualitative and quantitative recommendations for future PCP 
remuneration reforms, including which type of cost-control instruments should be used 
and the policies reflect the maximum quantity or expenditure that PCPs are allowed to 
produce or spend respectively. 
Since inefficient health resource allocation mainly arises from asymmetric information 
between providers and patients, this chapter also relates to the literature which has 
investigated physician incentive contracting in the presence of moral hazard and adverse 
selection (Choné and Ma, 2011; Jack, 2005; Kantarevic and Kralj, 2016). The main 
conclusion is that physicians should be offered a menu comprising negative-related 
retrospective and prospective components across contracts. However, this result is 
typically based on the setup where the physician only treats a single patient. When the 
physician has multiple patients with different severities of illness, their aggregated 
health benefits may violate a single crossing property. In reality, a menu of contracts 
have rarely been used to compensate physicians as it may lead to a two-tier healthcare 
system (Kay, 2002) and leave high informational rent for some physicians (Croxson et 
al., 2001). Furthermore, under this payment system the regulator and physicians have an 
incentive to renegotiate their contracts when physicians’ private information is revealed 
by their selection of contracts. Finally, the literature on “the delegation principle” shows 
that the allocation of a contract menu can be implemented by a single payment system 





Consider an economy consisting of a benevolent regulator and two types of risk-neutral 
individuals, namely patients and doctors. Patients are indexed by the subscript 𝑖 =
1,2, . . . , 𝑁 and doctors by the superscript 𝑗 = 1,2, . . . , 𝑀 where the parameters 𝑁,𝑀 and 
𝑛 =  𝑁,𝑀 are sufficiently large to apply the law of large numbers whenever needed. 
The benevolent regulator determines the health insurance scheme (hereafter HI), 
including the insurance premium and the price of medical services.  
From patients’ perspectives, all doctors appear alike. As a result, I assume that patients 
are allocated randomly to doctors. Patients have identical preferences over their health 
level and their health insurance costs. These preferences are represented by the linear 
utility function: 
 𝑢(ℎ, 𝜏) = ℎ̂ − 𝜏 (23) 
where ℎ̂  denotes the indicator of patient’s health level and 𝜏  the health insurance 
premium. 28  The patient’s health indicator is itself a function of three 
variables,  ℎ̂(𝑧𝑖, 𝑞𝑖, 𝜉𝑖) , where 𝑧𝑖  denotes the initial health level of patient 𝑖 , 𝑞𝑖  the 
quantity of medical service provided to him, and 𝜉𝑖 denotes the realization of random 
shock. The initial health status of an individual is itself a random variable 𝑧𝑖 ∈ {0, 𝑧} 
with 0 < 𝑧 < 1  and  𝑃𝑟[𝑧𝑖 = 0] = 𝛽 . For any individual, the realization of  𝑧𝑖  is 
assumed to be observable only by the doctor. In contrast, the quantity of health service 
is assumed to be verifiable. Finally, the random shock 𝜉𝑖 are assumed to be 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑 log-
normally distributed across patients with 𝜉𝑖~ln𝒩 (−
1
2
, 1),29 hence the distribution of 
 𝜉𝑖 implies 𝔼[𝜉𝑖] = 1. For parsimony of analysis, I impose a specific functional form:  
 ℎ̂(𝑧, 𝑞, 𝜉) = ℎ(𝑧, 𝑞)𝜉 (24) 
Where ℎ(𝑧, 𝑞) denotes the real health of a patient and it takes the form ℎ(𝑧, 𝑞) = 𝑧 +
(1 − 𝑧)𝑓(𝑞). 𝑓(𝑞) is a strictly increasing concave function with 𝑓′(0) = +∞, 𝑓(0) =
0 and lim
𝑞→+∞
𝑓(𝑞) = 1.30 Accordingly, an individual’s health increases with his initial 
                                                 
28 For similar approach, see Ellis and McGuire (1990) and Lee (1995). 





30 While ℎ ∈ [0,1] and ℎ̂ ∈ [0, +∞), we can find a function 𝑔(. ) such that 𝑔(ℎ̂) → ℎ. 
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health and the quantity of health service being provided. The marginal patient benefits 
of consuming health service decrease with the patient initial health and quantity of 
service provided respectively. Moreover, individual’s health has both lower and upper 
bounds. The introduction of the random shock 𝜉𝑖  prevents that patient or the health 
insurance scheme from deducting the patient initial health status by looking at his 
quantity of service provided. 
Each doctor provides medical services to 𝑛 individuals. The set of patients allocated to 
doctor 𝑗  is indexed by  𝐼(𝑗) = {𝑖 = (𝑗 − 1)𝑛 + 𝑙 | 𝑙 = 1, … , 𝑛} .31  Moreover, from the 
foregoing description of patients, doctor j’s clientele is fully described by the vector of 
initial health status associated with each individual denoted hereafter by the vector 𝒛𝒋  =
 (𝑧(𝑗−1 )𝑛+1 , . . . ,  𝑧 𝑛𝑗). In analogy, 𝒒
𝒋  = ( 𝑞( 𝑗−1 ) 𝑛+1  , . . . ,  𝑞𝑛𝑗)  denotes the vector of 
medical services provided by doctor 𝑗 to his patients. This production generates the costs: 
 
?̃?(𝒒𝒋 ) = 𝐶 ( ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑖∈𝐼(𝑗)
) (25) 
where 𝐶(. ) is a strictly increasing and convex function which satisfies 𝐶(0) = 𝐶′(0) =
0 and 𝐶′′′(. ) > 0. For a given per unit price of medical service-𝑝, doctor 𝑗 who produces 
the vector of services 𝒒𝒋  obtains the profit: 
 
Π(𝒒𝒋 , 𝑝) = 𝑝 ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑖∈𝐼(𝑗)
− 𝐶 ( ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑖∈𝐼(𝑗)
) (26) 
Doctors have preferences that are others regarding32, meaning that physicians are not 
only motivated by their financial returns but the health benefits of their patients. Since 
the physician can observe the initial health of each of his patient, the health outcome of 
his patients is measured by: 
 𝐻(𝒛𝒋 , 𝒒𝒋 ) = ∑ ℎ(𝑧𝑖, 𝑞𝑖)
𝑖∈𝐼(𝑗)
 (27) 
                                                 
31 For simplicity, I denote ( 𝑗 − 1 ) ×  𝑛 + 1 and 𝑛 × 𝑗 by ( 𝑗 − 1 ) 𝑛 + 1 and 𝑛𝑗 respectively hereafter. 
32 “Preferences over another individual’s payoffs, in addition to one’s own”. The other regarding 
preferences is considered to be altruistic, if one’s utility is increasing with another person’s payoff. For 
more details, see Kaplow (2010) and the literature cited therein.  
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Using this notation, I assume that a doctor’s preferences can be represented by the utility 
function:33  
 𝑉(𝐻, Π, 𝛼𝑗) = 𝛼𝑗𝐻 + Π (28) 
where 𝛼𝑗 > 0  measures that doctor’s concern for his patient 34  which is his private 
information. For the sake of simplicity, I assume that the altruism level 𝛼𝑗 takes only 
two values -𝛼𝑗 ∈ {α𝐿 , α𝐻} with 0 < α𝐿 < α𝐻 ≤ 1 and denote by Λ the proportion of α𝐿-
type doctors. Finally, a non-negativity restriction is imposed on the profit of doctors. 
This restriction can be interpreted as a legal constraint in accordance with the idea that 
work must be paid.  
The benevolent regulator determines the health insurance scheme in order to maximize 
expected social welfare under a self-financing constraint. I follow the standard approach 
of regulation and procurement (Laffont and Tirole, 1993), which assumes the welfare 
sums up the utilities of all the participants in the industry, including the provider.35 
Altogether, let 𝐮 = (𝑢1, 𝑢2, … , 𝑢𝑁) denote the vector of a patient’s utilities and 𝚷 =









The self-financing constraint on the HI scheme requires: 
 




where the parameter 𝜆 > 0 denotes the shadow price associated with the HI scheme. 
Intuitively, it captures the administrative costs associated with collecting the insurance 
premium, verifying the medical services provided by doctors and running healthcare 
system. This equation shows that the money collected from all patients has to cover 
                                                 
33 For more examples, see Woodward and Warren-Boulton (1984), Ellis and McGuire (1986), Lee (1995), 
Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011), and Galizzi et al. (2015). 
34  From the point view of an individual doctor, the number of patients 𝑛  is exogenously given. 
Accordingly, doctor 𝑗's preferences can be equivalently described by 𝑉(𝐻, Π, 𝛼𝑗) = 𝛼𝑗𝐻 + Π̅ where 𝐻 
and Π̅ denote the respective average health and profit per patient. 
35 For more examples, see Buchanan (1988), Chalkley and Malcomson (1998), Jack (2005), and Jelovac 
and Kembou Nzale (2017). 
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payment to doctors and the shadow costs generated by the process of collecting 
insurance premium. 
In order to gain further insight regarding society’s objectives, observe that 𝑊(𝐮,𝚷) can 
be written differently. From the equation (23)  and (26),  ∑ 𝑢𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 = ∑ ℎ̂𝑖 − 𝑁𝜏
𝑁
𝑖=1  
and  ∑ Π𝑀𝑗=1 = ∑ [𝑝∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑖∈𝐼(𝑗) − 𝐶(∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑖∈𝐼(𝑗) )]
𝑀
𝑗=1 . Hence using the equation (30), 
substituting the definition of the respective doctor’s profit (26) and cancelling common 
















𝑖=1  measures total expected health benefits across patients. In this 
formulation of welfare function, the term 𝜆∑ 𝑝𝑞𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 +∑ 𝐶(∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑖∈𝐼(𝑗) )
𝑀
𝑗=1  represents the 
total health expenditure of the medical system. These expenditures sum up the costs of 
collecting the insurance premium, the costs of verifying the medical services through 
the HI scheme and the doctor’s actual costs of providing medical services. Altogether, 
the regulator problem is to find a HI scheme which maximizes (31) considering the 
doctor’s choices with respect to the provision of medical services. 
To conclude this section, a few remarks are in order. First, while I used a specific form 
of patient health function ℎ(𝑧, 𝑞) = 𝑧 + (1 − 𝑧)𝑓(𝑞), results derived from the ensuing 
sections does not rely on this specification. My results will be hold as long as health 
function ℎ(𝑧, 𝑞)  satisfies ℎ𝑧 , ℎ𝑞 > 0, ℎ𝑧𝑞 , ℎ𝑞𝑞 < 0 , ℎ𝑞(𝑧, 0) = +∞  and 
lim
𝑞→+∞
ℎ(𝑧, 𝑞) = 1. However, using this specification helps to provide simple intuitions 
for my results. 
Second, the multiplication of the random shock element 𝜉~ln𝒩 (−
1
2
, 1) to the health 
function (24) ensures that the value of patient health remains positive. In contrast to Ellis 
and McGuire (1986) and Barham and Milliken (2015), who respectively assume an 
inversely U-shaped and a Bell-shaped health function, I assume that health function 
ℎ(𝑧, 𝑞) is increasing and concave in 𝑞. This assumption reflects the idea that health 
service is provided in order to improve the patient’s health. Moreover, when physicians 
are allocated the same number of patients, the more altruistic physician provides more 




> 0).  
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Third, the equation (29) is chosen as the welfare function as the payer is assumed to be 
a benevolent regulator who (e.g. the NHS in the UK) cares about all participants’ well-
being. However, there are many other studies which only maximizes patients’ utilities. 
These studies assume that the payer is a risk-neutral insurance company or a regulator 
that operates in a competitive market (e.g. Wu et al., 2018). I do not use this approach 
as healthcare markets in most developed countries are not competitive. Finally, I exclude 
the altruistic benefits from social welfare function (29) to avoid the issue of double 
counting (Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998; Hammond, 1987; Jack, 2005). As Chalkley 
and Malcomson (1998) pointed out, “there is strong case to exclude the benevolent 
component from social welfare on the grounds that benevolence represents a desire to 
do what is in the social interest and, as such, should have no role in determining what 
the social interest is” (p. 6).  
 
3.4 The Physician’s Optimization  
In this section, I take the HI policy  (𝑝, 𝜏)  as given and solve the decision problem of a 
physician characterised by the generic parameter  𝛼 . From the previous section, the 
doctor has only two types of patients; 𝑛𝐺  of them are characterised by an initial health 
level 𝑧𝐺  = 𝑧  while the remaining 𝑛𝐵 patients have the initial health level  𝑧𝐵 = 0 , 
denoting the set of types by 𝑇 = {𝐵, 𝐺}. Slightly abusing the notation, I write 𝑞𝑡 ≥ 0 for 












𝑞𝑡 − 𝐶 (∑𝑛𝑡𝑞𝑡
𝑡∈𝑻
) ≥ 0 
 
(32) 
 𝑞𝑡 ≥ 0 
 
 
where the first line represents that the physician selects medical service (𝑞𝐵, 𝑞𝐺) to 
maximize his utility defined in the equation (28). The second and third lines show that 
the physician’s profit defined in the equation (26) and the medical service quantity 
80 
 
supplied to 𝐵- and 𝐺-type patients are non-negative. Writing the Lagrangian associated 
with the doctor’s optimization problem (32) yields: 
 ℒ =  𝛼∑𝑛𝑡[𝑧𝑡 + (1 − 𝑧𝑡)𝑓(𝑞𝑡)] +∑𝜇𝑡𝑞𝑡
𝑡∈𝑻𝑡∈𝑻
+ (1 + 𝜂) [𝑝∑𝑛𝑡
𝑡∈𝑻




where 𝜂 is the Lagrange multiplier for the profit constraint and the 𝜇𝑡 are the respective 
multipliers of the non-negative service restrictions. Keeping in mind that 𝑧𝐵 = 0 














′(𝑞𝐵) + (1 + 𝜂)𝑛𝐵[𝑝 − 𝐶
′(𝑄)] + 𝜇𝐵 = 0
𝛼(1 − 𝑧)𝑛𝐺𝑓
′(𝑞𝐺) + (1 + 𝜂)𝑛𝐺[𝑝 − 𝐶
′(𝑄)] + 𝜇𝐺 = 0
𝜂[𝑝𝑄 − 𝐶(𝑄)] = 0
𝜇𝐵𝑞𝐵 = 0
𝜇𝐺𝑞𝐺 = 0




where 𝑄 = 𝑛𝐵𝑞𝐵  +  𝑛𝐺𝑞𝐺  denotes the total production of medical services by the 
doctor. The first two equations in (34) are the first-order conditions with respect to 𝑞𝐵 
and 𝑞𝐺 . The next three lines in (34) are the corresponding complementary slackness 
conditions associated with the inequalities in the optimization problem. Finally, the last 
line provides restrictions on the respective multipliers of non-negative requirements for 
profit and services.  
In order to simplify notation, I use 𝑓′𝐺 as 𝑓
′(𝑞𝐺), 𝑓′𝐵 as 𝑓
′(𝑞𝐵), and 𝐶 , 𝐶′ , 𝐶′′ as 𝐶 (𝑄) , 
𝐶′ (𝑄) and 𝐶′′(𝑄) respectively whenever this is possible without confusion. Moreover, 
I denote the solution to the equation system (34) by the superscript “*”. Keeping in mind 
that the assumptions 𝑓′ (0)  = + ∞ and 𝛼 > 0, as a result the physician will always 
provide  𝑞𝐵
∗ , 𝑞𝐺
∗ > 0  whenever his service provision generates income (i.e.  𝑝 > 0 ). 










𝛼𝑓′𝐵 + (1 + 𝜂)[𝑝 − 𝐶
′(𝑄)] = 0
𝛼(1 − 𝑧)𝑓′𝐺 + (1 + 𝜂)[𝑝 − 𝐶
′(𝑄)] = 0





Lemma 3.1 For all 𝑝 > 0 , 𝑞𝐵
∗  > 𝑞𝐺
∗  >0. 
Proof. From the first two equations in (35), we obtain 𝑓′𝐵 = (1 − 𝑧)𝑓′𝐺 . As 𝑓′′ < 0 
and 0 < 𝑧 < 1, we have  𝑞𝐵
∗  > 𝑞𝐺
∗ > 0 . ∎ 
Intuitively, at the point where the doctor provides the same service to both types of 
patients (i.e. 𝑞𝐵
∗ = 𝑞𝐺
∗ ), price and marginal costs are the same but the marginal return 
from the altruistic component is larger for less healthy patients. Accordingly, holding 
the total amount of medical services constant and substituting services for the healthier 
patients while increasing the provision of the less healthy raises the doctor’s utility.  
Depending on whether the physician’s profit (i.e.Π∗(𝑝)) is binding, there are two 
possible cases: Π∗(𝑝) > 0 or Π∗(𝑝) = 0. I start with the former case where the profit is 
strictly positive. Specifically, I define the set 𝑷 = {𝑝 > 0|Π∗(𝑝) = 𝑝𝑄∗ − 𝐶(𝑄∗) > 0} 
and consider a price 𝑝 ∈ 𝑷. According to the third line of the system (35), we know that 
the multiplier 𝜂∗ = 0. As a result, the system (35) simplifies to: 
{
𝛼𝑓′𝐵 + 𝑝 − 𝐶
′(𝑄) = 0













Proof. See Appendix A1. ∎ 
This lemma shows the physician increases the medical service quantity per patient in 
line with the price and the increase in the service provided to the 𝐵-patient is higher than 
that provided to the 𝐺-patient. Intuitively, the price increase raises the marginal benefit 
of providing medical service to both types of patient so that the medical service provided 
per patient is adjusted upwards. However, as the production per patient goes up, the 
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marginal benefit of providing each unit of service is reduced. Since this reduction as a 
result of providing additional service to the 𝐵-patient is lower than that of the 𝐺-patient, 
the marginal increase in the service provided to the 𝐵-patient is therefore higher. 
 









Proof. See Appendix A2. ∎ 
This lemma shows that the physician increases the intensity of medical service provided 
per patient as his altruism level increases. Intuitively, the rise in physician altruism 
ceteris paribus increases the marginal benefit of providing medical service. As a result, 
the physician increases the medical service intensity. This lemma also shows that the 
physician raises intensity of medical service provided to the less healthy individual more 
because the subsequent reduction in marginal benefit as a result of providing additional 
service is relatively lower.    
 









Proof. See Appendix A3. ∎ 
In contrast to Lemma 3.3, this lemma shows that the physician reduces the intensity of 
service provided per patient as the proportion of less healthy individuals increase. 
Intuitively, the less healthy individual demands a higher amount of treatment than the 
healthier individual. As a result, the increase in the proportion of the less healthy 
individual ceteris paribus increases the marginal cost of providing medical service. To 
counter the effect, the physician reduces health service provided per patient. In particular, 
the reduction of health service provided to the less healthy individual is higher, as the 
subsequent raise in the marginal health benefit as a result of reducing additional service 
is relatively larger.     
Substituting 𝑞𝐵
∗ (𝑝)  and 𝑞𝐺
∗ (𝑝)36  into the total quantity of service provided yields 
𝑄∗(𝑝) = 𝑛𝐵𝑞𝐵
∗ (𝑝) + 𝑛𝐺𝑞𝐺
∗ (𝑝) which I use to define the doctor’s profit function: 
                                                 
36 In the ensuing analysis, I assume 𝛼, 𝛽 constant except in the Lemma 3.7 and 3.8.  
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 Π∗(𝑝) = 𝑝𝑄∗(𝑝) − 𝐶(𝑄∗(𝑝))  (37) 
Taking the first-order condition of (37) with respect to 𝑝, we obtain 
 𝜕Π∗(𝑝)
𝜕𝑝




I now verify the following result. 
 
Lemma 3.5 Let 𝑝0 denote the smallest 𝑝 such that 𝜂
∗(𝑝) = 0, we have 𝑷 = (𝑝0, +∞). 
Proof. In order to verify the claim, I show that for all  𝑝 > 𝑝0, Π
∗(𝑝) > 0. Clearly, 
when 𝑝 → 0, the non-negative profit constraint will become binding, i.e.  𝜂∗(𝑝) > 0. 
Intuitively, as 𝑝 becomes arbitrarily close to zero, the doctor’s revenue converges to zero 
but his marginal utility remains large due to the altruistic component. In contrast, for 
𝑝 → +∞ the profit constraint is not binding, i.e. 𝜂∗(𝑝) = 0.37 Since 𝜂∗(𝑝) is continuous 
in 𝑝, while there exists at least a price 𝑝0 such that the doctor’s profit is just binding, i.e. 
Π∗(𝑝0) = 0. 




+) > 0.39 From (38) and using the definition 




+) = 𝑄∗ − (𝑝0 − 𝐶′)
𝑛𝐺𝑓′′𝐵 + 𝑛𝐵(1 − 𝑧)𝑓′′𝐺
𝛼(1 − 𝑧)𝑓′′𝐵𝑓′′𝐺 − 𝐶′′[𝑛𝐺𝑓′′𝐵 + 𝑛𝐵(1 − 𝑧)𝑓′′𝐺]
 (39) 
Hence, we want to show: 
 𝛼(1 − 𝑧)𝑄∗𝑓′′𝐵𝑓′′𝐺 − [𝑄










Keeping in mind that 𝛼(1 − 𝑧)𝑄∗𝑓′′𝐵𝑓′′𝐺 ≥ 0 and  𝑛𝐺𝑓
′′
𝐵
+ 𝑛𝐵(1 − 𝑧)𝑓
′′
𝐺
< 0 , the 
condition 𝐶′′′ > 0 ensures 𝑄∗𝐶′′ − 𝐶′(𝑄∗) + 𝑝0 > 0. As a result, the inequality (40) is 
                                                 
37 Ceteris paribus, the price increase directly raises the physician’s profit.  
38 This assumption is sufficient but clearly not necessary. For instance, lemma 3.5 will still hold if we 
assume 𝑄2𝐶′′ − 𝑄𝐶′(𝑄∗) + 𝐶 > 0. However, this assumption does not have non-technical meaning in 
reality. Instead, 𝐶′′′ > 0 is chosen as it can be naturally interpreted as an increasing and convex marginal 
cost. 
39 The function Π∗(𝑝) is not differentiable at 𝑝 = 𝑝0. I denote by 𝑝0
+ and 𝑝0
− the respective right- and left-
hand derivatives w.r.t. 𝑝 at 𝑝 = 𝑝0. 
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satisfied. 40 To conclude the proof, suppose that in contradiction to the claim there exists 
a price 𝑝 > 𝑝0 with Π
∗(𝑝) = 0. Then, by continuity, there exists a ?̂? > 𝑝0 with Π
∗(?̂?) =
0, and  
𝜕Π∗
𝜕𝑝
(?̂?−) < 0. However, this is not possible because following the same logical 
steps (38)-(40) would yield 
∂Π∗
𝜕𝑝
(?̂?−) > 0, which is a contradiction, thereby verifying the 
claim. ∎ 
Lemma 3.5 tells us that the physician’s profit can be partitioned by a unique critical 
price 𝑝0. Intuitively, as the physician obtains a positive profit for a sufficiently high price 
but a zero-profit if the payment is zero, there must be some price that the physician’s 
profit is just binding. Furthermore, as the physician’s profit is non-decreasing at the 
critical price, there exists only one critical price since otherwise the physician’s profit at 
critical price is negative. 
For the other case where the physician’s profit is binding, i.e.,𝑝 ∉ 𝑷 the system (35) 
simplifies to the following equation because we know that  Π∗(𝑝) = 0 . Hence, the 
quantity of medical services which maximize the doctor’s utility are implicitly defined 
by: 
{
𝑓′(𝑞𝐵) − (1 − 𝑧)𝑓′(𝑞𝐺) = 0




We can now use this system to complete the derivation of 𝑞𝐵
∗  and 𝑞𝐺
∗ . Altogether, we 
obtain the following result that there is only one way to obtain zero profit (i.e. set 𝑀𝑅 =
𝑀𝐶 and Π = 0). For all 𝑝 < 𝑝0, we can again apply the implicit function theorem to 
system (41) and obtain the following Lemma. 
 
Lemma 3.6 For all 𝑝 ∈ ℛ+/{𝑝0} > 0, the service supply function  𝑞𝑡
∗(𝑝)  for 𝑡 ∈ {𝐵, 𝐺} 




















Proof. See Appendix A4. ∎ 
                                                 
40 While the condition (18) is sufficient, it is clearly not necessary. 
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The result with respect to the left- and right-hand slope of the physician’s supply 
function 𝑞𝑡
∗(𝑝)  at the point 𝑝0  follows directly from the assumption 𝐶
′′′ > 0 . The 
intuition is straightforward for the case where both types of patient have the same health 
status, i.e. technically for 𝑧𝐵 = 𝑧𝐺 = 𝑧 = 0, so that 𝑞𝐺 = 𝑞𝐵 is denoted hereafter by 𝑞. 
Using the above notation, if the doctor’s profit is binding, i.e. 𝑝 ∉ 𝑷, the solution 𝑞∗ is 
implicitly defined by 𝑛𝑝𝑞 − 𝐶(𝑛𝑞) = 0. Hence, calculating the first order condition 







Alternatively, if 𝑝 ∈ 𝑷, the doctor profit is not binding, and the solution is defined by 







In Lemma 3.5 we show the intuitive result that 𝑷 = (𝑝0, +∞) which simply states that 
there is a critical price level above which doctors make a positive profit. Note, however, 
that at the point 𝑝0, while profit and quantity are continuous in price, they are not 
differentiable. For 𝑧 = 0, it is now immediate from 𝐶′′′ > 0 that the left-hand derivative 
in (42) at 𝑝0 becomes steeper than the right-hand derivative (43) at the same point. 
 








< 0.  
Proof. See Appendix A5. ∎ 
Intuitively, as the less healthy individual requires a higher amount of treatment, the 
physician’s total costs ceteris paribus increase. Constrained by the non-negative profit 
condition, the physician has to reduce the quantity of medical service provided per 
patient.  
 
Lemma 3.8. The critical price 𝑝0 is increasing in 𝛼. 
Proof. See Appendix A6. ∎ 
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To provide an intuition for the result, consider a doctor characterised by the altruism 
level 𝛼. From the previous results, we know that there exists a price 𝑝0(𝛼) such that the 
doctor’s profit is just binding. Suppose there exists a doctor with a slightly larger 𝛼 (i.e. 
a marginally more altruistic individual). Holding price constant that doctor would want 
to provide a bit more service. Note, however, that at 𝑝0(𝛼) we have 𝑝0(𝛼) < 𝐶′ so that 
profit would become negative and the constraint becomes strictly binding.  
Keeping in mind that a physician’s concern for patients is a random variable with two 
possibilities, 𝛼𝑗 ∈ {𝛼𝐿 , 𝛼𝐻}, and that there are two kinds of patients, we denote hereafter 
a low and a high altruistic doctor’s supply functions by 𝑞𝑡
𝐿(𝑝) and 𝑞𝑡
𝐻(𝑝)  and the 
respective critical price as 𝑝0
𝐿(𝑝) and 𝑝0
𝐻(𝑝) given 𝛼𝐿 , 𝛼𝐻 , 𝛽 and 𝑧 are holding constant. 
 
3.5 Welfare Analysis 
3.5.1 Welfare Maximization 
Taking the self-financing constraint of the health system into account, the results from 
the foregoing section are used to rewrite welfare equation (31) as a function of price. 
First, observe that expected health sums up individual patients’ expected health. 
Moreover, individual health depends on the doctor’s type and behaviour. Altogether, we 




=  Λ𝑀 {𝑛𝐵𝑓(𝑞𝐵
𝐿(𝑝)) + 𝑛𝐺[𝑧 + (1 − 𝑧)𝑓(𝑞𝐺
𝐿(𝑝))]
+ (1 −  Λ)𝑀{𝑛𝐵𝑓(𝑞𝐵
𝐻(𝑝)) + 𝑛𝐺[𝑧 + (1 − 𝑧)𝑓(𝑞𝐺
𝐻(𝑝))]}} 
(44) 
The price 𝑝 also determines the overall medical costs generated by doctors over the 
entire health system. Specifically, let the total service provided by a 𝐿- and a 𝐻- doctor 








= 𝑀[𝛬𝐶(𝑄𝐿(𝑝)) + (1 − 𝛬)𝐶(𝑄𝐻(𝑝))] (45) 
Finally, the non-medical costs associated with running the health system are given by 







= 𝜆𝑝𝑀[𝛬𝑄𝐿(𝑝) + (1 − 𝛬)𝑄𝐻(𝑝)] (46) 
Substituting (44)-(46) in (31) yields welfare as a function 𝑝. Slightly abusing notation,41 
we write 𝑊(𝑝) and note that it is a continuous function. 
Lemma 3.9. There exists a price 𝑝∗ > 0 such that 𝑊 (𝑝∗) ≥  𝑊 (𝑝)  for all 𝑝 > 0. 
Proof. See Appendix A7. ∎ 
Lemma 3.9 verifies that the initial welfare optimization with respect to the health 
insurance scheme is well defined. Intuitively, the proof proceeds as follows: first, I show 
that there exists a price 𝑝𝑁 > 0 such that for all 𝑝 > 𝑝𝑁 welfare is negative. Next, I 
apply the Extreme Value Theorem over the closed interval [0, 𝑝𝑁]. Once solved for 𝑝
∗, 
the equation (30) can be used to obtain the associated insurance premium required to run 














Further investigating the optimal solution would require proceeding to a comparative 
statics analysis using some of the endogenous parameters of the system. An analytical 
approach presents two difficulties. First, it may not be possible to characterise the 
optimal solution by using the first-order condition of the welfare optimization problem 
because of the potential non-differentiability of the optimal production of medical 
services at the prices 𝑝0
𝐿 and 𝑝0
𝐻  (see Lemma 3.5). Second, even if the solution were 
differentiable everywhere, the system of first-order equations may be too large for a 
meaningful analytical solution. As an alternative, a numerical simulation will be used in 
the ensuing analysis. 
 
3.5.2 Specifications of Numerical Experiments 
In order to perform a simulation, different parameters affecting welfare are specified.  
                                                 
41 Formally, in order to distinguish this welfare with the welfare represented by equation (9) a different 




• With respect to doctors, we initially impose the following parameters and functional 
forms. Doctors’ altruism parameters are given by  𝛼𝐿 = 0.15, 𝛼𝐻 = 1 . I used these 
parameters as they represent a relatively large difference between more and less altruistic 
doctors. Moreover, I set the initial proportion of low altruistic doctors at Λ = 0.7 to 
capture the fact that the majority of primary care physicians attach a relatively higher 
weight to their own financial interest rather than patients’ health benefits (e.g. Godager 
and Wiesen 2013, 2014). 




a doctor’s cost for medical services is represented by the quadratic form  𝐶(𝑄) =
1
200
𝑄2.42 These functions satisfy all the slope and curvature requirements introduced in 
Section 3.3. 
• With respect to patients, I start with the following parameters; 𝑁 = 100000 (total 
number of patients), 𝑛 = 100  (average number of patients allocated per 
physician),   𝑧 = 0.4 (initial health of 𝐺-type patients) and 𝛽 = 0.3 (the proportion of 𝐵-
type patients). The parameter of 𝑁, 𝑧 is selected to satisfy law of large numbers and to 
contrast initial health between alternative types of patients respectively. The parameter 
of 𝛽 is selected to capture the average proportion of less healthy patients (i.e. population 
over 65s) in developed countries. 
• I assumed that the shadow price of taxation is 𝜆 = 0.1 as in Laffont and Tirole (1986). 
 
3.5.3 Numerical Results 
I apply the foregoing specification and use Mathematica to solve the respective doctor’s 
problem and obtain all the supply functions. In the next subsection, these supply 
functions will be represented. Subsequently, I aggregate the supply decisions and 
calculate the welfare function which will be used to find the optimal price for medical 
services 𝑝∗. This initial setup will then be used to perform some numerical experiments.  
 
                                                 
42 It can be shown that this cost assumption satisfies 𝑄2𝐶′′ − 𝑄𝐶′ + 𝐶 ≥ 0, which is sufficient to prove 
Lemma 3.5.   
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3.5.3.1 Supply Curves 
Figure 3 represents the individual supply curves for L-doctors. It maps the quantity 





Figure 3. L-doctor’s supply function for a B-patient 
Figure 4 plots the individual supply functions of L- and H-doctors with respect to a type 𝑡 
patient. These graphics clearly depict the results summarised by the Lemmas 3.1, 3.2, 
3.3 and 3.6; for any give price 𝑝 > 0, the figure shows the physician provides more 
service to a less healthy individual than to a healthier one. Next, the supply curves have 
positive slopes, i.e. the physician increases service supply with price for 𝐵- and 𝐺-type 
patients. For the same patient, he tends to be provided more service from the physician 
with a higher level of altruism at a given price. Moreover, at the same price, the slope of 
healthcare supply function of 𝐵-patients is larger or equal to that of 𝐺-patients. Finally, 
the supply curves are not differentiable at the critical price 𝑝0













𝐿 is defined by the kink. 
                                                 






Figure 4.  L- and H- doctors’ supply curves for a T-type patient 
Just as before, the critical prices, 𝑝0
𝐿 and 𝑝0
𝐻 are defined by the respective kink of 𝑞𝑡
𝐿(𝑝) 
and 𝑞𝑡
𝐻(𝑝). The graphic verifies for the numerical example the finding from Lemma 3.9 
that the critical price of high altruistic provider exceeds that of the low altruistic provider 
(i.e. 𝑝0
𝐻  > 𝑝0
𝐿). The definitions of 𝑝0
𝐿 and 𝑝0
𝐻 indicate that, for 𝑝 ∈ [0, 𝑝0
𝐿], both types of 
doctors obtain zero profit. Hence, for these prices, altruism does not affect the quantities 
of medical service provided by either doctor. Intuitively, the total quantity is determined 
solely by the zero-profit condition. As a result, doctors have the same marginal cost and, 
therefore, supply the same quantity of service independent of their differing level of 
altruism. 
Second, for all 𝑝 ∈ [𝑝0
𝐿 , 𝑝0
𝐻] we have 𝑞𝑡
𝐻(𝑝) > 𝑞𝑡
𝐿(𝑝). In order to provide intuition for 
this result, consider that the 𝐻-doctor provides the quantity of medical service that is 
less or equal to that of the 𝐿- doctor (i.e. 𝑞𝑡
𝐻(𝑝) ≤ 𝑞𝑡
𝐿(𝑝)). The curvature assumption of 
the cost function and his higher level of altruism immediately imply that his marginal 
return of producing 𝑞𝑡
𝐻(𝑝)  would exceed its marginal cost, which is indeed a 
contradiction. Finally, for  𝑝 >  𝑝0
𝐻, 𝑞𝑡
𝐻(𝑝) ≥ 𝑞𝑡
𝐿(𝑝) , applying the preceding logic 
yields 𝑞𝑡
𝐻(𝑝) > 𝑞𝑡
𝐿(𝑝). However, doctors are increasing their service supply in price and 
their marginal return from altruistic component is zero given a large quantity provision 
of medical service. Hence, for very high payment rates, the quantity of service supplied 






3.5.3.2 Welfare Function and the Optimal Health Insurance Scheme 
I now substitute the supply decisions of the 𝐻- and 𝐿-doctors with respect to their 𝐺- 
and 𝐵-type patients into the welfare function in order to obtain 𝑊(𝑝). The next figure 
provides the geometrical representation.44 
 
Figure 5. Welfare and the Optimal Price 
Figure 5 provides a visual representation of lemma 3.9. The upper graph depicts the 
supply function of 𝐿-and 𝐻-supply curves to the type 𝑡-patients (as shown in Figure 4), 
while the lower graph represents welfare as a function of price. This example shows the 
welfare optimal price is  𝑝∗ = 0.2084, which lies between the critical price level of 𝐿- 
and 𝐻-type physicians (i.e. 𝑝0
𝐿 = 0.095 and 𝑝0
𝐻 = 0.26). As a result, the less altruistic 
doctors (the 𝐿 -type) obtain a strictly positive profit, while their more altruistic 
counterparts have zero profit at the welfare-maximizing price. Intuitively, the health 
insurance scheme does not have the required information to distinguish between 𝐻- and 
𝐿 -doctors as well as between 𝐺 - and 𝐵 -patients. As a result, the scheme sets an 
“intermediate” price which trades off the over-production from 𝐻-doctors against under-
                                                 
44 In order to see the welfare function clearly the starting point is set at 𝑝 = 0.05. 
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provision by 𝐿-doctors. To understand this “intermediate price”, suppose the economy 
is only comprised of 𝐻 -type physicians, then this example shows that the welfare-
maximizing price would become 𝑝𝐻
∗ = 0.189.45 This price is lower than 𝑝∗ if both types 
of doctors exist as the highly altruistic doctors require a low price in order to be 
motivated. On the contrary, if the economy is only comprised of 𝐿-type physicians, the 
welfare-maximizing price would become 𝑝𝐿
∗ = 0.248. This price is higher than 𝑝∗  as 
low altruistic providers require high financial rewards to be motivated. 
 
3.5.4 Comparative Static Experiments 
In this subsection, I perform a number of numerical exercises. The purpose of doing 
these exercises is to evaluate the optimal response of the health insurance scheme to 
variations in the exogenous variables. To do this, I vary one exogenous parameter at a 
time and solve the welfare maximizing health insurance scheme for each parameter 
constellation. Next, I use the solution (𝑝∗, 𝜏∗) to find the respective doctor’s quantity of 
service provided  (𝑞𝑡
𝐿∗, 𝑞𝑡
𝐻∗) , profits (Π𝐿∗, Π𝐻∗) , utilities(U𝐿∗, U𝐻∗) , expected patient 
heath ℎ𝑡
∗, and welfare to society 𝑊∗.46 Finally, based on the above information, I present 
a real life interpretation of each analysis.  
These experiments are structured as follows: Experiments 1 and 2 analyse the impact of 
varying the initial health of healthier individuals (𝑧) and the proportion of less healthy 
individuals (𝛽 ), which represent health consciousness promotion and the ageing 
population respectively. Experiments 3 and 4 examine the impact of varying the number 
of patients allocated per doctor (𝑛) and the proportion of less altruistic providers (Λ) 
respectively. These variations reflect recent trends, namely that hiring new medical staff 
becomes more difficult and that the proportion of more altruistic doctors is declining. 
Finally, Experiment 5 predicts the impact of technological innovation, which is 
represented by an increase in the technology factor (𝑇).  
 
 
                                                 
45 See the graph “the effect of varying Λ on the constrained optimal level of price” in the attached 
Mathematica file- Comparative static_lambda.  
46 The superscript “*” represents the value of the respective function at the solution (𝑝∗, 𝜏∗).   
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3.5.4.1 Variations in Patients’ Initial Health  
In the first experiment, I vary the initial health of 𝐺-type individuals (𝑧). To understand 
the aforementioned results, imagine that society were divided between the health 
conscious and other individuals. Moreover, suppose that raising the awareness of the 
health benefits associated with fruit and vegetables in the diet only affects 𝐺 -type 
patients so that their average health increases.  
In the numerical experiment, I varied 𝑧  between 0  and 1  (i.e. initially 𝐵 - and 𝐺 -
individuals are the same). The main results from this exercise are summarised in Figure 
6. 
 
6(a) The effect of varying z on welfare-
maximizing price 
 
6(b) The effect of varying z on physicians’ health 
service supply 
Figure 6. Effects of varying the initial health of healthier patients 
 
Result 1: Promoting health consciousness will reduce price, insurance premiums, and 
result in a better allocation of health services between patients. 
In order to derive an intuition for the underlying effects, consider a situation where the 
HI scheme equalizes the marginal cost associated with the health premium in terms of 
the marginal benefit thereof (in relation to health). Now, imagine a ceteris paribus (c.p. 
hereafter) increase in the initial health level of 𝐺-individuals due to a rise in 𝑧. This 
implies that a doctor’s marginal return 𝛽 (1 − 𝑧)𝑓′
𝐺
+ 𝑝  in relation to a 𝐺 -type 
individual decreases. Hence, doctors will reduce the level of health service which they 
provide for this type of patient so that 𝑄 goes down. As a result, doctors’ marginal 
costs 𝐶′ (𝑄), are also lowered. This produces a countervailing effect for 𝐵-type patients 
who receive more services. Altogether, all patients see their expected health levels 
increase. From the point of view of the HI, it means that the marginal benefit of health 
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services has gone down while the marginal costs associated with health premiums stay 
constant. Accordingly, the initial equality is no longer satisfied, thereby inducing HI to 
reduce 𝑝∗ as illustrated in the Figure 6a.  
The change in 𝑝∗  has a feedback effect in the production of health services for all 
patient-doctor pairs which are summarised in Figure 6b. As can be seen, the feedback 
effect does not reverse the initial directions in the variation of services; 𝐺-individuals 
still receive less services and 𝐵-patients continue to receive more services. The total 
effect on health is positive for both type of patients; 𝐵-individuals receive more medical 
services while the 𝑧 -effect on 𝐺 -individuals dominates the negative impact of the 
reduction of their services.  
Following the same reasoning used in the preceding experiment, the profit of 𝐻-doctors 
remains constrained by the non-negative requirement throughout. For 𝐿-doctors, the 
direct effect of the price reduction dominates the indirect effect of the reduction in output 
so that their profit declines. Nevertheless, my exercise shows both types of doctors 
attained higher utilities. For the 𝐻 -doctors, this result follows directly from the 
observation that their profit remains unchanged while the expected health level of their 
patients goes up. For the 𝐿-doctors, the finding is specific to the set of parameters chosen. 
Intuitively, the positive utility effect of the improvement in initial health dominates the 
negative utility impact of their reduction in profit.  
Finally, from the point of view of HI, the insurance premium is decreasing in the initial 
health of healthier individuals (𝑧). To illustrate this, first start with the above c.p. 
argument; 𝜏∗ would necessarily go down as 𝑄 decreases in 𝑧. The additional feedback 
effect due to the reduction in 𝑝∗ and the further decrease in 𝑄 only reinforce that initial 
impact. 
Overall, this experiment simulated the impact of an increase in the level of health 
consciousness by a fraction of the population, which can be interpreted as a fraction of 
the population is willing to adjust behaviour in order to improve their respective health 
(for instance by eliminating smoking, reducing alcohol consumption, improving eating 
habits, etc.). In that context, I imagined the impact of an advertising campaign promoting 
healthier behaviour (e.g. 10,000 steps a day, the “five fruit and vegetables” campaign, 
etc.). By assumption, only the fraction of the population that is health conscious would 
alter their behaviour and obtain a higher level of initial health as a result.  
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In the experiment 𝐺-patients were assumed to be the health-conscious individuals and a 
change in their awareness results in an increase in their initial health levels. This 
experiment therefore suggests that the HI scheme should reduce the insurance premium 
and the price for medical services. Despite the price reduction, altruistic physicians 
raised the service provided to 𝐵 -patients but reduced that offered to 𝐺 -individuals. 
Altogether, the evolution and the response of the HI scheme induced an improvement 
for all participants.  
 
3.5.4.2 Variation in the Proportion of Patients 
In the second experiment, I vary the proportion 𝛽 which measures the fraction of 𝐵-type 
patients in the economy. A real-life example of what we have in mind is the current 
dynamic in most countries where the rise in the average age of the population also means 
that the proportion of less healthy individuals within a given economy is increasing. 
Figures 7a and 7b summarises some of the results from the numerical exercise.  
 
7(a) Effect of varying 𝛽 on welfare-maximizing 
price 
 
7(b) Effect of varying 𝛽 on health service supply 
Figure 7. Effects of varying the proportion of less healthy patients 
 
Result 2: Population ageing will lead to a price and insurance premium increase and a 
reduction of medical service supplied. 
Figure 7a represents the optimal adjustment of the price for medical services as a 
response to the change in 𝛽. Intuitively, the increase in the proportion of less healthy 
patients requires that the overall production of medical services (i.e. 𝑄𝑗) increases. In 
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order to incentivize doctors to increase production, the health insurance scheme adjusts 
the price upward. Since the total production of medical services increases and 𝑝∗ rises, 
the health insurance premium 𝜏∗ also increases. Figure 7b maps the resulting quantity of 
health services from each possible pairing of patient and doctor. Not surprisingly, the 
quantity of services provided turned out to decrease in line with the fraction of less 
healthy individuals (B-type patients). As a result, expected health for both types of 
individual goes down as 𝛽 increases. 
In the numerical exercise, the decision of the more altruistic doctors was found to be 
constrained throughout by the zero-profit requirement. In contrast, the profit for the less 
altruistic doctors increased throughout. This reflects that the regulator selects a price to 
balance overproduction by 𝐻-doctors with underproduction on the part of 𝐿-doctors.  
It is noteworthy that in the experiment the well-being of both types of doctors was found 
to decrease in  𝛽 . For the more altruistic doctors, this follows directly from the 
observation that their profit remains constant while the average health of their patients 
goes down. For the less altruistic doctors, the finding is an artefact of the specific 
numerical experiment where the negative impact of the health reduction outweighs the 
positive utility impact of the increased profit. Overall, this experiment reproduces the 
key ingredients associated with an ageing population. Assuming that older individuals 
are on average less healthy than younger people, the idea of an ageing population is 
captured through an increase in the proportion of 𝐵-patients in society. The main finding 
of this experiment is that the optimal scheme would induce a reduction in the service 
provided to all types of patients, increasing the insurance premium while leading to 
deteriorating levels of satisfaction for medical staff. In other words, even under ideal 
conditions ageing would lead to patients, insurers and doctors’ increased dissatisfaction. 
 
3.5.4.3 Variation in the Proportion of Doctors 
In the third experiment, I study an increase in the parameter Λ which measures the 
fraction of 𝐿-type doctors. Intuitively, the experiment captures the observation that 
altruism in medicine has been declining (see Jones, 2002).47  
                                                 
47 For instance, many observers suggest that the average physician pays less attention to patients (e.g. GP 




8(a) Effect of increasing 𝛬 on expected supply of 
service provided per doctor 
 
8(b) Effect of increasing 𝛬 on social welfare 
Figure 8. Effects of varying the proportion of more altruistic physicians 
Result 3: Price and insurance premium will rise as the proportion of less altruistic 
doctors increases and the presence of multiple types of physicians will deteriorate social 
well-being. 
To illustrate, I let Λ vary from zero (all the doctors are characterised by a high level of 
altruism) to one. Not surprisingly, the optimal price and insurance premium are found 
to increase in Λ. Intuitively, with a lower proportion of 𝐻-type doctors, the regulator is 
forced to use more extrinsic motivation to align incentives, thereby requiring a larger 
premium. However, the presence of both types of doctors creates a tension, increasing 
the extrinsic motivation of 𝐿-doctors induces 𝐻-doctors to produce too much relative to 
the efficient level.48 Obviously, this tension disappears at either extreme of the support 
(𝛬 = 0  or  𝛬 = 1), which explains why the expected quantity of services initially 
decreases but then increases (Figure 8a). The effects in the expected health of patients 
follows a similar pattern, directly reflecting the level of expected medical services. 
Figure 8b captures the effect of changes in 𝛬 on welfare. Clearly, having only 𝐻-doctors 
is best because motivating them is easy so that costs are low. However, similar to the 
expected level of services with mix of both types of doctors, this implies that the price 
system works poorly; 𝑝 is too low to motivate 𝐿-doctors but too high for 𝐻-doctors who 
produce excessively relative to the efficient level. 
In healthcare market, it has often been claimed that the extensive provision of financial 
incentives has produced a crowding out of intrinsic motivation in the medical 
professions (Berdud et al., 2016). As a result, the current experiment examines the 
                                                 
48 The service quantity maximizes welfare when only L-or H-type doctors exist.  
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impact of a reduction in the level of altruism in relation to the optimal HI scheme by 
increasing the fraction of doctors with low altruism. My experiment predicts that both 
price and insurance premium would increase in line with the decline of more altruistic 
doctors. As a result, both types of physicians raised their production of services to their 
patients, thereby improving the associated level of satisfaction. From the point of view 
of the total medical service production, there is a countervailing force due to the 
reduction in the proportion of 𝐻-type doctors. In the experiment, this countervailing 
effect was found to dominate when the fraction of low altruism doctors was small. For 
the selected parameters, a decrease in the well-being of patients was found because the 
countervailing effect was always sufficiently large to overturn the indirect impact of 
price increases. However, welfare was not monotonic; as the fraction of low altruism 
doctors became large, the increase in doctors’ profits became large enough to 
compensate for the small reduction in patients’ utility. The welfare function is inversely 
U-shaped (Figure 8b), indicating that a large variance in the level of altruism among 
doctors made the price scheme not very effective. 
 
3.5.4.4 Variation in the Allocated Number of Patients 
In the fourth experiment, I vary the parameter representing the number of patients 
allocated per doctor. The example which comes to my mind is that the regulator alters 
the number of medical staff. With this in mind, observe that (29) can also be written as 
 𝑊 = 𝑁Λ[𝛽𝑢𝐵
𝐿 + (1 − 𝛽)𝑢𝐺
𝐿 ] + 𝑁(1 − Λ)[𝛽𝑢𝐵
𝐻 + (1 − 𝛽)𝑢𝐺
𝐻]




 denotes the expected utility of an 𝑖-patient allocated to a 𝑗-doctor and Π𝑗  is the 
profit of the 𝑗-doctor. Accordingly, a c.p. increase in the number of medical staff (𝑀) 
automatically raises welfare in our initial model. Obviously, this result ignores that 
adding medical staff is costly because it requires training them. While omitting training 
costs did not matter for the former experiments, it is clearly essential in the current case. 
Hence, in this subsection I include in the welfare function the linear educational costs 
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𝑐49 that are associated with the training of medical staff. The welfare function in this 
experiment therefore becomes: 
 𝑊 = 𝑁Λ[𝛽𝑢𝐵
𝐿 + (1 − 𝛽)𝑢𝐺
𝐿 ] + 𝑁(1 − Λ)[𝛽𝑢𝐵










Moreover, I use a specific cost function 𝐶(𝑄) =
1
100
𝑄1.4 which is increasing and convex 




 to substitute 𝑀 =
𝑁
𝑛
 while varying the average number of patients 𝑛. 
For the numerical experiment, I set the parameter related to per doctor training at 35, 
which ensures that the ratio of training to operational costs remained within a reasonable 
range.50  
 
9(a) The effect of varying n on social welfare 
 
9(b) The effect of varying n on insurance premium 
Figure 9. Effects of varying the number of patients allocated per physician 
Result 4: There exists a welfare and insurance premium that maximizes the number of 
patients allocated per doctor. 
To illustrate, we first show that 𝑝∗  is increasing in terms of the average number of 
patients per doctor (𝑛) throughout. The intuition is as follows: suppose doctors were to 
keep the per patient amount of medical service 𝑞𝑖
𝑗
 constant. Holding 𝑝∗ constant would 
                                                 
49 In the UK, for instance, research shows it costs around £220,000 to train a primary care doctor over 
their five-year degree (Brown, 2016). To analyse parsimony without losing generality, in this model I 
assume a linear training costs.  
50  My example captures the fact that the average training costs of a primary care physician’s is 
significantly less than his average income (per year).  As shown in Mathematica file Comparative 
static_n.pdf- the calculated ratio, selecting 𝑐 = 35 and the specific cost function makes the simulated ratio 
equals around 0.36. 
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imply that initial marginal benefits are unaffected. However, the increase in 𝑛 would 
result in an increase in the total amount of medical services provided by doctors, thus 
raising their marginal costs. Restoring equality between doctors’ marginal benefits and 
costs would require a reduction in services. To reduce the negative impact on health, the 
HI wants to motivate doctors to increase output, therefore it finds it advantageous to 
raise 𝑝∗. The price increase generates a countervailing incentive inducing doctors to 
reduce services (and therefore expected health levels) less severely. 
The experiment can also be reinterpreted in terms of finding the optimal number of 
patients per doctor. In Figure 9a, we varied the number of patients per doctor between 
50 and 500. As can be seen from this figure, the welfare maximizing 𝑛 (denoted by 𝑛 ∗ 
hereafter) turned out to be around 1000 individuals per doctor (𝑛 ∗ = 985 to be precise). 
At that point, the marginal educational costs are just equal to the marginal benefit of 
adding one more doctor to the system. This marginal benefit includes the increase of 
patients’ expected health, the reduction in physicians’ marginal costs, and the resulting 
decrease in 𝑝 ∗ . 
Figure 9b depicts the impact of 𝑛 on the health insurance premium. As can be seen, 𝜏∗ 
is increasing around 𝑛 = 𝑛 ∗, while for large 𝑛 it is decreasing. Intuitive variations in 𝑛 
have a direct and an indirect impact. In direct terms, raising 𝑛 reduces the number of 
doctors and thus c.p. total medical expenditures and total profit paid to 𝐿-type doctors. 
The indirect effect derives from the quantity adjustments and price changes affecting 
profits. In the numerical exercise, I find that 𝐿-doctors’ profit was increasing in n while 
the profit of H-doctors remained constrained by zero. In the example, the indirect effect 
was dominant for small 𝑛 while the direct effect prevailed for large 𝑛. 
The fourth experiment captures the idea of controlling medical cost through restricting 
the total number of physicians. To do this, the experiment raises the patients per doctor 
ratio and adjusts the model to account for the cost of educating doctors. Unsurprisingly, 
the resulting increase in workload induced physicians to reduce the level of services 
provided to all types of patients. To counter this tendency, the HI scheme raises the price 
of medical services to counter the negative impact on health. However, the insurance 
premium was not monotonous as neither the effect of the price increase nor the effect of 
the quantity reduction dominated throughout. 
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Patients’ utility was reduced throughout because it did not account for the costs 
associated with medical training. The total impact on welfare was also not monotonic. 
Specifically, when the ratio of patients to physicians is small, the reduction in the cost 
of physician training became large enough to compensate for the reduction in patients’ 
well-being. A by-product of this experiment was that it verified that an extension of the 
model which would take the number of medical staff into account is well behaved. In 
other words, the policy vector could easily be extended to include the decision of a 
patients-per-doctor ratio. Including that ratio as a policy choice would also allow one to 
expend the comparative static analysis and examine questions like the optimal variation 
in the number of patients-per-doctor as a response to ageing, technical change etc. While 
these are undoubtedly very important and interesting questions, they go beyond the 
scope of the current analysis.  
 
3.5.4.5 Variation in Medical Technology 
In this last experiment I try to capture one of the major trends that has affected HI 
schemes over the last half century. Major pharmaceutical and medical innovations have 
significantly improved health levels for all age categories. These innovations have led 
to an overall increase in both the quality of life and life expectancy. A by-product of this 
increased longevity is that the average age of the population is rising. However, given 
that the demand for medical services increases with age, the rising proportion of older 
people is placing an upward pressure on the overall demand for healthcare.  
In order to model this evolution within the current framework, we introduce a technology 
factor 𝑇 which is assumed to increase over time. Specifically, we use the functional form  
 ℎ(𝑧, 𝑞, 𝑇) = 𝑧 + (1 − 𝑧)𝑓(𝑞, 𝑇) (50) 






 while this equation captures that a rise in 𝑇  pivots 
expected health outcomes upward. To capture the population ageing that results from an 
improvement in medical technology, I assume that in the model increasing 𝑇 also raises 
the fraction of the 𝐵-type individuals in the economy. Since B- and G-type individuals 
can be interpreted as reflecting the population over and under the age of 65 in the 
economy respectively, this assumption therefore reflects that an increase in technology 
leads to an increase (or decrease) in the proportion of elderly (or young) individuals. As 
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a result, the average age of an individual in the economy increases, which reflects an 
ageing population. Specifically, I assume 𝛽(𝑇) = 𝑎𝑇𝑏  (𝑎, 𝑏 > 0). For the numerical 
experiment, I let 𝑇 vary from [2,3] and use the parameter values 𝑎 = 0.01, and 𝑏 = 3. 
These particular parameters are selected so that when 𝑇 increases from 2 to 3, 𝛽 goes 
from approximately 0.08 to 0.27. Since 𝛽 in this model measures the proportion of less 
healthy individuals, the aforementioned increase in 𝛽  matches the changes in the 
fraction of the over-65 population in developed countries such as Japan, Germany, and 
France from approximately 10% in 1960 to 25% in 2020 (Hawe, 2008). 
In contrast to these experiments, the dissimilarity between 𝐺 - and 𝐵 - patients is 
increased by raising 𝑧 from 0.4 to 0.8. This change is introduced to match the difference 
in the per person expenditure across the population over- and under-65. For instance, 
U.S. data shows that spending for the over-65 group is approximately four times what it 
is for the 34-44 group (similar findings exists for the UK and the EU overall, though the 
ratio is slightly lower than 4, see Robineau, 2016). Figure 10 summarises the key 
findings of the experiment. 
 
 
10(a) Effect of technology innovation on the total 
quantity of medical service provided by the type-j 
doctor 
 
10(b) Effect of technology innovation on the total 
quantity of medical service provided by the type-j 
doctor 
Figure 10. Effects of varying the technology factor 
Result 5: Medical innovation increases total health service provision and patient 
expected health but drives up health expenditure per person. 
The evolution of 𝑇 implies that the marginal effect of q on health changes over time. 
From the functional form, however, note the effect of  𝑇 on the health margin of 𝑞 
depends on the initial level of medical services; it is increasing for small but decreasing 
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for large 𝑞. In all cases, the evolution of T feedback into the motivation of doctors via 
the altruistic component of their preferences. Given the initial parameter set, I find that 
𝐵 -patients ceteris paribus received less services whereas 𝐺 -patients received more 
services for low 𝑇 but less services for high 𝑇. However, in all cases the technological 
improvement remained beneficial.  
The fraction of 𝐵-types present in the economy 𝛽 also increased over time in line with 
technological advances. This created an additional negative impact on the provision of 
services, as the increase in 𝛽 drives up total medical service demand and therefore the 
marginal cost of providing medical services. As a result, per patient services provided 
to both types of patients are reduced. In order to partially countervail the reduction of 
services, the HI benefited from raising price. The combination of more low health 
individuals with the increase in 𝑝 ∗ led to a rise in the supply of services by both types 
of doctors, 𝑄𝑗, 𝑗 = 𝐻, 𝐿, as represented in Figure 10a. Finally, there was an expansion 
of medical service together with a rise in the price required to increase the insurance 
premium as shown in Figure 10b.  
The total effect on expected health remained positive. With respect to profit levels, 𝐿-
doctors was found to benefit from the price evolution while 𝐻 -doctors remained 
constrained by the non-negativity condition. Regarding the level of doctors’ well-being, 
I found that it increased for both L- and H-doctors. Intuitively, the 𝐿-type physicians 
have higher profits and their patients’ health goes up. For the 𝐻-type physicians, their 
profit remains zero but their patients derived higher health benefits. In this numerical 
exercise, it turned out that patients’ health improvement and/or physicians’ rise in profits 
outweigh the growth in the 𝐵-individuals’ fraction. 
To conclude, this experiment reflects the argument that technology has been the key 
driver for burgeoning expenditure as pointed out by (Sorenson et al., 2013). I represented 
the idea as a continuously increasing “technology factor” making the health function 
more productive over time and raising the proportion of 𝐵 -patients. The latter 
requirement encompassed the idea that better medicine increases life expectancy, but in 
doing so also raises the fraction of individuals with high medical needs. Major findings 
are that the HI scheme should raise both price and insurance premium while 
continuously reducing the quantity services provided to all types of patient. With respect 
to total medical service production, there is an additional countervailing effect from the 
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change in the fraction of high need patients. Since the countervailing effect dominated 
throughout, the total production of medical services increased. Altogether, the well-
being of all types of patients are improved because the positive impact on patients’ health 
outweighs the negative impact on their premium.  
 
3.6 Cost Control Policies and Efficiency Enhancement 
In most developed countries, authorities responsible for health systems have been 
challenged by the evolution of fundamental trends and the implications for their 
respective health insurance schemes. Required adjustments to different systems have 
been marred by a plethora of criticisms from medical professionals, insurance 
companies, pharmaceutical firms and the public at large. A fundamental difficulty in 
evaluating the validity of these criticisms is the lack of an objective perspective. For 
instance, doctors may denounce a policy because their utility goes down while 
pharmaceutical firms may prefer increasing the supply of medication, and fully insured 
patients always favour an increase in medical services.  
Modelling the health insurance scheme from the perspective of a benevolent welfare 
maximizing planner is an attempt to provide a more objective viewpoint. With this in 
mind, the initial model introduced in Section 3.3 was characterised by a constrained 
optimal health insurance scheme, as discussed in Section 3.5. Furthermore, this section 
provides experiments aimed at evaluating the best response of the constrained efficient 
HI scheme to reflect trends that capture some of the salient features in recent evolutions.  
Section 3.5 emphasises that the presence of informational asymmetry using the pricing 
scheme to align incentives of doctors displays a major flaw; in of itself it is incapable of 
bridging differences in intrinsic/extrinsic motivation across medical staff. As a result, 
maximizing welfare induces doctors with a high intrinsic motivation (in the model 
referred to as ‘high altruism’) to produce more than those who require a high extrinsic 
motivation. The subsequent numerical experiments further show that any evolution of 
the underlying parameters which require an increase in medical services exacerbates this 
difference. Intuitively, inducing an increase in medical services requires raising the price 
which worsens the misallocation of resources. Accordingly, the next step of this analysis 
is to extend the set of policy tools used to align medical incentives. 
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In order to alleviate the tension presented in the last two sections resulting from the 
presence of private information associated with doctors’ preferences, many HI schemes 
resort to quantity rationing, costs restrictions or mixed payment in the production of 
medical services. For instance, with respect to the quantity rationing, the NHS system 
in the UK restricted the time spent on GP consultations and applied numerous examples 
of therapy and drug rationing. Well known examples include restrictions for cancer 
treatments, painkillers and arthritis medications (Press Association, 2016).  
With respect to the second type of restriction, the German HI scheme introduced 
different levels of expenditure cap in order to ensure that the health system does not 
spend more than the income generated by the aggregate insurance premium (Ehrbeck et 
al., 2010). For instance, the German health authority established an overall budget for 
the system at the regional level. This forces hospitals and physicians into negotiation 
with insurers in order to arrive at collective annual budgets (Ehrbeck et al., 2010). At 
the individual level, pharmaceutical expenditure caps per surgery have been 
implemented over the last decades (Busse et al., 2005). 
Finally, the mixed payment system is comprised of both fee-for-service and fixed 
payment per patient has been widely applied in the OECD economies (OECD, 2016). 
For instance, in the UK, Finland, Norway and Italy, primary care physicians are paid 
based on a combination of capitation and FFS for the purpose of containing health 
expenditure (CAP) and reducing referrals to hospitals (Park et al., 2007). In Ontario, 
Canada, the “Primary Care Reform” launched in the late 1990s introduced a menu of 
PCP payment that blends FFS, capitation and salary elements (Laberge et al., 2016). 
By construction, quantity and costs restrictions are very crude policy instruments since 
the medical information relating to specific patients’ health remains the private 
information of doctors. The purpose of this section is to explore whether quantity and 
revenue restrictions as well as capitation can nevertheless help to improve welfare. In 
order to keep the analysis tractable, each restriction will be examined separately. 
 
3.6.1 Quantity Restriction 
In this subsection, I introduce an additional policy variable denoted by ?̅?  which 
represents the maximum quantity of per patient treatment that a doctor can perform. 
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Accordingly, a HI policy becomes a triplet (𝑝, ?̅?, 𝜏). Just as in Section 3.4, doctors take 
the policy vector as given and maximize their utility. Accordingly, the optimization 
problem (32) needs to be slightly adjusted to integrate the requirement ?̅? ≥ 𝑞𝑡 for 𝑡 ∈












𝑞𝑡 − 𝐶 (∑𝑛𝑡𝑞𝑡
𝑡∈𝑻
) ≥ 0 
(51) 
 ?̅? ≥ 𝑞𝑡 ≥ 0  
where 𝛼 stands for degree of altruism of a generic doctor. In Appendix A8, I prove that 
the system (51) has a unique solution for any given policy vector  (𝑝, ?̅?, 𝜏). Slightly 
abusing the notation, I denote that, for this subsection, 𝑞𝑡
𝐻(𝑝, ?̅?) and 𝑞𝑡
𝐿(𝑝, ?̅?) is the 
respective solution for 𝐻- and 𝐿-doctors. Following the same procedures as used in 
Section 3.4, I substitute 𝑞𝑡
𝐻(𝑝, ?̅?) and 𝑞𝑡
𝐿(𝑝, ?̅?) into the equation (31) and obtain the 
welfare function ?̅?(𝑝, ?̅?). Observe that for any restriction level ?̅?, the same process as 
outlined in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 can be followed, i.e. I solved for the welfare maximizing 
price, denoted hereafter by 𝑝𝑄
∗ (?̅?), then substituted the solution into the welfare function 
to obtain ?̅?(𝑝𝑄
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?). Clearly, for ?̅? to be sufficiently large, the restriction never binds 
and ?̅?(𝑝𝑄
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?) = 𝑊(𝑝∗). Accordingly, we know 
 𝑊(𝑝∗) ≤ ?̅?(𝑝𝑄
∗ (?̅?∗), ?̅?∗) (52) 
where ?̅?∗  denotes the optimal level of quantity rationing imposed to 
maximize ?̅?(𝑝𝑄
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?). As a result, the inequality (52) shows that the optimal welfare 
under the quantity rationing is larger equal to the optimal welfare without imposing the 
restriction. 
From the foregoing section, one would think that a small reduction of ?̅? at the point ?̅? =
𝑞𝐵
𝐻(𝑝∗) should lead to an improvement in welfare. The logical argument is as follows: 
at the price 𝑝∗ which maximizes (31), we know that, relative to the first-best solution, 
𝐻-doctors over-produce while 𝐿-doctors under-produce. Intuitively, at 𝑝∗ the HI trade-
offs the benefit of an increase in the production of 𝐿-doctors against the reduction in 
welfare from an increase in production by 𝐻 -doctors. Hence, one would think that 
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introducing a restriction which forces 𝐻-doctors to marginally reduce production for the 
high need patients would positively impact this trade-off.  
Unfortunately, while this intuition is appealing, it is nevertheless false in many cases. 
To see why, consider the examples discussed above. In almost all cases, I found that H-
doctors were constrained by the zero-profit requirement. In such a situation, it is easily 
verified that a marginal reduction of ?̅? at ?̅? = 𝑞𝐵
𝐻(𝑝∗)  would not lead 𝐻 -doctors to 
reduce overall production. Instead, they would marginally reduce 𝑞𝐵  
𝐻 but simultaneously 
increase 𝑞𝐺
𝐻 while keeping total output and profit constant. Taken together, one would 
expect this to worsen welfare since it would take away medical services from the 
individuals who need them more to give to those who need them less. This observation 
implies that introducing a quantity restriction generates a countervailing incentive via 
the doctors’ zero-profit constraint. At a priori, there are no natural restrictions to 
guarantee which effects dominate. Accordingly, the standard comparative static 
technique will in general fail. In the remainder of this subsection, the foregoing 
numerical examples will be adapted to show that there are cases where a quantity 











(a). Optimal welfare as a function of ?̅? 
 
(b). Optimal price as a function of ?̅? 
 
 
(c) Total health service provided by L- and H-
doctors as a function of ?̅? 
 
 
(d) L- and H-type physicians’ profit as a 
function of ?̅? 
Figure 11. Quantity Restriction 
Specifically, I use the example described in Section 3.5.3 and follow the procedure 
outlined just above in order to obtain the function ?̅?(𝑝𝑄
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?), which has been plotted 
in Figure 11a. The graph reflects the general intuition discussed above. Initially, 
reducing the level of rationing ?̅?  below ?̅? = 0.58  worsens the welfare ?̅?(𝑝𝑄
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?) 
below 𝑊(𝑝∗). The numerical example is used to gain some further insights. Figure 11b 
shows that the initial reduction in ?̅? induced the HI scheme to reduce price. As explained 
above, 𝐻 -type doctors react to a small variation in ?̅?  by holding their total output 
constant (see Figure 11c), while shifting some of the production between 𝐵  and 𝐺 
patients. This worsens the allocation of medical resources since it shifts services away 
from needy patients. In order to reduce this negative impact, the HI scheme finds that it 
is advantageous to lower the price, thereby curtailing 𝑞𝐺
𝐻 and 𝑄𝐻. This process continues 
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until the reduction in ?̅? is sufficiently large to constrain the level of services so that the 
HI can sharply raise the price (see Figure 11c) to obtain  𝑞𝐵
𝐻(𝑝𝑄
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?) =
𝑞𝐺
𝐻(𝑝𝑄
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?) = ?̅? without reducing welfare. As a result, 𝑄𝐿 and 𝑄𝐻 goes up and the 𝐿-
type doctors increased medical service production more than 𝐻-type doctors (see Figure 
11c). At this point, any further restriction on ?̅? would, ceteris paribus, reduce the total 
medical service provided by 𝐻-doctors (see Figure 11c) and the HI scheme would adjust 
price downwards to counter this effect (see Figure 11a). Overall, the positive effect of 
the reduction in 𝑄𝐻  dominates the negative effect of price adjustment and welfare 
increases. 
As anticipated in the previous paragraph, the discontinuity of the response function 
𝑝𝑄
∗ (?̅?)  (and the feedback effect on all the other functions) implies that a marginal 
analysis cannot lead to a conclusive result for the general case. In particular, there is no 
guarantee that there is always a restriction ?̅? such that ?̅?(𝑝𝑄
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?) > 𝑊(𝑝∗). Overall, 
I find that even though imposing a per patient quantity restriction on a FFS system could 
improve welfare (as in the numerical example), it does involve numerous drawbacks. 
First, imposing the restriction may generate a countervailing incentive via physicians’ 
zero-profit constraint and there is no guarantee that the positive impact would dominate. 
Second, while rationing might improve welfare, it cannot induce efficiency. For instance, 
in the example, at the welfare optimum H-doctors ended up providing the same level of 
medical services to 𝐵- and 𝐺-patients despite their significant difference in medical 
needs. Note that such a policy is likely to face many criticisms; it would frustrate doctors 
(as they obtain lower utility), in particular the intrinsically motivated as well as health 
needy patients as their services may be reallocated to their less needy counterparts. 
 
3.6.2 Revenue Cap 
In this second subsection, I investigate an alternative regulation where the HI scheme 
restricts the average spending per doctor across patients. This subsection proceeds in the 
same way as the last section. First, a new policy variable is introduced denoted by ?̅? 
which measures the maximal level of expenditure that a doctor can spend across all his 
patients. Accordingly, a HI policy is a triplet (𝑝, ?̅?, 𝜏). Second, the doctor’s behaviour 














𝑞𝑡 − 𝐶 (∑𝑛𝑡𝑞𝑡
𝑡∈𝑻
) ≥ 0 
 
  (53) 
 ?̅? − 𝑝∑𝑛𝑡
𝑡∈𝑻
𝑞𝑡 ≥ 0 
 
   
 𝑞𝑡 ≥ 0  
The first line of the system (53) represents the physician’s objective function and the 
second, the third, and the last line shows the non-negative profit, the expenditure limit, 
and the non-negative service production respectively. 
Third, I show in Appendix A9 that (53) has a unique solution. The respective medical 
service provided by 𝐿- and 𝐻-type doctors are denoted by ?̃?𝑡
𝐻(𝑝, ?̅?) and ?̃?𝑡
𝐿(𝑝, ?̅?). These 
solutions are then substituted into the equation (31) to generate the welfare ?̃?(𝑝, ?̅?). 
Next, I denote by 𝑝𝑅
∗ (?̅?) the price of medical services which maximizes ?̃?(𝑝, ?̅?) for a 
given expenditure cap  ?̅? . Lastly, I substitute the solution into the welfare function, 
yielding the optimal welfare for a given ?̃? which is denoted by ?̃?(𝑝𝑅





(a) Optimal welfare as a function of revenue 
cap 
 




(c) Total health service produced as a 
function of revenue cap 
 
 
(d) The profit of the L- and H-doctor as a 
function of revenue cap 
Figure 12. Revenue Restriction 
In order to gain some insight, the numerical exercise in Section 3.6.1 is adjusted to 
evaluate the impact of a variation in the revenue cap. Figure 12 plots the result of the 
exercise for the parameter selected in Section 3.5.2. Observe that ?̅? → +∞, the revenue 
cap never binds so that ?̃?(𝑝𝑅
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?) = 𝑊(𝑝∗). Initial reductions in the revenue cap have 
no impact until reaching the point ?̅? ≈ 13. First, consider Figure 12c for value ?̅? > 13. 
From the foregoing section, we know that at 𝑝∗  the HI trades off the benefit of an 
increase in price which would increase 𝑄𝐿 against the loss of an increase in 𝑄𝐻. Next, 
suppose we are at the point ?̅? = 13. From Figures 10c and 10d, we find that a small 




∗ (?̅?), ?̅?) (54) 
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In other words, the revenue cap is such that the regulator is indifferent between imposing 
and relaxing the cap. To illustrate this further, at ?̅? = 13 the regulator has raised the price 
to a level such that 𝑄𝐻(𝑝𝑅
∗ (?̅?)) > ?̃?𝐻(𝑝𝑅
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?) > 𝑄𝐻(𝑝∗) and  ?̃?𝐿(𝑝𝑅
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?) >
𝑄𝐿(𝑝𝑅
∗ (?̅?)) > 𝑄𝐿(𝑝∗). As a result, price and total quantity of medical service go up and 
the regulator increases the health insurance premium. Altogether, the marginal reduction 
in ?̅? at ?̅? = 13 does not affect the welfare level as the positive impact of 𝑄𝐿 increases 
cancelled out the negative effect of the ?̃?𝐻 and 𝜏 increase (see Figure 12a). Finally, more 
reduction in ?̃? makes 𝐻-type doctors ceteris paribus reduce the ?̃?𝐻 and allows the HI 
scheme to reduce the price (see Figures 12b and 12c). The 𝐿 -type doctors would 
therefore reduce ?̃?𝐿 and the insurance premium goes down (see Figure 12c). Altogether, 
the positive effect on the reduction in ?̃?𝐻 and insurance premium outweighs the negative 
effect on the reduction in 𝑄𝐿, therefore welfare goes up (see Figure 12a). This process 
will continue until all the margins are realigned and the welfare maximum is attained 
at ?̅?∗. 
To conclude this subsection, a few remarks are in order. First, from Figure 12c note that, 
compared with the optimal policy without revenue restrictions, 𝐻-doctors are induced 
to produce less while 𝐿-doctors produce more. In other words, the optimal revenue cap 
helps the HI scheme to overcome one of the weaknesses associated with the standard 
FFS system which is linked to the informational asymmetry between HI and doctors. 
Second, compared with the quantity restriction, the revenue cap provides doctors with 
more flexibility which allows them to better adjust healthcare resources to the specific 
needs of individual patients. One would expect that this additional flexibility would 
make the revenue cap policy more palatable to doctors than the foregoing quantity 
restriction. Moreover, in this numerical example patients with initially low health were 
also better off with the revenue cap. 
 
3.6.3 Capitation 
In this last subsection, I explore another popular form of remuneration which pays the 
physician based on the number of patients treated and the total quantity of medical 
service produced. In line with the steps outlined in the above subsections, a fixed 
payment rate per patient denoted by 𝑘 ∈ (− ∞ ,+ ∞) is introduced. A HI policy is 
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therefore a triplet (𝑝, 𝑘, 𝜏). Next, the physicians’ best responses to a given policy vector 



















) ≥ 0 
(55) 
   
 𝑞𝑡 ≥ 0  
where the first line of the system (55) is the physician’s utility function with an 
additional term 𝑘 representing the reimbursement (capitation) per patient. The second 
and third lines represent the profit and production constraint respectively.  
The optimization problem (55) has a unique solution, as can be shown in the Appendix 
A10. I denote by ?̂?𝑡
𝐿(𝑝, 𝑘)  and ?̂?𝑡
𝐻(𝑝, 𝑘)  the respective quantity of medical service 
provided by 𝐿-and 𝐻-type doctors. By substituting these solutions into the initial welfare 
representation, one obtains the welfare function ?̂?(𝑝, 𝑘), finally, solving the welfare 
optimizing price 𝑝𝐾
∗ (𝑘)  and substituting this price into ?̂?(𝑝, 𝑘)  which yields the 
function ?̂?(𝑝𝐾





(a) Optimal welfare as a function of 
capitation 
 




(c) Total quantity of medical service 
produced by L- and H- doctors 
 
 
(d) Profit of L- and H- doctors 
Figure 13. Capitation 
To proceed, the numerical experiment conducted in Sections 3.5.1 is adjusted to examine 
the effect of changing the capitation rate. In Figure 13, I plot the results of the exercise 
for the parameter set introduced in Section 3.5.2. At the capitation rate 𝑘 = 0, 𝑝𝐾
∗ (0) =
𝑝∗ the HI scheme trades-off the benefit of an increase in the production of 𝐿-doctors 
against the deterioration in welfare from an increase in production by H-doctors. 
Moreover, at 𝑝∗ the 𝐻-type provider’s profit is just binding. Notice that when 𝑘 > 0, 
Figure 13b shows that the 𝑝𝐾
∗ (𝑘) initially goes down, then jumps upwards and become 
constant. Intuitively, marginal increase in 𝑘 relaxes 𝐻-type physicians’ binding profit 
constraint so that they raise their production of medical service. As a result, the average 
marginal cost of production increases and the HI scheme found it is advantageous to 
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adjust price downward. As a result, ?̂?𝐿 decreases, the insurance premium goes up, and 
welfare goes down (see Figure 13a). When 𝑘 is sufficiently high so that 𝐻-doctors are 
no longer constrained by the non-negative profit condition, the HI scheme will raise the 
price sharply to the level that maximizes unconstrained welfare optimization. Further 
increases in 𝑘 would only increase physicians’ profits and therefore the total costs of the 
HI scheme, leading to a deterioration of social well-being (see Figure 13a). Hence, when 
the regulator imposes the capitation 𝑘 > 0, the optimal welfare ?̂?(𝑝𝐾
∗ (𝑘), 𝑘) is lower 
than the optimal welfare without imposing capitation 𝑊(𝑝∗). 
However, when 𝑘  becomes negative, the 𝐻 -type doctor will reduce ?̂?𝐻  to avoid 
negative profit (see Figures 13c, d). To counter the effect of the reduction in ?̂?𝐻, the HI 
scheme adjusts the price upward and 𝐿-type physicians increase their production of 
medical services (see Figures 13b, c). In terms of total expenditure, the effect of the 
reduction in ?̂?𝐻 and the decrease in 𝑘 dominates the increase in price and ?̂?𝐿, thereby 
lowering the insurance premium. Overall, introducing a negative capitation aligns 
different physicians’ incentives, reduces the insurance premium, thus social welfare 
goes up (see Figure 13a). This process continues until all the margins are aligned at the 
rate  𝑘∗ ≈ −0.05 , where ?̂?𝐻(𝑝𝐾
∗ (𝑘), 𝑘) = ?̂?𝐿(𝑝𝐾
∗ (𝑘), 𝑘)  and Π̂𝐻(𝑝𝐾
∗ (𝑘), 𝑘) =
Π̂𝐿(𝑝𝐾
∗ (𝑘), 𝑘) = 0. 
In short, this subsection shows that the optimal physician payment system should blend 
the negative capitation and positive FFS. This result differs in an important way from 
what has become the conventional wisdom (see Kantarevic and Kralj, 2016), as mixing 
positive capitation and retrospective reimbursement would leave physicians with 
informational rent while reducing the production incentives of low altruistic providers. 
By contrast, blending the negative capitation with high retrospective payments would 
reduce 𝐻-type doctors’ over-production while motivating L-type doctors to raise their 
production. 
As a result, the HI scheme no longer trade off the benefit of an increase in the production 
of 𝐿-doctors against the reduction in welfare from an increase in production by 𝐻-
doctors. In reality, the negative capitation can be interpreted as the spending physicians 
paid to buy rights to serve patients while the payment can be compensated by the rise in 
health service price. The capitation is not only a tool that aligns physicians’ incentives 
but also an instrument that extracts physicians’ informational rent. The experiment also 
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shows that the negative capitation outperforms quantity rationing and revenue restriction, 
as these cost-containment instruments cannot completely align physicians’ incentives 
and is not able to extract physicians’ informational rent. 
 
3.6.4 Discussion 
Standard analysis of the FFS scheme focuses on the use of fees to align doctors’ 
incentives. However, asymmetric information between physicians, patients and health 
insurance systems has been found in the literature, resulting in medical service 
overproduction, health spending escalation and inefficient allocation of health resource 
(Léger, 2008; McGuire, 2000). Specifically, the foregoing sections have underlined that 
ignoring extrinsic motivation and the difference thereof across doctors necessarily leads 
to an inefficiency in the allocation of medical resources. The main reason for this 
inefficiency is that, for the same fee structure, high intrinsically motivated staff 
automatically supply more medical services than low motivated individuals. A natural 
response to this inefficiency is to regulate medical service price. However, as all doctors 
increase their service supply with price, raising or reducing price would further 
exacerbate highly motivated doctors’ overproduction or low motivated doctors’ 
underproduction. Hence, imposing a conventional price regulation does not guarantee 
an improvement in the efficiency of health resource allocation. 
A logical reaction to the weakness of price regulation is to adjust the scheme by 
introducing additional restrictions aimed at capping the supply of medical services by 
high intrinsically motivated medical staff. Doing so helps to curb highly motivated 
doctors’ excessive supply while the HI scheme can simultaneously increase the price for 
services with the aim to reduce the medical service under-provision of less motivated 
medical staff.  
In that respect, although individual quantity rationing is shown to be useful, it can only 
be used in a relatively restrictive environment where the quantity of medical service 
supplied to individual patient can be closely and accurately monitored. Without such 
monitoring, quantity rationing may induce highly intrinsically motivated doctors to shift 
service supply away from patients with more health needs to their less needy 
counterparts, holding the total service supply constant and therefore resulting in 
inefficient resource allocation. Since the costs associated with monitoring is high 
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(Chalkley and Malcomson, 2002) and the regulator does not know patients’ health, it 
may be difficult to implement individual quantity rationing.  
My experiments pointed to an additional difficulty with a pure quantity restriction of 
services, namely, welfare may not react smoothly (see Figure 11). Theoretically, this is 
not a problem and welfare would increase if the quantity ratioing is sufficiently 
restrictive. However, from a practical point of view, this may be much more complicated, 
as it is very difficult for the regulator to decide the exact level of the maximum service 
quantity per patient that can be provided. Further, potential deviations from the quantity 
rationing target may result in a deterioration of current social well-being. 
Finally, even when the HI scheme pays monitoring costs and successfully implements 
efficiency enhancing quantity rationing, the policy may receive many criticisms from 
both patients and doctors. For instance, physicians might observe that they cannot use 
their local knowledge while some of them – in particular those who are highly motivated 
– would even complain that their well-being is deteriorated. Patients with high levels of 
health needs are also likely to complain as they receive the same amount of service as 
their low health needs counterparts but have to pay a higher premium. 
Some of the previous unintended effects associated with imposing individual quantity 
rationing can be also found in reality. For instance, Chua et al. (2019) has shown that 
imposing limits on opioid may result in the excessive prescriptions and inadequate pain 
control in the US, as a uniform restriction does not satisfy patients’ heterogeneous 
combinations of opioid use and pain needs. Moreover, their evidence shows that the 
quantity restriction is either set too high to reduce excessive prescribing or too low to 
avoid the potential for inadequate pain control. While physicians’ prescription of opioids 
has been restricted, patients can nevertheless obtain opioids from other resources. A 
recent report by the US Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 
(SAMHSA) found that about half of people who misused prescription opioids in the past 
year obtained them from a friend or relative for free (Lipari and Hughes, 2017).  
Overall, this study shows while individual quantity rationing could be used to enhance 
resource allocation efficiency, the unintended effects, high costs associated with 
monitoring, as well as potential criticisms from both patients and doctors has restricted 
its further application. Given the aforementioned limitations of quantity rationing, one 
would consider controlling total medical expenditure within a primary care practice to 
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be a better alternative as the revenue cap requires less monitoring and allows physicians 
to use their local knowledge, thereby reducing costs and improving patients’ health 
benefits. 
Specifically, this policy reduces high intrinsically motivated physicians’ over-
production by directly limiting their total expenditure while the HI scheme 
simultaneously raises the fee-for-service price to incentivise service provision by low 
intrinsically motivated physicians. However, compared to quantity rationing, this policy 
does not provide physicians with a countervailing incentive which induces highly 
motivated physicians to shift service from the more health needy to less needy 
individuals. Furthermore, I find this policy is always efficiency enhancing, as long as 
the maximum expenditure per physician can be set below the remuneration level that the 
most motivated physician would receive while exceeding the reward that the least 
motivated doctors would gain under a pure FFS system. This specific range of effective 
revenue restriction will be a lot easier and less costly for the regulator to determine in 
comparison to quantity rationing. 
The policy also does not require a detailed monitoring of physicians’ medical service 
supply, thereby saving all monitoring costs. Finally, as the expenditure cap allows 
physicians to use their local knowledge, patients with high severe illnesses are provided 
with more services, therefore average patient health is improved.  
While an expenditure cap overcomes most weaknesses associated with using quantity 
rationing, my study reflects some of its disadvantages. First, while the initial reduction 
of the expenditure cap per physician limits more altruistic physicians’ overproduction, 
the subsequent sharp increase in price provides all physicians with additional 
informational rents. Next, to further reduce the more motivated physicians’ 
overproduction, the health authority keeps reducing the maximum health spending per 
physician. However, the HI scheme would adjust the price downward to counter this 
reduction, which weakens the low motivated physicians’ incentives to increase their 
service production. These two observations show that introducing an expenditure cap in 
a FFS system could not extract physicians’ informational rents (as a result of 




Indeed, the real-world applications of expenditure cap demonstrate some of the insights 
derived above. First, many more applications of revenue restriction compared to quantity 
rationing can be found in the real-world applications. For instance, the UK has applied 
quality adjusted life years, on the basis that, for each extra year of life delivered, if it 
costs more than £30,000 then, adjusted for quality, it should not be publicly funded 
(Cookson, 2013). Germany has also extensively used sectoral and regional budgets for 
hospitals and ambulatory care (Stabile et al., 2013). Moreover, France introduced a 
national cap on statutory health insurance expenditure in 1997, capping healthcare 
spending for six sectors (Sandier et al., 2004). 
Second, comparing revenue cap and quantity rationing, both theory and experiments 
suggest the former policy induces more service provision than the latter given the same 
budget (Fan et al., 1998). Mougeot and Naegelen (2005) further demonstrate that a 
revenue cap cannot solve the conflicts between allocation efficiency and rent extraction, 
therefore it can never act as a means of achieving first-best social welfare. Poterba 
(1994), Benester and Wambach (2006) and Fischer et al. (2018) have also found that 
using revenue caps may drive health spending in the long-term, exacerbating medical 
service overproduction while inducing inappropriate drug prescription for elderly 
patients. As a result, one should further consider a policy which provides physicians 
incentives that align with the one embedded in FFS, while extracting physicians’ 
informational rents. The former requirement keeps patients’ total health benefits 
unchanged while reducing the overall costs of medical operations. The latter reduces the 
regulator’s total health spending on physicians and the costs generated from collecting 
insurance premium. 
My numerical analysis shows that negative capitation is the best cost-control instrument; 
the negative capitation curbs the high intrinsically motivated doctors’ excessive service 
provision while extracting informational rents from low motivated physicians without 
affecting their incentives in supplying medical service. The HI scheme, therefore, found 
that it is advantageous to adjust price upwards, which incentivises low motivated 
physicians to provide more services. This process continues until both types of 
physicians provide the same amount of service for respective types of patients while 
having a zero profit. In short, negative capitation is used to align all physicians’ 
incentives while an FFS payment reimburses the costs that physicians incur. Notice my 
model does not consider fixed costs associated with enrolling a patient, therefore 
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negative capitation is an artefact. In reality, the HI scheme should blend price with a 
positive capitation less than the fixed costs associated with treating each individual. 
Mixed payment systems comprise of fee-for-service payments and capitation has been 
widely used. For instance, primary care physicians in the UK, Finland, Norway and Italy 
are paid based on a combination of capitation and FFS for the purpose of containing 
health expenditure and reducing hospital referrals (Park et al., 2007). In the US, 
capitation payments have also been used in both outpatient and inpatient care within the 
framework of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) or managed care plans 
(Carrin, 2012). Despite these applications, there is limited evidence that the capitation 
has been set at less than the administrative cost per patient in a blended payment system. 
However, outside of the healthcare sector, there are many applications of negative 
capitation. For instance, a bonding contract comprised of a positive bonus and a negative 
fixed payment is frequently used in the construction sector to guarantee that the 
contractor’s performance in accordance with the conditions of their contract as well as 
protecting against the contractor’s default (Awad and Fayek, 2012). Moreover, franchise 
agreement also requires the franchisee pays a franchisee (i.e. a firm set up to market a 
product or service in a specific location) pays a franchisor (i.e. the parent company which 
developed some products or services) a certain sum money for the right to sell the 
franchisor’s services or products (Rubin, 1978). For instance, McDonalds require at least 
£110,000 unencumbered funds from its franchisee to invest in the UK, with £40,000-
£80,000 to buy a restaurant and a one-off franchise fee of £30,000.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I derived the optimal physician payment mechanisms based on numerical 
simulations. My results show that FFS system is inefficient as it fails to align incentives 
of heterogeneously motivated physicians. The study then reproduces the impact of the 
recurrent trends; these findings suggest that price and insurance premiums increase with 
ageing and science innovations, which are consistent with some stylized facts presented 
for healthcare systems in most developed countries. Moreover, revolutions in current 
trends also exacerbate the misallocation of health resources. 
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The numerical analysis then provides both qualitative and quantitative recommendations 
for policy changes. I found that introducing FFS system a ceiling on the maximum 
number of medical services provided per patient, an expenditure cap per physician, or a 
negative capitation could enhance efficiency in terms of the use of healthcare resources. 
In particular, social welfare will be improved if the foregoing restrictions are selected at 
a level that could cap the health services provided by strongly motivated physicians. 
Finally, I find that the negative capitation is superior to other cost-containing methods 
as it perfectly aligns L- and H-type doctors’ incentives while extracting all informational 
rents.  
 
3.8 Limitations and Extensions 
The theoretical framework can be extended in two important ways. First, primary care 
providers often face a plurality of problems and have multiple sets of activities.  They 
not only need to decide the service quantity/quality provided per patient but also the type 
or the number of patients to be treated. In addition, they determine the level of cost 
reducing efforts and whether or not to refer patients to specialized treatment. 
Accordingly, a natural extension would attempt to allow physicians select the number 
of patients to be treated, which will be discussed in Chapter 4. Furthermore, it is worth 
to check whether my current findings hold when physicians can also select patient types. 
Physicians’ decisions on the level of their quality enhancing efforts and speciality care 
referral have been discussed by Allard et al. (2011) and Allard et al. (2014). However, 
these studies do not consider how these decisions are influenced by cost control policies. 
Second, my work has assumed that patients differ only in their initial health while 
physicians differ only in their degree of altruism. Furthermore, my model considers the 
simplest situation where there are only two types of physicians and patients. It is 
worthwhile to examine whether my current findings can be generalized when there are 
more than two types of patients or physicians. Meanwhile, it will also be interesting to 
determine how the introduction of additional heterogeneities such as individual benefits 
from treatment or marginal costs of service provision will change my results. These 
extensions have been discussed respectively by Chalkley and Malcomson (2002), 
Makris and Siciliani (2013) and Kantarevic and Kralj (2016), although these studies 
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focused on designing a menu of contracts. However, they have not considered the 
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′′ + 𝑛𝐵(1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺
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′′ + 𝑛𝐵(1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺
′′]
> 0 (59) 
 
where the respective signs follow from the curvature assumptions 𝑓′′ < 0 , 𝐶′′ > 0 . 
Moreover, since lim
𝑞→0
𝑓′(𝑞) = +∞, lim
𝑞→+∞
𝑓′(𝑞) = 0 , 𝑓′ > 0, 𝑓′′ < 0,  we must 
have  𝑓′′′ > 0 .  For parsimony, I assume  0 > 𝑓𝐵
′′ ≥ (1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺
′′ . Hence, we have 
−(1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺
′′ ≥ −𝑓𝐵








 , thereby verifying the claim.  
 
A2 
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′′ + 𝑛𝐵(1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺
′′]
> 0 (62) 
As shown in the appendix A1, −(1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺
′′ ≥ −𝑓𝐵
′′ > 0. Moreover, as 𝑓𝐵










> 0 verifying the claim. 
 
A3 
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′′ + 𝑛𝐵(1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺
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′′ + 𝑛𝐵(1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺
′′]
< 0 (65) 
As shown in appendix A1, 0 > 𝑓𝐵
′′ ≥ (1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺








< 0 , 
verifying the claim. 
 
A4 
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′′ + 𝑛𝐵(1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺
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′′ + 𝑛𝐵(1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺
′′]
> 0 (68) 
This verifies the first part of the claim. Next, as shown in Appendix A, we have 0 >
(1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺
′′ > 𝑓𝐵



















+). The other possibility where 𝑡 = 𝐺 is perfectly symmetrical 

















Rearranging terms and taking the respective signs of 𝑓′′ and 𝐶′′ into account, we obtain: 
[𝑛𝐺𝑓𝐵
′′ + 𝑛𝐵(1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺





This is true since the RHS is positive while the LHS is negative. The observation follows 
because the first square bracket is negative whereas the second is positive by 𝐶′′′ > 0 
and 𝑝0𝑄
∗  − 𝐶(𝑄∗)  = 0. 
 
A5 
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Following the same procedures as in the A6 and denote ∆𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝐵
∗ − 𝑞𝐺










′′ + 𝑛𝐵(1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺









′′ + 𝑛𝐵(1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺
′′ < 0 (73) 
The assumption 0 > 𝑓𝐵
′′ ≥ (1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺












Consider the production vector for services which solves (35). We use this solution to 
define the ensuing total production of services denoted by ?̂?(𝑝, 𝛼).51 The critical price 
𝑝0 is implicitly a function of 𝛼 which is determined by solving: 
 
𝑝0?̂?(𝑝0, 𝛼) − 𝐶 (?̂?(𝑝0, 𝛼)) = 0 (74) 
Calculate the first order condition of (74) with respect to 𝛼, we have: 
 






+ (𝑝0 − 𝐶′)
𝜕?̂?
𝜕𝛼
= 0 (75) 
 




(𝑝0, 𝛼) > 0 and 
𝜕?̂?
𝜕𝛼
(𝑝0, 𝛼) > 0. Moreover, the system (35) implies that  𝑝0 −




> 0. As a result, we must have 
𝜕𝑝0
𝜕𝛼
> 0, verifying the claim. 
 
A7 
Proof. First, observe at 𝑝 = 0, patients’ total health is positive (𝑧 > 0), keeping in mind 
that welfare sums up individuals’ health and the system’s overall medical cost 𝑊(0) >
                                                 
51 Slightly abusing the notation, observe that ?̂?(𝑝, 𝛼) = 𝑄∗(𝑝, 𝛼) iff 𝑝 ∈ 𝑷. 
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0. Moreover, for 𝑝 ∈ [0, 𝑝0
𝐿), 𝐿- and 𝐻- doctors’ profits are strictly binding so that 
𝑞𝑡
𝐿(𝑝) = 𝑞𝑡
𝐻(𝑝) = ?̃?(𝑝) and the slope of the welfare as a function of 𝑝 is:  
 𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝑝
(𝑝) = [𝑓′?̃?𝐵(𝑝) − 𝜆𝑝 − 𝐶 (?̃?(𝑝))]
𝜕?̃?
𝜕𝑝
(𝑝) − 𝜆?̃?(𝑝) (76) 
For  𝑝 → 0+,  ?̃?𝐵(0) = ?̃?(0) = 𝐶 (?̃?(0)) = 0 . However,  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑓




(0+) > 0, we have 
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝑝
(0+) > 0. 
Second, 𝑞𝑡
𝐿 , 𝑞𝑡
𝐻 are increasing in 𝑝, so the slope and curvature assumptions ensures that 
∑ ℎ𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 (𝑝) is increasing concave and bounded (i.e.  ∑ ℎ𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 (𝑝) ≤ 𝑁). However, the 
total cost 𝜆∑ 𝑝𝑞𝑖(𝑝)
𝑁
𝑖=1 +∑ 𝐶 (∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑗
𝑖=(𝑗−1 )𝑛+1
(𝑝))𝑀𝑗=1  is increasing and unbounded. 
Hence, as  𝑝  becomes sufficiently large, we have  𝜆 ∑ 𝑝𝑞𝑖(𝑝)
𝑁
𝑖=1 +
∑ 𝐶 (∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑗
𝑖=(𝑗−1 )𝑛+1
(𝑝))𝑀𝑗=1 > 𝑁  and  𝑊(𝑝) < 0 . Moreover, notice 
that  𝜆 ∑ 𝑝𝑞𝑖(𝑝)
𝑁
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝐶 (∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑗
𝑖=(𝑗−1 )𝑛+1
(𝑝))𝑀𝑗=1  is a continuous function of  𝑝 
and  𝜆 ∑ 𝑝𝑞𝑖(0)
𝑁
𝑖=1 +∑ 𝐶 (∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑛𝑗
𝑖=(𝑗−1 )𝑛+1
(0)) = 0𝑀𝑗=1 , with the intermediate value 
theorem showing that there exists a price  𝑝𝑁  such that  𝜆 ∑ 𝑝𝑞𝑖(𝑝𝑁)
𝑁
𝑖=1 +





𝑗=1 , hence, for  𝑝 = 𝑝𝑁 ,𝑊
′(𝑝𝑁) < 0 . Altogether, the 
extreme value theorem implies that there exists at least a price 𝑝∗ ∈ [0, 𝑝𝑁]  that 





𝑊(𝑝), this verifies the claim. 
 
A8 
The Lagrange of (51) is:  
 ℒ =  𝛼∑𝑛𝑡[𝑧𝑡 + (1 − 𝑧𝑡)𝑓(𝑞𝑡)] +∑𝜇𝑡(?̅? − 𝑞𝑡)
𝑡∈𝑻𝑡∈𝑻
+ (1 + 𝜂) [𝑝∑𝑛𝑡
𝑡∈𝑻




















′(𝑞𝐵) + (1 + 𝜂)𝑛𝐵[𝑝 − 𝐶
′(𝑄)] + 𝜇𝐵 = 0
𝛼(1 − 𝑧)𝑛𝐺𝑓
′(𝑞𝐺) + (1 + 𝜂)𝑛𝐺[𝑝 − 𝐶
′(𝑄)] + 𝜇𝐺 = 0
𝜂[𝑝𝑄 − 𝐶(𝑄)] = 0
𝜇𝐵(?̅? − 𝑞𝐵) = 0
𝜇𝐺(?̅? − 𝑞𝐺) = 0




The first two equations in (78) are the first-order conditions with respect to 𝑞𝐵 and 𝑞𝐺 .
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The next three lines in (78) are the corresponding complementary slackness conditions 
associated with the inequalities in the optimization problem. Finally, the last line gives 
the restriction on the respective multipliers of non-negative requirements for profit and 
services. The first order condition with respect to 𝑞𝐵 and 𝑞𝐵 in (78) can be set equal to 
zero, therefore we have the necessary condition to solve utility maximization 𝑞𝐵. In 
addition, the functions 𝑓′ and 𝐶′ are monotonous while the respective solution of  𝑞𝐵 
and  𝑞𝐺  is unique for a given policy vector. 










2(1 + 𝜂)𝐶′′ −𝑛𝐵𝑛𝐺(1 + 𝜂)𝐶′′ 






Since  𝛼(1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐵
′′ − 𝑛𝐵
2(1 + 𝜂)𝐶′′ < 0 , and  [𝛼(1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐵
′′ − 𝑛𝐵
2(1 + 𝜂)𝐶′′][𝛼𝑛𝐺(1 −
𝑧)𝑓𝐺
′′ − 𝑛𝐺
2(1 + 𝜂)𝐶′′] − (𝑛𝐵𝑛𝐺(1 + 𝜂)𝐶
′′)2 > 0 , the sufficient and necessary 
condition all support the presence of  𝑞𝐵 and 𝑞𝐺  to maximize (51) therefore our problem 
is well-defined. 
 
                                                 





Writing the Lagrange of the problem (53), we have: 
 ℒ =  𝛼∑𝑛𝑡[𝑧𝑡 + (1 − 𝑧𝑡)𝑓(𝑞𝑡)] +∑𝜇𝑡𝑞𝑡
𝑡∈𝑻𝑡∈𝑻
+ (1 + 𝜂 − 𝜔)𝑝∑𝑛𝑡
𝑡∈𝑻
𝑞𝑡 − (1 + 𝜂)𝐶 (∑𝑛𝑡𝑞𝑡
𝑡∈𝑻
) + 𝜔?̃? 
(80) 
Following the same procedure as in the last subsection, we derive the necessary 
















′(𝑞𝐵) + (1 + 𝜂)𝑛𝐵[𝑝 − 𝐶
′(𝑄)] − 𝜔𝑛𝐵𝑝 + 𝜇𝐵 = 0
𝛼(1 − 𝑧)𝑛𝐺𝑓
′(𝑞𝐺) + (1 + 𝜂)𝑛𝐺[𝑝 − 𝐶
′(𝑄)] − 𝜔𝑛𝐺𝑝 + 𝜇𝐺 = 0
𝜔(?̃? − 𝑝𝑄) = 0
𝜂[𝑝𝑄 − 𝐶(𝑄)] = 0
𝜇𝐵𝑞𝐵 = 0
𝜇𝐺𝑞𝐺 = 0




The first two equations in (81) are the first-order conditions with respect to 𝑞𝐵 and 𝑞𝐺 . 
The next four lines in (81) are the corresponding complementary slackness conditions 
associated with the inequalities in the optimization problem. Finally, the last line gives 
the restriction on the respective multipliers of non-negative requirements for profit, 
services and the cap. The first order condition with respect to 𝑞𝐵 and 𝑞𝐺 in (81) can be 
set equal to zero, then we have the necessary condition to solve utility maximization 𝑞𝑡. 
In addition, the functions 𝑓′ and 𝐶′ are monotonous, while the respective solution of 
 𝑞𝐵(𝑝, ?̃?) and  𝑞𝐺(𝑝, ?̃?) is unique.  
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2(1 + 𝜂)𝐶′′ −𝑛𝐵𝑛𝐺(1 + 𝜂)𝐶′′ 





As 𝛼(1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐵
′′ − 𝑛𝐵
2(1 + 𝜂)𝐶′′ < 0 , and  [𝛼(1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐵
′′ − 𝑛𝐵
2(1 + 𝜂)𝐶′′][𝛼𝑛𝐺(1 −
𝑧)𝑓𝐺
′′ − 𝑛𝐺
2(1 + 𝜂)𝐶′′] − (𝑛𝐵𝑛𝐺(1 + 𝜂)𝐶
′′)2 > 0. The second order condition of the 
system (81) is negative, thereby verifying the claim. 
 
A10 
As in the last section, the Lagrange of the system (55) is: 
 ℒ =  𝛼∑𝑛𝑡[𝑧𝑡 + (1 − 𝑧𝑡)𝑓(𝑞𝑡)] +∑𝜇𝑡𝑞𝑡
𝑡∈𝑻𝑡∈𝑻








Following the same procedures as in the last subsections, the necessary condition that 














′(𝑞𝐵) + (1 + 𝜂)𝑛𝐵[𝑝 − 𝐶
′(𝑄)] + 𝜇𝐵 = 0
𝛼(1 − 𝑧)𝑛𝐺𝑓
′(𝑞𝐺) + (1 + 𝜂)𝑛𝐺[𝑝 − 𝐶
′(𝑄)] + 𝜇𝐺 = 0







The first two lines of the equation are the first order conditions with respect to  𝑞𝐵 
and   𝑞𝐺  and the third to fifth lines are the corresponding complementary slackness 
conditions associated with the optimization inequalities. The last line has the restriction 
on the respective multipliers of non-negative requirements. Given 𝑓′  and 𝐶′  are 
continuous, the respective solution  𝑞𝐵(𝑝, 𝑘) and   𝑞𝐺(𝑝, 𝑘) are unique. 
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2(1 + 𝜂)𝐶′′ −𝑛𝐵𝑛𝐺(1 + 𝜂)𝐶′′ 





Given  𝛼(1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐵
′′ − 𝑛𝐵
2(1 + 𝜂)𝐶′′ < 0 , and  [𝛼(1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐵
′′ − 𝑛𝐵
2(1 + 𝜂)𝐶′′][𝛼𝑛𝐺(1 −
𝑧)𝑓𝐺
′′ − 𝑛𝐺
2(1 + 𝜂)𝐶′′] − (𝑛𝐵𝑛𝐺(1 + 𝜂)𝐶
′′)2 > 0. The second order condition of the 





Chapter 4. The optimal design of fee-for-service contract 2 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter analysed the design of the optimal compensation scheme for 
altruistic providers in an environment where physicians decide the quantity of medical 
service (e.g. the number of prescriptions or the length of hospital stay) and have private 
information about their degree of altruism as well as their patients’ initial health. The 
main finding is that the optimal remuneration blends both positive payment per service 
and a negative reimbursement per patient. The negative payment has been applied 
widely in practice, well-known examples include franchise agreements (Rubin, 1978) 
and bonding contracts (Awad and Fayek, 2012). 
The aforementioned result is obtained in a parsimonious setup in which the physician 
faces no fixed costs in terms of providing medical service and is allocated a given 
number of patients. Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is to generalize the previous 
analysis by removing the above two restrictions. Specifically, I follow Wu et al. (2018) 
as well as Barham and Milliken (2015) who allow the physician to choose the size of his 
practice.53 Moreover, the physician faces fixed costs associated with enrolling patients. 
The generalizations, however, make it essential to design a health insurance scheme that 
ensures the entire population’s access to healthcare. In short, this chapter improves our 
understanding regarding how price variations and different cost control instruments 
affect physicians’ choices regarding their practice size and service quality. Moreover, 
it provides qualitative recommendations in relation to optimal incentive contracting for 
primary healthcare providers.  
The chapter follows the same procedures adopted in Chapter 3 to solve the optimal 
health insurance scheme. First, I characterize the physician’s decision on medical service 
quantity and patient numbers as a function of price and capitation.54 The main departure 
from the previous analysis is that the price rises may lead to a decrease in the level of 
medical service intensities/qualities provided. This is because, compared to improving 
                                                 
53 According to Barham and Milliken (2015), allow physicians to select their practice sizes is particularly 
relevant in countries facing medical staff shortages.  
54 I denote capitation as fixed payment per patient, which has also been defined in the Chapter 1. 
133 
 
quality, enrolling an additional patient provides the physician with extra marginal 
altruism benefits. As a result, when constrained by a zero-profit condition, the physician 
increases his practice size to maximize utility while reducing service intensities to 
maintain zero profit. 
In the second part of the chapter, I derive the constrained optimal fee-for-service system 
that ensures the entire population’s access to healthcare. As in the previous chapter, the 
price system fails to align more altruistic doctors’ incentive to overproduce55 and less 
altruistic doctors’ incentive to underproduce as a result of moral hazard and adverse 
selection. However, in the current extension, the regulator faces additional trade-offs 
between productive efficiency and full patients’ access. 
In the final part of this chapter, I examine whether three cost-control mechanisms56 
introduced in the previous chapter – i.e. per patient expenditure control, per patient 
quantity rationing, and a capitation less than fixed costs– can be used in the current 
context to enhance resource allocation efficiency and ensure all patients have access to 
healthcare. I find that all three methods can be used to achieve these objectives. This is 
because cost control policies directly limit the total quantity of medical service produced 
while combining price with cost-control instruments aligns physicians’ heterogeneous 
incentives. Specifically, the cost-control instruments force low altruistic providers to 
reduce service quality per patient but increase the number of patients treated. Meanwhile, 
by adjusting price downward, high altruistic providers are incentivised to reduce their 
practice size and to improve medical service quality.  
Overall, I find that the revenue cap and capitation perform better than quantity rationing, 
as the former two instruments exploit the private knowledge of doctors. While imposing 
a fee-for-service system a capitation or a revenue cap improves social welfare at the 
same level, the former payment is considered as the best remuneration mechanism as it 
is more tolerant of potential mistakes that could be made by the regulator compared to 
the revenue cap. The result that capitation is superior to other cost control instruments 
                                                 
55 As discussed in the Chapter 3, the more/less altruistic physician would provide a higher/lower total 
caseload than they would do in an economy with the more/less altruistic physicians only. 




is therefore consistent with the one obtained in Chapter 3, reflecting that my previous 
findings can be further generalized in a less restrictive context.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 briefly discusses the related 
literature while Section 4.3 introduces the model. Section 4.4 describes the physician’s 
utility optimization problem, derives his decisions in terms of the number of patients 
treated as well as medical service quality, and provides a comparative static analysis of 
these decisions. Section 4.5 describes the regulator’s optimization problem and 
introduces parameters for the succeeding numerical analysis. Section 4.6 evaluates 
different cost control instruments and derives the optimal form of HI scheme. Finally, 
Section 4.7 concludes, section 4.8 discusses potential extensions, while Appendix 4.9 
provides all proofs. 
 
4.2 Related literature 
Broadly speaking, this study relates to three types of literature. First, it relates to the 
literature that compares physician responses to the incentives embedded in traditional 
payment systems (Ellis and McGuire, 1986; Léger, 2008). This literature often uses a 
principal-agent model whereby the physician is viewed as a representative making 
treatment decisions for a single patient (e.g. Choné and Ma, 2011; Ellis and McGuire, 
1986; Jack, 2005), or the physician has a utility function per patient (Allard et al., 2014; 
Eggleston, 2000; Ellis, 1998). Many studies use this approach for investigating the ways 
in which differences in information structure, physician preferences or patient 
characteristics affect the quality or the intensity of treatment provided. In contrast, this 
chapter allows the physician to treat multiple types of patients and addresses the extent 
to which the physician reacts to a different remuneration system by adjusting his roster 
size compared to the quality/quantity of care provided.  
Studies in this literature examining incentives embedded in different payment systems 
to accept low-cost patients (cream-skimming) while limiting access to excessively 
expensive patients (dumping) are also related (Barros, 2003; Ellis, 1998; Ma, 1994; Ma 
and McGuire, 1997). Their main focus, however, is to characterize the consequences of 
physician selection of patients and to derive the payment that induces an efficient level 
of quality or cost efforts (Ma, 1994,1998). Different to all of these studies, this chapter 
analyses the design of physician payment, not only to ensure the efficient provision of 
135 
 
quality but also to ensure the entire population’s access to healthcare (Barham and 
Milliken, 2015). 
Recent studies in this literature also discuss the design of physician payment for 
heterogeneous patients and providers (Jack, 2005; Kantarevic and Kralj, 2016; Wu et al., 
2018). In contrast to all of these studies proposing a menu of physician compensation 
systems, my study derives an optimal single payment which blends both FFS and 
capitation. This remuneration scheme can be interpreted as an indirect implementation 
of the direct revelation mechanism via a single and linear schedule. The single payment 
system has been widely applied in the healthcare and other sectors, as it does not require 
reporting information (i.e. physicians’ types) and therefore is not subject to the problem 
of renegotiation (Demougin, 1989; Maskin and Moore, 1999). Moreover, the linear 
payment schedule does not embed incentives that induce physicians to pick up low-cost 
patients.  
Second, this chapter relates to the literature on physicians’ competition for patients 
(Allard et al., 2011; Ma and McGuire, 1997; McGuire, 2000), in which the physician’s 
practice size is determined endogenously. This literature considers an environment 
where patients are relatively scarce and argues that competition may provide physicians 
with an incentive to improve their quality of care or to keep their patients who have an 
option to switch to an alternative provider. The main departure from this literature is that 
I do not model physicians’ competition. Accordingly, my model is more suited to 
countries facing primary care physician (PCP) shortages while theirs are more appealing 
to countries with a surfeit of PCPs.    
Finally, this chapter relates to the literature which compares the impact of imposing 
different cost-control instruments on the supply of health service by self-interested 
primary care physicians (PCPs) who are paid on a FFS basis (Benstetter and Wambach, 
2006; Fan et al., 1998; Mougeot and Naegelen, 2009; Neudeck, 1991). As discussed in 
Chapter 2, this study contributes by introducing important features of the healthcare 
market in the stylised model, including moral hazard and adverse selection problems as 





I use the same model as in the previous chapter except the following extensions. First, 
the physician 𝑗 can select both the number of patients 𝑛𝑗 and the quantity vector 𝒒𝑗  for 
patients with alternative health status. Since there are only two types of patients and their 
distributions are given exogenous,57 the respective number of B- and G-type patients is 
denoted by 𝑛𝐵
𝑗
= 𝛽𝑛𝑗  and 𝑛𝐺
𝑗
= (1 − 𝛽)𝑛𝑗. The vector of the number of patients treated 




). Denoting the medical service provided by doctor 𝑗 to 




, the quantity of service provided is therefore 
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Second, I use a more general form of the total cost function ?̃?(𝑛𝑗 , 𝑄𝑗 , 𝐹). For simplicity, 
I assume the cost function is additively separable. This cost function form takes a 
specific form: 58 
 ?̃?(𝑛, 𝑄, 𝐹) = 𝑛𝐹 + 𝐶(𝑄) (86) 
where 𝐹 is exogenously given and the first term 𝑛𝐹 can be interpreted as the total fixed 
costs whereas the second term 𝐶(𝑄) represents the treatment costs. This cost function 
?̃?(𝑛, 𝑄, 𝐹) therefore captures the notion that the physician cares about both the number 
of patients treated and his total caseload. Moreover, the treatment cost function 𝐶(𝑄) is 
increasing and convex, which satisfies 𝐶′′′ > 0 and 𝐶(0) = 𝐶′(0) = 0.  
Third, the physician is not only reimbursed by fee-for-service but also a capitation 
denoted by 𝑘. As a result, the doctor 𝑗 who produced 𝒒 = (𝑞𝐵, 𝑞𝐺) obtains the profit: 
 Π̃(𝑛, 𝒒, 𝑝, 𝑘, 𝐹) = 𝑝𝑄(𝒒) + 𝑛𝑘 − ?̃?(𝑛, 𝑄, 𝐹) (87) 
The welfare again sums up patients’ expected utility and doctors’ expected profit over 
the entire economy under a self-balancing restriction. With the introduction of the 
capitation rate 𝑘, this restriction can be written as: 
                                                 
57 From Chapter 3, 𝑧𝑖 ∈ {0, 𝑧}  with 0 < 𝑧 < 1. Define 𝑧𝐵 = 0, 𝑧𝐺 = 𝑧 , we have 𝑃𝑟[𝑧𝑖 = 𝑧𝐵] = 𝛽  and 
𝑃𝑟[𝑧𝑖 = 𝑧𝐺] = 1 − 𝛽. 
58 To simplify the cumbersome notation, I drop the physician’s identification superscription j in the 











where the left side of the equation represents total premium collected from patients and 
the right side the total payment to physicians. Finally, by assuming −𝜏 the patient’s 
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where the former term measures total expected health benefits across patients and the 
latter the net health expenditure of the medical system. In contrast to the previous 
Chapter 3, the regulator not only has to find a HI scheme that maximizes (89) but also 
need to ensure that the entire population have access to healthcare (i.e. ∑ 𝑛𝑗𝑀𝑗=1 = 𝑁), 
given the doctor’s choices with respect to the number of enrolled patients and the 
provision of medical services. 
The foregoing setup closely parallels the one used by Barham and Milliken (2015), 
which is the first study deploying a population approach59 to analyse physician incentive 
contracting in the presence of patient and physician heterogeneities. My model differs 
from theirs in four ways: First, I do not assume a bell-shaped altruism function. Instead, 
a concave patient health function and a fixed cost associated with enrolling an individual 
patient is introduced; second, my model imposes a minimum profit condition on the 
physician; third, I do not assume the exogenously given target level of medical service 
quantity provided per patient, this target level now depends on the physician 
remuneration scheme and other exogenous factors. Finally, I analyse the impact of 
introducing different cost control instruments on physician behaviour and the design of 
optimal physician payment when cost policies are considered. Overall, these extensions 
allow us to derive rather than assume the optimal quantity of service provided per patient 
while analysing how the physician trades-off his patients’ enrolment and health service 
quality improvement under a binding profit as well as under different cost control 
policies. 
                                                 
59 Physicians determine the size of their practice and the quality of care provided as well as ensuring that 
all patients have access to healthcare (Barham and Milliken, 2015, p. 896). 
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4.4 The Physician’s Optimization 
Following the same procedures as in the last chapter, I solve the utility maximization 
problem of a physician characterized by the generic parameter 𝛼  given the HI 
policy (𝑝, 𝜏, 𝑘). Denote the set of types by 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 = {𝐵, 𝐺}, 𝛽𝑡 the given proportion of 
the respective type of patients (i.e. 𝛽𝐵 = 𝛽, 𝛽𝐺 = 1 − 𝛽), 𝛼 the level of the physician’s 
altruism, 𝑞𝑡 the quantity of medical service provided per patient, and 𝑛 the total number 
of patients treated, the doctor’s optimization problem is: 
𝑈 = max
𝑛,𝑞𝑡









) ≥ 0 
(90) 
  
𝑛, 𝑞𝑡 ≥ 0  
the Lagrangian associated with the doctor’s optimization problem (90) is: 
 




+ (1 + 𝜂) [∑𝑛𝛽𝑡
𝑡∈𝑻




where η is the Lagrange multiplier for the profit constraint and the 𝜇𝑡, 𝜓 the respective 
multipliers of the non-negative restrictions. Notice 𝑧𝐵 = 0,  𝑧𝐺 = 𝑧  and denote by ?̅? =
𝛽𝐵𝑞𝐵 + 𝛽𝐺𝑞𝐺  the average quantity of service provided per patient. The first order 



















𝛼[𝛽𝑓𝐵 + (1 − 𝛽)(𝑧 + (1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺)] + (1 + 𝜂)[?̅?(𝑝 − 𝐶
′) + 𝑘 − 𝐹] + 𝜓 = 0
𝛼𝑛𝛽𝑓𝐵
′ + (1 + 𝜂)𝑛𝛽(𝑝 − 𝐶′) + 𝜇𝐵 = 0
𝛼𝑛(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺
′ + (1 + 𝜂)𝑛(1 − 𝛽)(𝑝 − 𝐶′) + 𝜇𝐺 = 0








The first three equations in (92) are the first-order conditions with respect to 𝑛, 𝑞𝐵 
and 𝑞𝐺 . The next four lines in (92) are the corresponding complementary slackness 
conditions associated with the inequalities in the optimization problem. Finally, the last 
line gives the restriction on the respective multipliers of non-negative requirements for 
profit, services, and the number of patients. In order to simplify notations, I denote 
𝑓(𝑞𝐺), 𝑓(𝑞𝐵) by 𝑓𝐺 , 𝑓𝐵 and 𝑓′(𝑞𝐺), 𝑓′(𝑞𝐵) by 𝑓𝐺
′ , 𝑓𝐵
′ . Moreover, 𝐶(𝑄), 𝐶′(𝑄), 𝐶′′(𝑄) are 
denoted as 𝐶, 𝐶′, 𝐶′′ respectively without causing confusion wherever possible. Finally, 
I denote the solution to the system (92) by the superscript “*”. In the following analysis, 
I assume the parameters 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝐹, 𝑧 ∈ (0,1) are holding constant, except for comparative 
static analysis with respect to them. 
 
Lemma 4.1 For all 𝑝 > 0,  the solution of system (92) satisfies 𝑞𝐵
∗  , 𝑞𝐺
∗  >0.  
Proof. The system (92) has eight potential solutions. First, when 𝜓 > 0, there are four 
types of solutions: 1) 𝜇𝐵, 𝜇𝐺 > 0, 2) 𝜇𝐵 > 𝜇𝐺 = 0, 3) 𝜇𝐺 > 𝜇𝐵 = 0 and 4) 𝜇𝐵 = 𝜇𝐺 =
0. Second, when 𝜓 = 0 there are also four types of solution: 5) 𝜇𝐵, 𝜇𝐺 > 0, 6) 𝜇𝐵 >
𝜇𝐺 = 0 , 7) 𝜇𝐺 > 𝜇𝐵 = 0  and 8) 𝜇𝐵 = 𝜇𝐺 = 0 . Given the assumptions  𝑓
′(0) = +∞ , 
𝛼, 𝛽, 𝑝, 𝑘, 𝐹 > 0 and 𝑓(. ) is increasing, concave and bounded, the solutions 1), 2), 3) 
and 5), 6), 7) do not satisfy either the second or the third equation of the above system, 
thus verifying the claim. ∎ 
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This result is consistent with the Lemma 3.1, which shows that the intensity of service 
provided per patient is always positive. The main difference, however, is that the 
physician in the current setup needs to select the number of patients and may choose not 
to enrol any patients. Since the physician always provide the positive service quantity. 













𝛼[𝛽𝑓𝐵 + (1 − 𝛽)(𝑧 + (1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺)] + (1 + 𝜂)[?̅?(𝑝 − 𝐶
′) + 𝑘 − 𝐹] + 𝜓 = 0
𝛼𝑓𝐵
′ + (1 + 𝜂)(𝑝 − 𝐶′) = 0
𝛼(1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺
′ + (1 + 𝜂)(𝑝 − 𝐶′) = 0
𝜂[𝑝𝑄 − 𝐶(𝑄) + 𝑛(𝑘 − 𝐹)] = 0
𝜓𝑛 = 0




The following lemma characterizes the necessary condition that the physician will enrol 
patients. 
 
Lemma 4.2 For all  𝑝 > 0,−𝛼 ≤ 𝑘 − 𝐹 < 0 , the system (93) has an interior 
solution 𝑛∗ > 0 (𝑖. 𝑒.  𝜓∗ = 0). 
Proof. Substituting the second and the third equations into the first equation in the 
system (93) yields: 
 
𝛼{𝛽(𝑓𝐵 − 𝑞𝐵𝑓𝐵
′) + (1 − 𝛽)[𝑧 + (1 − 𝑧)(𝑓𝐺 − 𝑞𝐺𝑓𝐺
′)]} + (1 + 𝜂)(𝑘 − 𝐹) + 𝜓 = 0 (94) 
𝑞𝐵, 𝑞𝐺 > 0, 𝜂 ≥ 0, 𝜓 ≥ 0, the concave and bounded 𝑓 implies that 0 < 𝑓𝐵 − 𝑞𝐵𝑓𝐵
′ ≤ 1 
and 0 < 𝑧 + (1 − 𝑧)(𝑓𝐺 − 𝑞𝐺𝑓𝐺
′) ≤ 1. The equality of (94) requires 𝑘 − 𝐹 < 0. Next, 
as the first term of the above equation 𝛼{𝛽(𝑓𝐵 − 𝑞𝐵𝑓𝐵
′) + (1 − 𝛽)[𝑧 + (1 − 𝑧)(𝑓𝐺 −
𝑞𝐺𝑓𝐺
′)]} ≤ 𝛼 and 𝜂 ≥ 0, suppose on the contrary 𝑘 − 𝐹 < −𝛼, then the equality of (94) 
requires 𝜓∗ > 0, a contradiction. The necessary condition of  𝜓∗ = 0 is 𝑘 − 𝐹 ≥ −𝛼. ∎ 
To provide intuition, notice that the concavity of patient health function implies that the 
physician obtains higher marginal altruism benefits from enrolling an additional patient 
rather than improving service quality for existing patients. Therefore, the physician has 
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an incentive to enrol too many patients while severely under-treating each individual. 
To counter this incentive, the marginal financial return per patient has to be set 
negative.60 However, this negative payment cannot be set lower than the maximum 
altruism benefits each patient generates, as otherwise the physician would have no 
incentive to enrol any patients (marginal financial return per patient becomes negative).  
Since 𝛼 ∈ (0,1), the restriction −𝛼 ≤ 𝑘 − 𝐹 < 0 implies that the regulator has very 
limited choices of capitation rate 𝑘 if the fixed cost 𝐹 is sufficiently large. This problem 
comes from the fact that the patient health function is scaled in the range zero to one, 
while there is no restriction on the value of 𝐹 that can be taken. This issue can be solved 
by providing the health function and the fixed cost 𝐹 at the same scale. In this paper, I 
solve this issue by selecting a 𝐹 within the range between zero and one. 
In the following analysis, I assume the price and capitation is set at the respective range 
𝑝 > 0 and −𝛼 ≤ 𝑘 − 𝐹 < 0. While there is an interior solution (𝑛∗ > 0 and 𝑞∗ > 0), 
the boundary solution (𝑛∗ = 0 and 𝑞∗ = +∞) may also exist. Since the latter solution 
does not make sense in reality, I only consider the interior solutions. 
 
Lemma 4.3 For all 𝑝 > 0 and −𝛼 ≤ 𝑘 − 𝐹 < 0, we have 𝑞𝐵
∗ > 𝑞𝐺
∗ > 0 
Proof. From the second and third equations in (93), we obtain  𝑓𝐵
′ = (1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺
′ . 
Since 𝑓′′ < 0, 0 < 𝑧 < 1 and 𝑞𝐵
∗ , 𝑞𝐺
∗ > 0 , we have 𝑞𝐵
∗ > 𝑞𝐺
∗ > 0. ∎ 
Intuitively, the physician receives the same financial returns from serving 𝐵- or 𝐺-type 
patients. However, the extra marginal altruistic benefits obtained from treating the 𝐵-
type patient would induce the doctor to provide a higher 𝑞𝐵. While this result is similar 
to what has been found in Barham and Milliken (2015), this Chapter follows a 
completely different process. In this Chapter, the physician is allocated a fixed fraction 
of a respective type of patients and select quantities to maximize his utility. In Barham 
and Milliken (2015), however, the altruistic physician would only treat frail individuals 
while the non-altruistic physician would treat healthy patients. Treated by the altruistic 
                                                 
60 The same problem also encounters in Barham and Milliken (2015). As they do not assume fixed costs, 
the physician has an incentive enrol too many patients while severely undertreat each individual when 
altruism function is concave or enrol too few patients while severely overtreat each individual when 
altruism function is convex. As a result, altruism function has to be bell-shaped in their paper to ensure 
that the physician obtains an equilibrium between enrolling patient and improve service quality. 
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physician who receives a relatively higher marginal altruism benefit from providing 
medical service, the frail patient in Barham and Milliken (2015) is therefore provided 
with a higher amount of service.  
The main purpose of this section is to analyse how the physician trades off the choice of 
enrolling additional patients and raising medical service intensity (quality). In order to 
simplify the explanations, I will discuss the intuition of the simplest case where all 
patients have the same health status 𝑧𝐵 = 𝑧𝐺 = 0 and therefore receive 𝑞𝐵 = 𝑞𝐺 = 𝑞. 
However, for the derivation of the ensuing results, I provide the general proof in the 









𝛼𝑓(𝑞) + (1 + 𝜂)[𝑞(𝑝 − 𝐶′(𝑄)) + 𝑘 − 𝐹] = 0
𝛼𝑓′(𝑞) + (1 + 𝜂)(𝑝 − 𝐶′(𝑄)) = 0





The profit of the physician can be either positive or zero, therefore we have alternative 
solutions. First, we consider the situation where the physician’s profit is strictly positive. 
Given 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝐹  and capitation payment 𝑘 , denote the set ?̃? =
{𝑝 > 0|Π̃∗(𝑝) = 𝑝𝑄∗ + 𝑛∗(𝑘 − 𝐹) − 𝐶(𝑄∗) > 0} and consider the price  𝑝 ∈ ?̃?.61  By 
definition, 𝜂∗ = 0 and the system (95) can be further simplified to: 
 
{
𝛼𝑓(𝑞) + 𝑞(𝑝 − 𝐶′(𝑄)) + 𝑘 − 𝐹 = 0
𝛼𝑓′(𝑞) + 𝑝 − 𝐶′(𝑄) = 0
 (96) 
Notice that all the functions are continuously differentiable, while an infinitesimal 
variation around 𝑝 will therefore keep the profit positive. I use this observation to derive 
the following results: 















Proof. See Appendix B1. ∎ 
                                                 
61 To avoid the cumbersome notation, I denote the ?̃? as ?̃?(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝑘, 𝐹, 𝑧) hereafter. 
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As in Barham and Milliken (2015), I show that a rise in service price does not lead to a 
higher level of medical service provided per patient. To provide the intuition, notice that 
the price increase raises the physician’s marginal benefit derived from providing medical 
service; as a result, the physician increases his total caseload 𝑄. Since raising one unit 
of quality or enrolling one more patient yields the same payoff 𝑝 − 𝐶′, the physician’s 
decision regarding patient number and quality depends on the level of marginal altruistic 
benefit from enrolling an additional patient net of administration cost and the level of 
marginal glow derived from raising quality. In other words, the equilibrium decision of 
q and n can be reached if and only if: 
 𝛼[𝑓(𝑞) − 𝑞𝑓′(𝑞)] + 𝑘 − 𝐹 = 0 (97) 
Where the term 𝛼𝑓(𝑞) represents the marginal altruism benefit of enrolling an additional 
patient, 𝛼𝑞𝑓′(𝑞) the marginal altruism benefit of raising one unit of health service 
intensity, and 𝑘 − 𝐹 the net marginal financial return from enrolling one more patient. 
From equation (97), the physician’s decision on quality does not depend on price. Since 
the physician increases his total caseload while keeping service quality constant as the 
price goes up, the number of patients treated must increase62 according to the definition 
of total caseload. 
 















Proof. See Appendix B2. ∎ 
Lemma 4.5 shows that the physician increases his roster size but reduces service quality 
for existing patients when the capitation rate goes up. Intuitively, as capitation rate 
increases, the marginal benefit of enrol additional patient becomes higher than the 
marginal cost. As a result, the physician will increase his roster size. The increase in 
roster size ceteris paribus raises the marginal cost of providing quality, thus requiring 
the physician to reduce quality. Altogether, while the physician reduces quality, he 
increases his size of total caseload. Finally, as the increase in the marginal warm glow 
                                                 
62 Notice that the number of patients treated 𝑛∗ may not take integer values. As explained in Barham and 
Milliken (2015), patients could be ‘part-time patients of more than one doctor.  
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benefit increase as a result of reducing 𝑞𝐵
∗  is lower than that of 𝑞𝐺
∗ , the reduction of 𝑞𝐵
∗  
is therefore higher than 𝑞𝐺
∗ .  
This result is also consistent with Barham and Milliken (2015) but further generalizes 
their analysis to the case in which the physician treats more than one type of patient. 
Overall, Lemma 4.4 and 4.5 show that their results do not require a specific physician’s 
preference (i.e. bell-shaped altruism function). Furthermore, since Barham and Milliken 
(2015) assume altruistic/non-altruistic physicians, frail/healthy patients, and altruistic 
(non-altruistic) physicians only treat frail (healthy) patients. As a result, they do not 
investigate the effect of varying a physician’s altruism level or the proportion of a 
respective type of patient on the physician’s choices of practice size and quality. The 
following Lemmas 4.6 and 4.7 therefore step forward and analyse how these changes 
affect the physician’s decision on his practice size as well as quality of service provided. 
 















Proof. See Appendix B3. ∎ 
In contrast to Chapter 3, Lemma 4.6 shows that the more altruistic doctors would provide 
less service intensity to each individual. Intuitively, as the physician can select patient 
number and quality, the equilibrium is only obtained when the marginal net benefit of 
enrolling an additional patient is equivalent to the loss of warm glow benefits by raising 
service quality. A ceteris paribus increase in the relative degree of altruism increases 
the marginal warm glow benefit derived from enrolling an additional patient. Since the 
per patient administration cost does not change, the physician has to reduce medical 
service quality in order to re-establish the balance.  
As the increase in the level of altruism raises the physician’s marginal return for service 
production, the physician would increase his total caseload. By definition, the increase 
of total caseload and the reduction in service quality implies that the number of patients 
treated increases with the physician’s altruism. Similar to Lemma 4.5, the reduction of 
𝑞𝐵  raises less marginal warm glow benefits than that of reducing  𝑞𝐺 , thereby the 
physician reduces more 𝑞𝐵 than 𝑞𝐺  as his level of altruism increases. Finally, as −𝛼 ≤
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𝑘 − 𝐹 < 0, 𝑝 − 𝐶′ < 063 and the physician increases the number of patients treated and 
total caseload with the degree of his altruism, the more altruistic physician therefore has 
a lower profit. 
 















Proof. See Appendix B4. ∎ 
This Lemma shows that the physician reduces the number of patients and service total 
caseload as the proportion of less healthy individuals increases. In contrast to Chapter 3, 
the individual patient is provided a higher intensity of medical service as the proportion 
of less healthy individuals increases. This result derives directly from the extension that 
the physician can choose both service intensities and the number of patients to be treated. 
Intuitively, a ceteris paribus increase in the proportion of less healthy individuals leads 
to the same reduction in the proportion of healthier individuals, resulting in a reduction 
in average health per patient treated. Moreover, since the less healthy individual requires 
a higher quantity of medical service to be provided, total caseload and the marginal cost 
of production goes up ceteris paribus. As a result, the physician will reduce his practice 
size. The increase in the proportion of less healthy individuals also reduces net altruism 
benefits between enrolling patients and raising quality (see equation (94)). To counter 
this effect, the physician raises quality. Overall, the physician reduces his total caseload. 
As the payment per service and per patient does not fully cover their costs. Hence, the 
reduction in the number of patients and total caseload leads to an increase in the 
physician’s profits.  
Substituting  𝑛∗(𝑝, 𝑘, 𝛼) , 𝑞∗(𝑝, 𝑘, 𝛼)64  into the total caseload function 
yields 𝑄∗(𝑝, 𝑘, 𝛼) = 𝑛∗(𝑝, 𝑘, 𝛼)𝑞∗(𝑝, 𝑘, 𝛼).  The doctor’s profit function is therefore:  
  Π̃∗(𝑝, 𝑘, 𝛼) = 𝑝𝑄∗(𝑝, 𝑘, 𝛼) + (𝑘 − 𝐹)𝑛∗(𝑝, 𝑘, 𝛼) − 𝐶(𝑄∗(𝑝, 𝑘, 𝛼)) (98) 
 
                                                 
63 See the second equation of the system (95). 
64I assume the parameters 𝛽, 𝐹, 𝑧  are given constant and only analyse the effect of varying price, capitation 
and the degree of physician altruism.  
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Taking the first-order condition of (98) with respect to 𝑝 and simplify, we have: 
 𝜕 Π̃∗(𝑝, 𝑘, 𝛼)
𝜕𝑝
=  𝑄∗ + [𝑞∗(𝑝 − 𝐶′) + 𝑘 − 𝐹]
𝜕𝑛∗
𝜕𝑝





Lemma 4.8 Denote 𝑝0(𝑘, 𝛼)  the smallest p such that  𝜂
∗(𝑝0, 𝑘, 𝛼) = 0 , then  ?̃? =
(𝑝0(𝑘, 𝛼), +∞). 
Proof. To verify the claim, we need to show  Π̃∗(𝑝, 𝑘, 𝛼) > 0 for all 𝑝 > 𝑝0(𝑘, 𝛼) at a 
given capitation rate net of fixed cost 𝑘 − 𝐹. First, when 𝑝 → 0 the non-negative profit 
constraint is binding, i.e. 𝜂∗(𝑝0, 𝑘, 𝛼) > 0. From the system (95) and the equation (98), 
as the price converges to zero, therefore the revenue of the physician also converges to 
zero but his marginal benefit remains large65 given the assumption of the altruistic 
component. In contrast, as 𝑝 → +∞ the physician’s profit for a given −𝛼 ≤ 𝑘 − 𝐹 < 0 
is not binding, i.e. 𝜂∗ = 0 . By construction, there is a price 𝑝0(𝑘, 𝛼)  such that the 




> 0 given 𝐶′′′ > 0. From the profit function (98), the definition of  𝑄∗ and  
𝜕𝑄∗
𝜕𝑝
 obtained from Appendix B1 we have: 
 𝜕 Π̃∗(𝑝, 𝑘, 𝛼)
𝜕𝑝
=  𝑄∗ +
𝑞∗(𝑝 − 𝐶′) + 𝑘 − 𝐹
𝑞∗𝐶′′
 (100) 
We want to show the equation (100) is positive, which is the same as verifying: 
  𝑄∗𝑞∗𝐶′′ + 𝑞∗(𝑝 − 𝐶′) + 𝑘 − 𝐹 > 0 (101) 
Multiply both sides by 𝑛∗, notice that 𝑝0𝑄
∗ = 𝐶( 𝑄∗) − 𝑛∗(𝑘 − 𝐹) and the price level 
is  𝑝0. The objective becomes to prove: 
 ( 𝑄∗)2𝐶′′ −  𝑄∗𝐶′ + 𝐶 > 0 (102) 
𝐶′′′ > 0 implies 𝑄∗𝐶′′ − 𝐶′ > 0 and therefore ( 𝑄∗)2𝐶′′ −  𝑄∗𝐶′ > 0. Given 𝐶 ≥ 0, I 
verified that (102) is positive. To conclude the proof, suppose that in contradiction to 
the claim that 𝑝 > 𝑝0 with Π̃
∗(𝑝0, 𝑘, 𝛼) = 0, then by definition of continuity there exists 
a price ?̂? > 𝑝0 with  Π̃
∗(?̂?, 𝑘, 𝛼) = 0 and 
𝜕 Π̃∗(𝑝−,𝑘,𝛼)
𝜕𝑝
< 0. However, this is not possible 
                                                 
65 This condition will be hold as long as we have an interior solution 𝑛∗ > 0. 
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as following the aforementioned logic would show  
𝜕 Π̃∗(𝑝−,𝑘,𝛼)
𝜕𝑝
> 0 , which is a 
contradiction and thus verifying the claim. ∎ 
The result is that the physician’s profit is increasing in price when he has a positive profit, 
which is consistent with the finding in Chapter 3. The intuition is that the positive (direct) 
impact of the price increase dominates the subsequent and negative impacts (indirect) of 
the patient number as well as the total caseload increase. Since this work imposes non-
negative profit conditions on physicians (Barham and Milliken, 2015), we can move 
forward to characterize the physician’s decision on the number of patients treated and 
service quality as a function of the price or capitation when his profit is binding. 
When the physician’s profit is strictly binding (i.e. 𝑝 ∉ ?̃? ), the profit of the physician 
satisfies  Π̃∗ = 0 . Accordingly, the number of patients selected and the quantity of 
medical services provided which maximize the doctor’s utility are implicitly defined by: 
 
{
(𝑝 − 𝐶′)(𝑓 − 𝑞𝑓′) − (𝑘 − 𝐹)𝑓′ = 0
𝑝𝑛𝑞 − 𝐶(𝑛𝑞) + 𝑛(𝑘 − 𝐹) = 0
 (103) 
where the first equation of (103) is derived from dividing the first by the second equation 
in the system (95).66 Intuitively, this equation shows the marginal rate of substitution 
between quality and the number of patients should be the same in the iso-profit and iso-
utility curves. The second equation of (103) represents the binding profit condition. We 
can now use this system to complete the derivation of the interior solution of 𝑛∗(𝑝, 𝑘, 𝛼) 
and 𝑞∗(𝑝, 𝑘, 𝛼). First, it is obvious that the equilibrium between the number of patients 
and medical service does not change with physicians’ degrees of altruism. Second, for 
all  𝑝 < 𝑝0 , I apply the implicit function theorem to system (103) and derive the 
following result. 
 
Lemma 4.9 For all 𝑝 ∉ ?̃?  and−𝛼 < 𝑘 − 𝐹 < 0,  the selected number of patients 
 𝑛∗(𝑝, 𝑘, 𝛼)  and the service supply functions 𝑞𝑡
∗(𝑝, 𝑘, 𝛼)  for 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 = {𝐵, 𝐺}  satisfy 
                                                 

































+, 𝑘, 𝛼). 
Proof. See Appendix B5. ∎ 
In contrast to Chapter 3, I find that the physician reduces service quality when price goes 
up, though he does raise his practice size and total caseload. As illustrated in the Lemma 
4.5, a ceteris paribus increase in price raises the marginal return of providing total 
caseload. Accordingly, total caseload goes up. When the physician has a binding profit, 
he has an incentive to substitute quality for practice size. In this case, the physician’s 
optimization problem is to maximise the altruistic benefits 𝑛𝑓(𝑞) while holding his 
profit 𝑝𝑄 − 𝐶(𝑄) + 𝑛(𝑘 − 𝐹) constant at zero. The equilibrium level of (𝑛∗, 𝑞∗)  is 
therefore obtained when (1) the marginal rates of substitution between patient number 
and quality are the same in both the iso-profit line and the in-difference curve as well as 
(2) the physician’s profit is zero (see the first and the second equation of system (94) 
respectively). Since the marginal altruism benefit of enrolling an additional patient is 
higher than raising one unit of quality, the physician increases his practice size in order 
to maximize utility. However, constrained by the non-negative profit condition, the 
physician has to reduce quality. This Lemma also shows that the decrease in 𝑞𝐺 is lower 
than 𝑞𝐵, as the increase in the marginal warm glow benefit as a result of reducing 𝑞𝐵 is 
lower than that derived from reducing 𝑞𝐺 .  
 
Lemma 4.10 For   𝑝 ∉ ?̃?  and  −𝛼 < 𝑘 − 𝐹 < 0  the selected number of patients 
 𝑛∗(𝑝, 𝑘)  and the service supply functions 𝑞𝑡















Proof. See Appendix B6. ∎ 
This Lemma shows that the physician increases his roster sizes but reduces service 
qualities as the capitation rate goes up when his profit is binding. This result is again 
different to what has been shown in Chapter 3 that service intensities provided do not 
decrease with capitation rate. Intuitively, when the capitation rate increases, the 
physician has more incentive to increase practice size. Similar as the case when price 
increases, the physician increases the number of patients treated to maximize utility 
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while reducing quality to maintain a zero profit. As shown in Lemma 4.6, raising 
capitation increases the physician’s marginal return of production. Hence, he raises his 
practice size and total caseload. 
Lemma 4.11 For a given −𝛼 < 𝑘 − 𝐹 < 0, the critical price 𝑝0 is increasing in 𝛼. 
Proof. See Appendix B7. ∎ 
Lemma 4.11 is consistent with Lemma 3.8 in Chapter 3 with a similar intuition. Consider 
a physician characterized by a parameter 𝛼 at a given capitation rate net of fixed cost 𝑘. 
From the lemma 4.7 we know that there exists a price 𝑝0(𝛼, 𝑘) such that the doctor’s 
profit is just binding. Suppose there is a physician with a slightly larger 𝛼  (i.e. a 
marginally more altruistic individual). Holding price constant that doctor would want to 
treat more patient and provide a higher total caseload (see Lemma 4.6). However, since 
we have 𝑝0(𝛼, 𝑘) < 𝐶′  and 𝑘 − 𝐹 < 0  so that the more altruistic physician’s profit 
would become negative. As a result, to prevent the 𝛼-type doctor from having a negative 
profit, 𝑝0(𝛼, 𝑘) has to be raised. 
Keep in mind that a physician’s concern for patients only takes two values  𝛼𝑗 ∈
{𝛼𝐿 , 𝛼𝐻}  with 0 < 𝛼𝐿 < 𝛼𝐻 ≤ 1,  𝑃𝑟[𝛼𝑗 = 𝛼𝐿] = 𝛬 , 𝑃𝑟[𝛼𝑗 = 𝛼𝐻] = 1 − 𝛬  and that 
there are two kinds of patients 𝑧𝑖 ∈ {𝑧𝐵, 𝑧𝐺} with 0 = 𝑧𝐵 < 𝑧 = 𝑧𝐺 < 1, 𝑃𝑟[𝑧𝑖 = 𝑧𝐵] =
𝛽, 𝑃𝑟[𝑧𝑖 = 𝑧𝐺] = 1 − 𝛽. Given that 𝛼
𝐿 , 𝛼𝐻, 𝛽, 𝐹, Λ, 𝑧 are constant, I denote a low and a 
high altruistic doctor’s response functions by 𝑛𝐿(𝑝, 𝑘), 𝑞𝑡
𝐿(𝑝, 𝑘),  𝑛𝐻(𝑝, 𝑘), 𝑞𝑡
𝐻(𝑝, 𝑘) 




4.5 Welfare Analysis 
4.5.1 Welfare Maximization 
Since physicians can now select the number of patients, the regulator in this chapter not 
only needs to derive a health insurance scheme that maximizes welfare but also to ensure 
the entire population have access to healthcare. Taking the self-financing constraint of 
the health system into consideration, I follow the same procedures as in Chapter 3 
                                                 
67  To simplify the expression of welfare function, I drop all superscript “*” in the solutions from 
physicians’ optimization problem for the ensuing analysis. 
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applying the results from the foregoing section to rewrite welfare function (89) as a 
function of price and capitation. Next, by assuming the interior solution of welfare 
maximizing price and capitation, I use the equation (88) to calculate the optimal 
insurance premium. 
Total health benefits function adds up across all treated patients’ expected health, which 
depends on the doctor’s type and behaviour. Assuming the expected health of untreated 





=  Λ𝑀 {𝑛𝐿(𝑝, 𝑘) [𝛽𝑓(𝑞𝐵
𝐿(𝑝, 𝑘)) + (1 − 𝛽) (𝑧 + (1 − 𝑧)𝑓 (𝑞𝐺
𝐿(𝑝, 𝑘)))]}
+ (1 −  Λ)𝑀 {𝑛𝐻(𝑝, 𝑘) [𝛽𝑓(𝑞𝐵
𝐻(𝑝, 𝑘)) + (1 − 𝛽) (𝑧 + (1 − 𝑧)𝑓 (𝑞𝐺
𝐻(𝑝, 𝑘)))]} 
(104) 
   
The payment vector (𝑝, 𝑘)  also determines the overall medical costs generated by 
doctors over the entire health system. Specifically, let the total service provided by a 𝐿- 
and a 𝐻- doctor be denoted by 𝑄𝐿(𝑝, 𝑘) and 𝑄𝐻(𝑝, 𝑘). Using this notation, the overall 








= 𝑀{𝛬[𝐶(𝑄𝐿(𝑝, 𝑘)) + 𝐹𝑛𝐿(𝑝, 𝑘)] + (1 − 𝛬)[𝐶(𝑄𝐿(𝑝, 𝑘)) + 𝐹𝑛𝐻(𝑝, 𝑘)]} (105) 
Where the first term and the second term represent the total operational and fixed costs 
incurred respectively. Finally, the non-medical costs associated with running the health 






= 𝜆𝑀{𝛬[𝑝𝑄𝐿(𝑝, 𝑘) + 𝑘𝑛𝐿(𝑝, 𝑘)] + (1 − 𝛬)[𝑝𝑄𝐻(𝑝, 𝑘) + 𝑘𝑛𝐻(𝑝, 𝑘)]} (106) 
Substituting (104)-(106) in (89) yields welfare as a function of (𝑝, 𝑘). Slightly abusing 
the notation, I write the welfare function as 𝑊(𝑝, 𝑘). From Section 4.4’s analysis, the 
interior solution of 𝑛𝐿(𝑝, 𝑘), 𝑞𝑡
𝐿(𝑝, 𝑘) and 𝑛𝐻(𝑝, 𝑘), 𝑞𝑡
𝐻(𝑝, 𝑘) is continuous in 𝑝 for all 
𝑝 > 0 and 𝐹 − 𝛼𝐿 ≤ 𝑘 < 𝐹.68 Therefore, 𝑊(𝑝, 𝑘) is also continuous in 𝑝 if 𝑝 > 0 and 
𝐹 − 𝛼𝐿 ≤ 𝑘 < 𝐹. 
 
                                                 




Lemma 4.11 For a given 𝐹 − 𝛼𝐿 < 𝑘 < 𝐹 , there exists a price 𝑝𝑁(𝑘) > 0 such 
that 𝑀[𝛬𝑛𝐿(𝑝, 𝑘) + (1 − 𝛬)𝑛𝐻(𝑝, 𝑘)] = 𝑁.  
Proof. From lemma 4.4 and 4.8, we know that 𝑛𝐿(𝑝, 𝑘) and 𝑛𝐻(𝑝, 𝑘) are continuous and 
increasing in price for any given 𝑝 > 0 and 𝐹 − 𝛼𝐿 ≤ 𝑘 < 𝐹. As a result, there must 
exist a price 𝑝 = 𝑝𝑁(𝑘) > 0 that makes 𝑀[𝛬𝑛
𝐿(𝑝, 𝑘) + (1 − 𝛬)𝑛𝐻(𝑝, 𝑘)] = 𝑁. ∎ 
Lemma 4.11 shows that for a given capitation rate 𝑘, there exists a unique price 𝑝𝑁(𝑘) 
such that physicians would treat all patients in the economy. Substitute 𝑝𝑁(𝑘) into 
𝑊(𝑝, 𝑘)  yields  𝑊(𝑝𝑁(𝑘), 𝑘) . As 𝑝𝑁(𝑘)  is continuous in  𝑘 , 𝑊(𝑝𝑁(𝑘), 𝑘)  is also 
continuous in 𝑘.  
 
Assumption 1: The exogenous parameters 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝐹, 𝑧 and functions ℎ(. ) and 𝐶(. ) are 
selected in a way that 𝑊(𝑝, 𝑘) has an interior solution, i.e. there exists a price 𝑝𝑀 such 
that 𝑊(𝑝𝑀, 𝑘) ≥ 𝑊(𝑝, 𝑘) for all 𝑝 > 0 and 𝐹 − 𝛼
𝐿 < 𝑘 < 𝐹. 
From the Lemma 4.4 and 4.9, we know that at a given capitation rate 𝑘 ∈ (𝐹 − 𝛼𝐿 , 𝐹) 
and a price  𝑝 → 0+ , physicians enrol a relatively a small number of patients while 
providing large intensities of medical service. Both types of physicians have a zero profit 
and would raise the number of patients to be treated but reduce medical service 
intensities to be provided as price increases. The assumptions of health function 
therefore implies a relatively large marginal health benefit associated with treating an 
additional patient while a small marginal benefit associated with raising quality. Hence, 
𝑊(𝑝, 𝑘) would have an interior solution if the expected marginal health benefit of 
enrolling an additional patient dominates the associated net fixed costs.  
 
Assumption 2: Welfare maximization FFS system neither implies the shortage of patient 
demand nor the full patient access to health care (i.e.  𝑀[𝛬𝑛𝐿(𝑝𝑀, 𝑘) + (1 −
𝛬)𝑛𝐻(𝑝𝑀, 𝑘)] < 𝑁).  
My research investigates the design of a primary care physician remuneration scheme 
when the patient demand of health service is larger than the (optimal) amount that can 
be supplied by a healthcare system(𝑀[𝛬𝑛𝐿(𝑝𝑀, 𝑘) + (1 − 𝛬)𝑛
𝐻(𝑝𝑀, 𝑘)] < 𝑁). The 
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cases where a healthcare system can benefit from creating more healthcare demand 
(𝑀[𝛬𝑛𝐿(𝑝𝑀, 𝑘) + (1 − 𝛬)𝑛
𝐻(𝑝𝑀, 𝑘)] > 𝑁) or all healthcare demand has already been 
satisfied 𝑀[𝛬𝑛𝐿(𝑝𝑀, 𝑘) + (1 − 𝛬)𝑛
𝐻(𝑝𝑀, 𝑘)] = 𝑁 do not reflect challenges faced by 
HI systems in developed countries. Hence, the design of the optimal PCP under these 
two situations will be not be discussed.  
Denote the constrained optimal price by 𝑝∗(𝑘)69 , one can use the equation (88) to derive 
the associated insurance premium required to run the medical system. Specifically, 
multiplying both side of (88) by 
1+𝜆
𝑁









Since the first order equations of the aforementioned system are too large for a 
meaningful analytical solution and the system contains non-differentiability at the price 
level 𝑝0
𝐿(𝑘) and 𝑝0
𝐻(𝑘), I proceed to the ensuing analysis by employing a numerical 
analysis.  
 
4.5.2 Specifications of Numerical Experiments  
In order to perform the numerical exercise, I use the same specification of parameters as 
in Chapter 3.5.2 except for the following adjustments:  
 The administration cost per patient is set at  𝐹 = 0.1. The parameter of 𝐹  is 
selected at this level, which ensures a well-behaved 𝑊(𝑝, 𝑘). 
 From Lemma 4.2, the necessary condition that 𝐿 and 𝐻-type doctors will enrol a 
positive number of patients is 𝑘 ∈ [𝐹 − 𝛼𝐿 , 𝐹) (i.e. 𝑘 ∈ [−0.05,0.1)). Since the 
per patient reimbursement in reality is non-negative, I assume in the following 
analysis that the capitation rate can be taken in the range 0 ≤ 𝑘 < 0.1. 
 With respect to patients, the specification of the total number of patients (i.e.𝑁 =
100000) captures that there are more patients demanding health services than 
the efficient number of patients who can be treated by the HI scheme. This 
                                                 
69 In the current remuneration scheme, we have 𝑝∗ = 𝑝𝑁 > 𝑝𝑀. 
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reflects the reality that the health authority does not have abundant resources. As 
a result, it faces a two-way trade-off between efficiency and full patient access. 
 
4.5.3 Numerical Results 
I apply the foregoing specifications and use Mathematica to solve the respective doctors’ 
problems and obtain all the supply functions. Next, I investigate the case where there is 
only a FFS payment (i.e.  𝑘 = 0) and depict supply functions of different types of 
physician. Finally, I aggregate the supply decisions and calculate the welfare function 
which will be used to find the optimal price for medical services 𝑝∗ which achieve the 
highest welfare while ensuring that all patients access healthcare. 
 
4.5.3.1 Physicians’ Response Curves  
Figure 14 depicts L-doctors’ responses to price changes. The Figure 14a, 14b, 14c and 
14d respectively maps the number of patients selected to be treated, the total caseload 
provided, the quantity supplied to a B- and a G-patient, and the profit as a function of 
the regulatory price at 𝑘 = 0, i.e. 𝑛𝐿(𝑝), 𝑄𝐿(𝑝), 𝑞𝑡
𝐿(𝑝), 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 = {𝐵, 𝐺}, and Π𝐿(𝑝).70  
                                                 
70  In order to avoid an overly cumbersome notation, I write  𝑛𝐿(𝑝), 𝑞𝑡
𝐿(𝑝), 𝑄𝐿(𝑝)  and Π𝐿(𝑝)  as 
 𝑛𝐿∗(𝑝), 𝑞𝑡





Figure 14. The L-doctor’s response functions as price varies 
The graphic demonstrates the results summarized by the Lemmas 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.8 and 
4.9; first, for all 𝑝 > 0 and at a given 𝑘 ∈ [0,0.1), the system has interior solutions for 
𝑛𝐿(𝑝) and  𝑞𝑡
𝐿(𝑝), 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 = {𝐵, 𝐺} . Second, the 𝐿 -type physician provides a higher 
medical service intensity to individuals with lower health status (𝑞𝐵
𝐿(𝑝) > 𝑞𝐺
𝐿(𝑝) > 0, 
figure 14c). Third, in contrast to the result in the Chapter 3, the intensity of medical 
service provided 𝑞𝑡




(𝑝) < 0) 
in the range 𝑝 ∈ (0, 𝑝0




(𝑝) = 0) in the range  𝑝 ∈
(𝑝0
𝐿 , +∞) (Figure 14c). Fourth, the number of patients enrolled is increasing in 𝑝 but 









𝐿+) , Figure 14a). Fifth, 
similar to the function of patient numbers, total caseload also increases in p but with a 
kink 𝑝0
𝐿 (Figure 14b). Finally, the 𝐿-doctors’ profit is binding at zero for the price range 
𝑝 ∈ (0, 𝑝0
𝐿) but increasing for the range 𝑝 ∈ (𝑝0
𝐿 , +∞) (Figure 14d). 
The next figure plots the individual decision functions of L- and H-doctors with respect 
to a type 𝑡 patient. This figure mainly reflects result obtained in the Lemma 4.6.  As in 
the previous figure, Figure 15a and 15c depict decisions of alternative types of doctor in 
relation to roster sizes and the medical service quantity as a function of the price. The 




Figure 15. L- and H-doctors’ response curves for a type-t patient   
The critical price 𝑝0
𝐿 is defined by the kink of 𝑛𝐿(𝑝) and 𝑞𝑡
𝐿(𝑝) (Figure 15 a,c). However, 
for the parameters associated with H-type doctors, we have   𝑎𝛼𝐻 [𝛽𝑓(𝑞𝐵
𝐻) +
(1 − 𝛽) (𝑧 + (1 − 𝑧)𝑓((𝑞𝐺
𝐻)))] > 𝐹 , meaning the marginal benefit of enrolling 
additional patient is always higher than the associated administration costs. According 
to the equation (94), the system has an equilibrium only if the net reimbursement per 
patient is negative (𝑘 − 𝐹 < 0) and the Lagrange multiplier must satisfy 𝜂 > 0. As a 
result, H-type doctors in this example always have a zero profit, therefore we have 𝑝0
𝐻 =
+∞ (Figure 15d).71  
The definition of 𝑝0
𝐿 indicates that, for 𝑝 ∈ (0, 𝑝0
𝐿), both types of doctors obtain zero 
profit. While L- and H-type doctors have different degrees of altruism, to maximize their 
utilities their willingness to exchange the number of patients to be treated for the medical 
service intensity to be provided are always the same. Moreover, L- and H-doctors’ 
profits are binding at zero. Restricted by these two conditions, the number of patients 
                                                 
71 It can be shown that if the value of 𝑧 selected are sufficiently low, we will also have a critical price 𝑝0
𝐻 
for 𝐻 -type doctors, which is defined at the kink of  𝑞𝑡
𝐻(𝑝)  or  𝑛𝐻(𝑝) . Nevertheless, the current 
specification of parameters does not change the results. 
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enrolled and the intensity of medical service provided by both types of doctors are the 
same (Figure 15-a, c). 
Second, for all 𝑝 ∈ (𝑝0
𝐿 , +∞], the 𝐻-type physicians treat more patients (𝑛𝐻(𝑝) > 𝑛𝐿(𝑝), 
Figure 15a), provide higher total caseload (𝑄𝐻(𝑝) > 𝑄𝐿(𝑝), Figure 15b) while provide 
lower service intensity (𝑞𝑡
𝐻(𝑝) < 𝑞𝑡









(𝑝) = 0, Figure 15c) than the 𝐿-type physicians as the price goes up. 
Intuitively, the H-type doctors obtain higher altruism benefits from enrolling and serving 
patients, they have higher roster sizes and total caseload. At equilibrium, a pair of 
practice size and intensity is selected such that the net marginal altruism benefits from 
enrolling additional patient are the same as the benefits of raising medical service quality. 
As physicians face the same fixed cost of enrolling additional patient, the physician has 
higher altruism therefore provide the lower intensity of medical service. As shown in 
the previous section, the net marginal health benefits of enrolling additional patients or 
raising quality are independent of price when the physician’s profit is positive (see the 
equation (94)). When the physician’s profit is binding, he increases the number of 
patients enrolled to maximize utility while reducing quality to ensure a non-negative 
profit. Accordingly, the service intensity provided by L-type physicians remains the 
same whereas the quality produced by H-type physicians is reduced as price increases. 
Finally, as the capitation net of fixed cost 𝑘 − 𝐹  is negative, price is less than the 
marginal cost of providing total caseload, and the 𝐻-type doctors have higher roster sizes 
and total caseload, their profit is therefore lower (see lemma 4.6). In particular, for the 
parameters selected in this example, the more altruistic providers always have a zero 
profit (Figure 15d). 
 
4.5.3.2 Welfare Function and the Number of Treated Patients under FFS 
Substituting the supply decisions of the H- and L-doctors with respect to their G- and B-





Figure 16. Welfare and Total Number of Patients Treated   
In Figure 16a, notice that the welfare is maximized at the price 𝑝𝑀 = 2.1 which is higher 
than 𝑝0
𝐿 = 0.22, indicating that less altruistic doctors (the 𝐿-type) have a strictly positive 
profit while the more altruistic physicians are constrained by the zero-profit condition. 
Intuitively, the health insurance scheme does not have the required information to 
distinguish between H- and L-doctors as well as between G- and B-patients. As a result, 
the scheme sets an “intermediate” price which trades off the total caseload over-
provision from H-doctors against under-provision by L-doctors (see Figure 15b). Figure 
16b represents the result from Section 4.11 that the total number of patients treated 
increase in price and there is a price at the given capitation rate to ensure the entire 
population have access to healthcare. However, as pointed out in the Section 4.5.2, the 
price that ensures all patients’ access does not maximize social well-being (i.e. 𝑝𝑀 <
𝑝𝑁 = 2.38). 
As shown in the previous chapter, the pricing scheme fails to align doctors’ incentives 
in the presence of information asymmetry. In particular, the more intrinsically motivated 
physicians will treat many patients (but provide too low quality) whereas the less 
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intrinsically motivated providers will provide very high quality (but enrol too few 
patients). Overall, welfare-maximizing price induces doctors with a high intrinsic 
motivation (in the model this is referred to as high altruism) to produce more than those 
who require a high extrinsic motivation.  
In contrast to the last chapter, the current optimal HI scheme has to set the price higher 
than the welfare maximization level to ensure all patients have access to healthcare, 
which leads to total caseload over-provision. The next step of the analysis therefore uses 
a set of policy tools to control medical service over-provision and to align the incentives 
of different types of healthcare providers. 
 
4.6 Cost-control policies and efficiency enhancements 
In order to alleviate the tensions outlined in the previous section resulting from the 
presence of private information associated with doctors’ preferences and patients’ initial 
health, improve patients’ health, control costs while guaranteeing that all patients can 
access healthcare, many healthcare systems have imposed quantity and expenditure 
limitations or introduced blended prospective and retrospective payments, as discussed 
in the Chapter 1 and Chapter 3.  
By construction, quantity and costs restrictions as well as the blended payment are very 
crude as patients’ severity of illness and providers’ preferences is information only 
retained by doctors. The purpose of this section is to explore whether quantity rationing, 
revenue restrictions or capitation can be imposed on a pricing system to improve welfare 
in the current context. In order to keep the analysis tractable, I examine each restriction 
separately in Sections 4.6.1-3. After that, I explain relations between these restrictions 
and highlight departures from Chapter 3’s results. 
 
4.6.1 Quantity Rationing 
In this section, I introduced to the setup in the Section 4.3 a new variable ?̅? which 
represents the highest intensity of per patient treatment that a doctor can perform. Given 
𝑘 = 0, a HI policy is therefore a triplet (𝑝, ?̅?, 𝜏). Similar to Section 4.4, the doctor takes 
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this policy vector as given and maximize his utility. As a result, the optimization problem 
(90) has to be adjusted to include 𝑞𝑡 ≤ ?̅? for 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 = {𝐵, 𝐺}, therefore we have: 
𝑈𝑄 = max
𝑛,𝑞𝑡











) ≥ 0 
 
 (108) 
 ?̅? ≥ 𝑞𝑡  
  
𝑛, 𝑞𝑡 ≥ 0  
where the first line of the system shows the physician’s utility optimization problem and 
the second, third line represents the non-negative profit restriction and the quantity 
restriction respectively. Finally, the last line shows the roster size and the intensity of 
service are non-negative. In this system, 𝛼  represents a generic doctor’s degree of 
altruism. Similar as the discussion in Section 4.5.2, the system (108) can have both 
boundary and interior solutions for all 𝑝 > 0, ?̅? > 0 and 0 ≤ 𝑘 < 𝐹, if patient health 
function, the physician’s cost function as well as exogenous parameters are chosen 
appropriately. In the ensuing analysis, I only consider those interior solutions.72  
Slightly abusing notation, I denote in this subsection the respective solution for 𝐻- and 
𝐿-doctors by 𝑛𝐿(𝑝, ?̅?), 𝑞𝑡
𝐿(𝑝, ?̅?) and 𝑛𝐻(𝑝, ?̅?), 𝑞𝑡
𝐻(𝑝, ?̅?). Following the same procedures 
as in Section 4.5, I substitute 𝑛𝐿(𝑝, ?̅?), 𝑞𝑡
𝐿(𝑝, ?̅?) and 𝑛𝐻(𝑝, ?̅?), 𝑞𝑡
𝐻(𝑝, ?̅?) into the equation 
(89) and obtain a welfare function 𝑊𝑄(𝑝, ?̅?). Notice that for any restriction level ?̅?, the 
following process can be followed, i.e. solve for the price that maximizes welfare 
guarantees all patients can access health services, denoted hereafter by 𝑝𝑄
∗ (?̅?),73 then 
substitute this solution into the welfare function to obtain 𝑊𝑄( 𝑝𝑄
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?). Clearly, for a 
                                                 
72 Theoretically, the system may have a boundary solution 𝑛𝑗∗(𝑝, ?̅?) and 𝑞𝑡
𝑗∗(𝑝, ?̅?) = ?̅? (𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 = {𝐿, 𝐻}) if 
?̅? becomes sufficiently large.   
73  Notice that when ?̅?  is sufficiently large, the welfare maximizing price under quantity rationing 
is 𝑝𝑄
∗ (?̅?) = 𝑝𝑁. 
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sufficiently large  ?̅? , the restriction does not bind and  𝑊𝑄( 𝑝𝑄
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?) = 𝑊(𝑝𝑁) . 
Accordingly, we have: 
 𝑊(𝑝𝑁) ≤ max
?̅?
 𝑊𝑄(𝑝𝑄
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?) (109) 
which means the optimal welfare under quantity rationing is at least the same as that 
under a pure pricing system given the entire population have access to healthcare. From 
the analysis of foregoing section, one would expect that a marginal reduction of ?̅? at the 
point ?̅? = 𝑞𝐵
𝐻(𝑝𝑁) should lead to an improvement in welfare. Intuitively, the price 𝑝𝑁 
which ensures all patients have access to health services is too high compared to the 
welfare maximizing level 𝑝𝑀. As a result, the total health service provided is larger than 
the efficient level.  
Moreover, at 𝑝𝑁 the HI would benefit from reducing total caseload while maintaining 
the entire population’s access to healthcare. As a result, one would expect that 
introducing a restriction which forces 𝐿-doctors to marginally reduce production for 
high health needy patients would positively impact this trade-off. More specifically, the 
reduction in ?̅? would first induce 𝐿-type doctors to increase their number of patients 
treated. This increase allows the HI system to adjust price downwards, thereby 
decreasing the total service provided and raising the medical service intensity provided 
by 𝐻-type doctors per patient. To see these, I use the example described in Section 4.5.2 
and follow the procedures described above to obtain  𝑝𝑄
∗ (?̅?) , 𝑛𝐿(𝑝𝑄
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?) , 
𝑛𝐻(𝑝𝑄
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?) , 𝑞𝑡
𝐿(𝑝𝑄
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?) , 𝑞𝑡
𝐻(𝑝𝑄
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?) , 𝑄𝐿(𝑝𝑄
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?) , 𝑄𝐻(𝑝𝑄
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?) , 
Π̃𝐿(𝑝𝑄
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?), Π̃𝐻(𝑝𝑄
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?) and  𝑊𝑄(𝑝𝑄
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?) which have been plotted respectively 




Figure 17. Welfare and total service supplied when quantity restriction varies 
 
Figure 18. The optimal price and L- and H-doctors’ decisions 
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The Figure 17a shows the intuition discussed above, that is, reducing ?̅?  below ?̅? =
𝑞𝐵
𝐿(𝑝𝑁) = 1.28 improves welfare above 𝑊(𝑝𝑁). Other graphics provide more insights; 
the initial reduction in ?̅?  below 𝑞𝐵
𝐿(𝑝𝑁) incentivizes 𝐿-type doctors to increase their 
roster sizes (Figure 18a), which subsequently induces the HI scheme to reduce the price 
(Figure 18b). As a result, 𝐻-type doctors decrease their number of patients treated and 
increase their service quality (Figure 18c). Overall, limitation on ?̅?  reduces total 
caseload provided by both types of doctors (Figure 17b) and the profit of 𝐿-type doctors 
(Figure 18d). However, the reduction in ?̅? does not affect the profit of 𝐻-type doctors 
(Figure 18d). Since total caseloads are reduced and incentives for both types of doctors 
are realigned, welfare goes up. This process continues until both types of doctor enrol 
the same number of patients and provide the same quality of medical service (i.e. ?̅? =
0.13). At this point, any further reduction in ?̅? will reduce physicians’ revenue and the 
zero-profit condition would induce them to decrease the total number of patients treated. 
In order to counter this effect, the HI system raises the price. Finally, welfare will reach 
the maximum level when both marginal social cost and marginal social benefits are 
equal (i.e. ?̅? = 0.1). 
Altogether, while imposing per patient quantity restrictions on a FFS system could 
improve welfare (as in the numerical example), it cannot induce efficiency. In the 
example at the welfare optimum 𝐻 -doctors ended up providing the same level of 
medical services to 𝐵- and 𝐺-patients despite their significant difference in medical 
needs. Note that such a policy is likely to face many criticisms; this would frustrate 
doctors, in particular those who are intrinsically motivated as well as drawing criticism 
from more needy patients. 
 
4.6.2 Revenue Cap 
In the second subsection, I analyse an alternative cost-containing method where the HI 
scheme restricts the average expenditure per patient.74 This subsection proceeds in the 
same way as the previous one. First, a new policy variable denoted by ?̅? which measures 
the maximum expenditure that a doctor can spend on each individual is introduced. 
                                                 
74 While in Chapter 3 the revenue restriction is on individual physician, the number of patients allocated 
per physician is fixed. As a result, limiting total expenditure per physician is the same as restricting health 
spending per patient. 
163 
 
Given 𝑘 = 0, a HI policy is again a triplet (𝑝, ?̅?, 𝜏). Second, doctors’ behaviour for a 
given policy vector (𝑝, ?̅?, 𝜏) is derived, i.e. I solve: 
𝑈𝑅 = max
𝑛,𝑞𝑡


















𝑞𝑡 ≥ 0 
 
  
𝑛, 𝑞𝑡 ≥ 0  
where the first line shows the physician’s utility maximization problem, the second and 
the third line represent the non-negative profit constraint and the revenue restriction 
respectively. The last line is non-negative constraint imposed on the practice size and 
medical service intensities provided. Third, slightly abusing the notation, the interior 
solution of the respective number of patients treated and the medical service provided 
are denoted by 𝑛𝐿(𝑝, ?̅?), 𝑞𝑡
𝐿(𝑝, ?̅?) and 𝑛𝐻(𝑝, ?̅?), 𝑞𝑡
𝐻(𝑝, ?̅?). 
These solutions are then substituted into (89) to generate the function 𝑊𝑅(𝑝, ?̅?). Next, I 
denote by  𝑝𝑅
∗ (?̅?) the price maximizing social welfare while ensuring all patients obtain 
health service for a given expenditure cap ?̅?. Lastly, substituting the solution into the 
welfare function yields 𝑊𝑅(𝑝𝑅
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?). Since as ?̅? → +∞, 𝑝𝑅
∗ (?̅?) = 𝑝𝑁, we have: 
 𝑊(𝑝𝑁) ≤ max
?̅?
 𝑊𝑅(𝑝𝑅
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?) (111) 
Substitute the constrained optimal price into the supply functions yields 𝑛𝐿(𝑝𝑅
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?), 
𝑛𝐻(𝑝𝑅
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?) , 𝑞𝑡
𝐿(𝑝𝑅
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?) , 𝑞𝑡
𝐻(𝑝𝑅
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?) . The total caseload and profit of the 
respective type of patient are then 𝑄𝐿(𝑝𝑅
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?) , 𝑄𝐻(𝑝𝑅
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?) , Π̃𝐿(𝑝𝑅
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?)  and 
Π̃𝐻(𝑝𝑅
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?). Finally, social welfare is 𝑊𝑅(𝑝𝑅
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?). In order to gain more insights, 
the numerical exercise from Section 4.6.1 is adjusted to examine the impact of varying 






Figure 19. Welfare and total service supplied when revenue restriction varies 
 
Figure 20. The optimal price and L- and H-doctors’ decisions  
The Figure 19a plots the result of the exercise for the parameter introduced in Section 
4.5.2. Observe that ?̅?  is sufficiently large while the revenue cap never binds so 
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that   𝑊𝑅(𝑝𝑅
∗ (?̅?), ?̅?) = 𝑊(𝑝𝑁) . Initial reductions in the revenue cap starts affecting 
physicians’ decisions regarding their quality of care and patient numbers when ?̅? 
approaches the point ?̅? ≈ 2.43, where 𝐿-type providers’ spending per patient just binds. 
At this point, the reduction in ?̅? would force 𝐿-type doctors to reduce quality (see Figure 
20c) while increasing the number of patients to treat (Figure 20a). The HI system hence 
found it is advantages decreasing the price (Figure 20b), resulting in 𝐻-type doctors 
reducing their roster sizes and raising medical service quality. As the price goes down, 
both types of doctors reduce their total caseload (Figure 19b) and the less altruistic 
providers have less profits (Figure 20d).  
Overall, social welfare improved (Figure 19a) as the total caseload provided in the 
society is reduced and incentives for different types of doctors are realigned. This 
process will continue until ?̅? ≈ 0.22, where incentives for both types of doctor are 
completely aligned (i.e. they select the same number of patients and provide the same 
quality of medical service). At this level of restriction, any further reduction beyond this 
expenditure level will reduce physicians’ revenue and therefore resulting in the 
reduction of patient enrolment. To counter this effect, the HI scheme has to increase the 
price. The maximum level of welfare will be attained at ?̅? ≈ 0.15, where all the margins 
are aligned. 
A few remarks are provided to conclude this subsection. First, notice from Figures 19 
and 20 that the current system reduces the total caseload provided while ensuring the 
entire population’s access to treatment. Second, compared with the optimal pricing 
policy without introducing expenditure cap, 𝐻 -doctors are induced to treat fewer 
patients and provide a higher quality of service while 𝐿-doctors are motivated to treat 
more patients and reduce service quality. In other words, the optimal expenditure control 
helps HI overcome one of the weaknesses related to the standard FFS system and linked 
to the informational asymmetry between HI and doctors.  
Finally, compared with the quantity restriction, the revenue cap provides doctors with 
more flexibility which allows them to better adjust healthcare resources to the specific 
needs of individual patients. One would expect that this additional flexibility would 
make the revenue cap policy more palatable to doctors than the foregoing quantity 
restriction. I also find in this numerical example that patients with lower initial health 
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levels obtain more service and therefore have higher expected health under the 
expenditure control is higher than under the quantity rationing. 
 
4.6.3 Capitation 
In the last subsection, I investigate the effect of blending the pricing system and one of 
the most frequently used prospective remuneration method, namely fixed payment per 
patient or capitation. I refer capitation as a “cost-control” instrument as it will be set 
below the level of per patient fixed cost, thereby reducing physicians’ incentive to enrol 
patients and increase total caseload. Following the procedures outlined in the previous 
two sections, I first assume that the capitation rate takes value within the range 0 < 𝑘 <
𝐹. As a result, a HI policy becomes triplet (𝑝, 𝑘, 𝜏). Second, the physician selects the 















) ≥ 0 
(112) 
  
𝑛, 𝑞𝑡 ≥ 0 
 
 
where the first line of the system is the physician’s utility optimization problem whereas 
the second line and the third line represent the non-negative constraints imposed on 
profit, practice size and medical service intensity provided. Then, considering the 
interior solution only, I denote the respective solution of 𝐿-and 𝐻-type doctors based on 
the foregoing system by 𝑛𝐿(𝑝, 𝑘), 𝑞𝑡
𝐿(𝑝, 𝑘) and 𝑛𝐻(𝑝, 𝑘), 𝑞𝑡
𝐻(𝑝, 𝑘).  
Substituting these solutions into (89) yields the welfare function 𝑊𝐾(𝑝, 𝑘). Next, I solve 
the price which maximizes social welfare while ensuring all patients access health 
services and denote the solution by 𝑝𝐾
∗ (𝑘). Finally, substituting this price back into the 
physician’s supply functions, total caseloads and profits yields 
𝑛𝐿∗( 𝑝𝐾
∗ (𝑘), 𝑘), 𝑞𝑡
𝐿∗( 𝑝𝐾
∗ (𝑘), 𝑘), 𝑛𝐻∗( 𝑝𝐾
∗ (𝑘), 𝑘), 𝑞𝑡
𝐻∗( 𝑝𝐾
∗ (𝑘), 𝑘); 𝑄𝐿∗( 𝑝𝐾




∗ (𝑘), 𝑘), Π𝐿∗( 𝑝𝐾
∗ (𝑘), 𝑘), Π𝐻∗( 𝑝𝐾
∗ (𝑘), 𝑘) . The social welfare function is 
then 𝑊𝐾(𝑝𝐾
∗ (𝑘), 𝑘). The following two figures show the impact of varying 𝑘 based on 
the parameters introduced in Section 4.5.2. 
 
 




Figure 22. The optimal price and L- and H-doctors’ decisions 
Figure 21a plots the overall impact of varying 𝑘 on optimal social well-being, which 
indicates blending capitation with FFS indeed helps improving welfare, i.e.  
 𝑊(𝑝𝑁) ≤ max
?̅?
 𝑊𝐾(𝑝𝐾
∗ (𝑘), 𝑘) (113) 
To illustrate, notice that when 𝑘 = 0, we have 𝑊𝐾(𝑝𝐾
∗ (𝑘), 𝑘) = 𝑊(𝑝𝑁). When the HI 
starts raising capitation, both 𝐿- and 𝐻-type doctors will enrol more patients. Since all 
patients have already accessed health services (under the welfare maximized FFS), the 
HI will adjust price downwards (Figure 22b). 𝐿-type physicians will increase their 
practice size but reduce service quality (Figure 22 a, c) as the direct impact of raising 
capitation outperforms the indirect effect of the price reduction. On the contrary, 𝐻-type 
physicians will reduce their practice size but increase their service quality (Figure 22 a, 
c) as the indirect effect of price reduction dominates. Overall, both types of doctors 
reduce their total caseload (Figure 21b) while the less altruistic doctors obtain a lower 
profit (Figure 22d).  
As the introduction of capitation not only reduces both types of doctors’ total caseloads 
but also align their incentives, social welfare goes up. This process continues until the 
capitation rate rises to 𝑘 = 0.037 where both types of doctor select the same roster size 
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and provide the same intensities of medical service as well as having zero profit. At this 
capitation rate, any further increases in 𝑘 would force the HI system to reduce price at a 
lower rate, as 𝐿-type doctors have a zero profit and no incentive to increase their practice 
size. Since both types of doctor select the same number of patients to be treated and 
provide the same intensities of medical service, the impact of raising capitation 
dominates the impact of reducing price. Hence, both types of doctors reduce health 
service intensities. Finally, when capitation reaches the level 𝑘 = 0.066, all margins 
align and social welfare reaches the maximum level. Under the selected parameters, I 
find welfare at the optimal capitation in this numerical exercise is the same as at the 
optimal revenue restriction. 
To summary this subsection, a few remarks are in order. First, my results suggest that 
the HI scheme can improve social well-being by mixing FFS and capitation. This 
mechanism substitute price by capitation, which ensures all patients have access to 
treatment while realigning doctors’ different incentives and reducing total caseload. 
Second, using the optimal capitation yields the same level of social welfare as using the 
optimal expenditure cap, as both systems exploit physicians’ private knowledge and 
provided a different quality of service to different types of patients. Finally, while the 
optimal capitation improves the same level of welfare as the optimal revenue cap, it is 
more tolerant of mistakes made by the regulator (i.e. there are more combinations of 
price and capitation rate that leads to social well-being at around the maximum level). 
This is because the substitution between price and capitation allows physicians to have 
more flexibility in terms of determining the total number of patients to be enrolled and 
the health service intensities to be provided. 
 
4.6.4 Discussion 
The FFS payment has been the predominant physician payment used by many developed 
and developing countries over the last decades (Porter and Kaplan, 2016). Patients under 
this system are rarely excluded from treatment and are more likely to receive the 
intensity of medical service that maximizes their health (Ginsburg, 2015). On the other 
hand, physicians’ income increases as they enrol additional patients and provide more 
service. FFS therefore successfully aligns incentives between patients and doctors. 
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However, evidence shows that FFS induces treatment overprovision and drives up 
healthcare spending (Ginsburg, 2015; Léger, 2008; McGuire, 2000). 
The above analysis points out that physician-predicted responses to variations in 
different systems differ in important ways from traditional wisdom. Specifically, I show 
physicians increase their practice sizes but do not raise service quality when the price 
goes up. This result is consistent with studies which have found no evidence of supplier 
induced demand under a fee-for-service regime in countries with publicly funded 
healthcare systems (Carlsen and Grytten, 1998; Grytten et al., 2008; Grytten et al., 2001; 
Grytten and Sørensen, 2001; Madden et al., 2005). While a FFS system can be designed 
to ensure that all patients have access to healthcare, my numerical finding shows it 
inevitably incentivizes medical service over-provision and cost escalation. Moreover, 
the same reimbursement per service to different types of patients leads to inefficiencies 
as it induces more intrinsically motivated staff to treat too many patients while offering 
too low levels of quality. Meanwhile, more extrinsically motivated physicians provide 
too high a level of service quality but treat too few patients. 
A logical reaction to this situation is to introduce into FFS system additional restrictions 
aimed at capping the expenditure or service intensity provided by extrinsically motivated 
doctors while reducing the price. Doing so helps to incentivise low altruistic providers 
to enrol more patients and to raise quality provided by more intrinsically motivated 
doctors. Moreover, the introduction of cost control policies reduces the excessive 
provision of total caseload by both types of doctors. 
In that respect, quantity rationing is found to improve efficiency, nevertheless it does 
not react to physicians’ local knowledge. In contrast to Chapter 3 which suggests that 
quantity rationing may sometimes worsen social welfare, this chapter demonstrates that 
restricting service intensity provided per patient can always improve welfare when 
physicians are able to select their practice size. There are two main departures from the 
last chapter: (1) it is the less altruistic doctor who provides a higher intensity of medical 
service and is first restricted by quantity rationing as the value of the restriction imposed 
becomes lower, and (2) quantity restriction would induce physicians to substitute the 
number of patients treated and average health service quality rather than substituting 
between service quality provided between two types of patients. In Chapter 3, as the 
physician is allocated a fixed number of patients, the introduction of quantity restriction 
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may induce him to substitute the service provided to less healthy individuals to healthier 
individuals, resulting in an inefficiency. In this chapter, the use of quantity restriction 
induces less motivated physicians enrol more patients, leading to an efficiency 
improvement. 
With respect to revenue restriction, this analysis shows that the restriction not only 
reduces total caseload and realigns different physicians’ incentives but also continues to 
use local doctors’ information. However, the expenditure cap in this chapter is per case 
while in the last chapter it restricts per physician total spending. It can be shown that if 
this chapter introduces a per physician expenditure cap as in Chapter 3, it would not 
improve welfare as much as quantity rationing as it does not induce the re-alignment of 
different physicians’ incentives between enrolling more patients and increasing medical 
service quality. 
Finally, I show that the physician reduces the quality of service as the capitation rate 
increases, although he increases the number of patients treated. This result is consistent 
with Barham and Milliken (2015), however, it does not require the assumption of the 
bell-shaped physician altruism. While mixing payment per patient less than fixed cost 
per patient with price is regarded as the optimal cost control policy in this chapter, I find 
this mixed system does not yield higher social well-being compared to the revenue cap. 
This is because both restrictions align physicians’ incentives, reduce total caseload, and 
exploit doctors’ local knowledge. The only difference between introducing capitation 
and a revenue cap is that the former is more tolerant of potential mistakes by health 
authorities. In the current context, capitation can be considered as a substitute of price 




In this chapter, I have studied the design of incentive contracting when physicians 
determine their own practice sizes and the HI scheme can use both financial payments 
as well as cost-control instruments to align incentives. To formalize this idea, I extend 
the analytical framework outlined in the last chapter by endogenizing the number of 
patients allocated and introducing a fixed cost per patient. This setup allows us to analyse 
how the physician trade-off between enrolling more patients and improving health 
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service quality without imposing a particular assumption on the physician’s preference. 
Moreover, my model does not assume an exogenously given optimal service provided 
per patient. Instead, it can be derived as a function of price, capitation rate, as well as 
other exogenous parameters at the level that maximizes welfare while ensuring all 
patients have access to healthcare. Finally, this model extends Barham and Milliken’s 
(2015) analysis to the case where the physician needs to treat multiple types of patient 
while constrained by the non-negative profit condition. 
This model generates four main findings: First, raising per patient or per service 
reimbursement does not lead to improvement in health service quality; Second, the more 
altruistic the physician is, the higher number of patients he would like to treat but the 
lower quality he would provide. Third, the FFS system leads to an inefficient provision 
of health service and medical service over-provision; Finally, cost control policies such 
as per patient quantity limitation and expenditure control as well as capitation are found 
to be effective in terms of enhancing efficiency and controlling costs. In particular, 
blending FFS and capitation outperforms introducing a FFS system a quantity rationing, 
or revenue cap as it reacts to the local knowledge of doctors and is more tolerant of 
potential mistakes that could be made by the health insurance scheme. The mix of FFS 
and per patient reimbursement less than fixed costs can also be regarded as a bonding 
contract, which sells physician the right to serve patients. This remuneration scheme 
aligns different types of physician incentives and extracts their informational rents. 
 
4.8 Limitations and Extensions 
The generality of the analytical framework in Chapters 3 and 4 offers a simple 
mechanism that is sufficiently detailed to understand the impact of introducing 
respective cost control policies in a fee-for-service physician remuneration payment 
system. However, in addition to the extensions discussed in Chapter 3, there are also 
other opportunities for further development. In particular, my thesis focuses on 
investigating physicians’ decisions regarding their patient enrolment or the provision of 
medical service intensity under a FFS system and the subsequent impact of introducing 
three commonly used cost-control policies. As a result, physicians’ decisions under other 
frequently used single payment systems such as salary, cost-reimbursement and cost 
sharing have not yet been explored. Hence, future research might adjust my model to 
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include these systems. In addition, the recently developed cost control policies such as 
bundled payment, global budgets and payment-for-performance have played an 
increasingly important role in reducing costs and improving service quality (Offodile et 
al., 2019, Santos et al., 2019). Accordingly, it will be beneficial to model these policies 
and evaluate their impact. Future studies can also examine the design of the optimal 
menu of contracts when cost control policies have been taken into consideration. While 
my research does not analyse this option, the results I generate can be interpreted as the 
indirect implementation of the direct revealing mechanism (Gaynor et al., 2018), with a 
restriction that the payment has to be linear in quantity.  
Another potential extension could be to allow patients playing a positive role in 
determining the service quantity to be provided by their physicians. Studies in this 
stream of literature have analysed the optimal design of patient insurance and physician 
payment simultaneously as well as their impact on physicians’ health service supply and 
patients’ healthcare demand decisions. For instance, in Ellis and McGuire (1990), the 
patient and his physician need to reach a Nash-bargaining equilibrium in relation to 
quantity of service to be supplied. In Ma and McGuire (1997), the patient decides the 
quantity of service to be supplied while the physician decides the level of effort to be 
exerted. In both papers, the insurance scheme decides the premiums or patients’ co-
payments to be collected and the remuneration scheme of physicians. Furthermore, as 
physicians’ risk attitude also plays an essential role in determining health service 
provision (Arrieta et al., 2017; Galizzi et al., 2013), it will be interesting to see how my 
results would change if patients or physicians are assumed to be risk-averse. 
Altogether, theoretical research over the next 5-10 years should extend my setup by 
including more essential features of the healthcare market, analysing physician 
behaviour under other most frequently used physician payment mechanisms, examine 
the impact of imposing recently developed cost-control instruments and investigating 
the optimal design of insurance for patients and payment for doctors. 
Next, it is interesting to see whether my theoretical or numerical predictions hold up to 
empirical scrutiny. For instance, my thesis shows whether the physician increases his 
service quality in price depends on whether he is allowed to decide his practice size. 
Moreover, my findings suggest that price and insurance premiums increase with ageing 
(represented by the proportion of the population over 65), the proportion of less altruistic 
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physicians, and science innovations (represented by a technology factor). My results 
also suggest the need to impose a FFS payment; either a cost control policy such as 
capitation, an expenditure cap, or quantity rationing which would result in welfare 
improvement. In particular, using capitation increases social welfare at least to the same 
level when the other two instruments are used. Econometricians could construct models 
to test the significance of these hypotheses. To test the impact of using different cost 
control policies, future studies should find a way to measure social welfare. 
Subsequently, evidence of physicians’ decisions on the supply of health service or 
patient enrolment before and after introducing the above cost control policies and 
variations of welfare should be compared with my theoretical findings. Econometric 
models can also be used to estimate the percentage of respective drivers (i.e. population 
ageing or technology innovation) contributes to healthcare expenditure growth. Finally, 
econometric models will allow forecasting or simulating of variations of health service 
price, insurance premium and the average income of physician over the next decades. 
Finally, and as discussed in Chapter 2, laboratory experiments could be one of the best 
tools to test my theoretical predictions. This is because experiments allow researchers to 
investigate physician behaviour in a controlled manner and under ceteris paribus 
conditions (Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011). Moreover, participants in the experiments are 
randomly assigned to experimental conditions excluding selection bias. Experimental 
investigations are based on actual decisions associated with monetary rewards that are 
related to participants’ choices. This is a situation real physician face in their daily 
practice. Experiments also serve as “wind tunnels” before institutional changes such as 
healthcare reforms are implemented (Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011).  
Future studies can also extend the experiment of Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011) by 
modelling cost control policies and analysing their impact on the physician’s supply of 
health service to the individual patient as well as to social welfare. To do that, 
researchers may divide all subjects into three groups and follow the process of Hennig-
Schmidt et al. (2011) to analyse their service supply decisions under FFS only by 
recording per patient service provided 𝑞𝑖 and expenditure incurred 𝑟𝑖 while denoting the 
highest quantity of service offered by ?̅? and the highest expenditure incurred by ?̅?. Next, 
researchers could introduce the first group with a quota 𝑞𝑖 ≤ ?̅?, the second group with 
an expenditure cap 𝑟𝑖 ≤ ?̅?, and the thrid group with a positive or negative payment per 
patient in addition to a FFS payment. These would allow researchers to examine how 
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physicians’ supply decisions change after the introduction of respective cost control 
policies. By measuring patients’ health benefits in monetary terms, the experiments can 
use the welfare function introduced in Chapter 3 to estimate the social well-being 







Proof. Calculating the first order condition with respect to 𝑝 and applying the implicit 













































































> 0 and 
𝜕𝑞∗
𝜕𝑝
= 0, thereby verifying the claim.  
The proof can be easily generalized to the case where 𝑧𝐵 = 0 and 𝑧𝐺 = 𝑧, so in this 
situation the first order condition with respect to price becomes: 
 
(
?̅?2𝐶′′ 𝑄𝛽𝐶′′ 𝑄(1 − 𝛽)𝐶′′
?̅?𝐶′′ 𝑛𝛽𝐶′′ − 𝛼𝑓𝐵
′′ 𝑛(1 − 𝛽)𝐶′′















































?̅?2𝐶′′ 𝑄𝛽𝐶′′ 𝑄(1 − 𝛽)𝐶′′
?̅?𝐶′′ 𝑛𝛽𝐶′′ − 𝛼𝑓𝐵
′′ 𝑛(1 − 𝛽)𝐶′′




































Proof. Calculating the first order condition with respect to 𝑘  and using the implicit 














































> 0 (123) 


















?̅?2𝐶′′ 𝑄𝛽𝐶′′ 𝑄(1 − 𝛽)𝐶′′
?̅?𝐶′′ 𝑛𝛽𝐶′′ − 𝛼𝑓𝐵
′′ 𝑛(1 − 𝛽)𝐶′′
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 depends on the level of 𝑓𝐵
′′  and (1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺
′′ . Since 𝑓′′ <
0 and 𝑓′(+∞) = 1, we know 𝑓′′′ > 0. Moreover, as 𝑞𝐵
∗ > 𝑞𝐺
∗ > 0, 𝑓′′ < 0, 0 > 𝑓𝐵
′′ ≥
(1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺








, verifying the claim. 
 
B3 
From the second equation of (96), we know 𝑝 − 𝐶′ = −𝛼𝑓′. Substituting this into the 
first equation of (96) yields: 
 𝛼[𝑓(𝑞) − 𝑞𝑓′(𝑞)] + 𝑘 − 𝐹 = 0 (126) 







< 0 (127) 
Calculating the first order condition with respect to 𝛼 for the second equation of (96) 





𝛼𝑞𝑓𝑓′′ − 𝑛𝐶′′(𝑓 − 𝑞𝑓′)
𝛼𝑞2𝑓′′𝐶′′














> 0 (129) 
Since 𝑝 − 𝐶′ < 0, 𝑘 − 𝐹 < 0,
𝜕𝑛∗
𝜕𝛼
> 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝜕𝑄∗
𝜕𝛼




= (𝑝 − 𝐶′)
𝜕𝑄∗
𝜕𝛼
+ (𝑘 − 𝐹)
𝜕𝑛∗
𝜕𝛼
< 0 (130) 
When there are two types of patients, following the verification procedures from B2 and 
denoting 𝑓̅ = 𝛽𝑓𝐵 + (1 − 𝛽)[𝑧 + (1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺]  and  𝑓′̅ = 𝛽𝑓𝐵
′ + (1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺



















?̅?2𝐶′′ 𝑄𝛽𝐶′′ 𝑄(1 − 𝛽)𝐶′′
?̅?𝐶′′ 𝑛𝛽𝐶′′ − 𝛼𝑓𝐵
′′ 𝑛(1 − 𝛽)𝐶′′







































′′ − 𝑛𝛼𝐶′′[𝛽(1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺





















Similar to Appendix B2, we have 
𝜕𝑛∗
𝜕𝛼












Denoting ∆𝑓 = 𝑓𝐵 − [𝑧 + (1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺] and ∆𝑞 = 𝑞𝐵 − 𝑞𝐺, the first order condition with 




















?̅?2𝐶′′ 𝑄𝛽𝐶′′ 𝑄(1 − 𝛽)𝐶′′
?̅?𝐶′′ 𝑛𝛽𝐶′′ − 𝛼𝑓𝐵
′′ 𝑛(1 − 𝛽)𝐶′′










hence,   

























𝛼∆𝑓 + ∆𝑞(𝑝 − 𝐶′ − 𝑄𝐶′′)
?̅?2𝐶′′
−
𝑛[𝛼∆𝑓 + ∆𝑞(𝑝 − 𝐶′)][𝛽(1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺





𝛼∆𝑓 + ∆𝑞(𝑝 − 𝐶′)
𝛼?̅?𝑓𝐵
′′ > 0
𝛼∆𝑓 + ∆𝑞(𝑝 − 𝐶′)
𝛼?̅?(1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺







As 0 > 𝑓𝐵
′′ ≥ (1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺



















𝛼∆𝑓 + ∆𝑞(𝑝 − 𝐶′)
?̅?𝐶′′





= (𝑝 − 𝐶′)
𝜕𝑄∗
𝜕𝛽
+ (𝑘 − 𝐹)
𝜕𝑛∗
𝜕𝛽





For 𝑝 ∉ ?̃?, the first order condition of (103) with respect to 𝑝 is: 
 
(
−𝑞𝐶′′(𝑓 − 𝑞𝑓′) −𝑓′′[𝑞(𝑝 − 𝐶′) + 𝑘 − 𝐹] − 𝑛𝐶′′(𝑓 − 𝑞𝑓′)



























−𝑞𝐶′′(𝑓 − 𝑞𝑓′) −𝑓′′[𝑞(𝑝 − 𝐶′) + 𝑘 − 𝐹] − 𝑛𝐶′′(𝑓 − 𝑞𝑓′)























−𝑛(𝑓 − 𝑞𝑓′)(𝑄𝐶′′ + 𝑝 − 𝐶′) − 𝑄𝑓′′[𝑞(𝑝 − 𝐶′) + 𝑘 − 𝐹]
𝑓′′[𝑞(𝑝 − 𝐶′) + 𝑘 − 𝐹]2 + 𝑛𝐶′′(𝑘 − 𝐹)(𝑓 − 𝑞𝑓′)
> 0
(𝑓 − 𝑞𝑓′)[𝑞(𝑄𝐶′′ + 𝑝 − 𝐶′) + 𝑘 − 𝐹]

















𝑛(𝑘 − 𝐹)(𝑓 − 𝑞𝑓′) − 𝑛𝑞2𝑓′′[𝑞(𝑝 − 𝐶′) + 𝑘 − 𝐹]














(𝑄2𝐶′′ − 𝑄𝐶′ + 𝐶){−𝑛𝐶′′(𝑓 − 𝑞𝑓′) − [𝑞(𝑝 − 𝐶′) + 𝑘 − 𝐹]𝑓′′}
𝑄𝐶′′{𝑓′′[𝑞(𝑝 − 𝐶′) + 𝑘 − 𝐹]2 + 𝑛(𝑘 − 𝐹)𝐶′′(𝑓 − 𝑞𝑓′)}











−𝑓′′[𝑞(𝑝 − 𝐶′) + 𝑘 − 𝐹](𝑄2𝐶′′ −𝑄𝐶′ + 𝐶)
𝑛𝐶′′𝑓′′[𝑞(𝑝 − 𝐶′) + 𝑘 − 𝐹]2 + 𝑛2(𝑘 − 𝐹)(𝐶′′)2(𝑓 − 𝑞𝑓′)
> 0 (142) 
 
The above proof can be easily extended to the case when 𝑞 = (𝑞𝐵, 𝑞𝐺). In this case, the 






 (𝑝 − 𝐶
′) [𝛽(𝑓𝐵 − 𝑞𝐵𝑓𝐵′) + (1 − 𝛽) (𝑧 + (1 − 𝑧)(𝑓𝐺 − 𝑞𝐺𝑓𝐺′))] − (𝑘 − 𝐹)𝑓𝐵′ = 0
𝑓𝐵
′ = (1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺 ′






Denote 𝑓̅ = 𝛽𝑓𝐵 + (1 − 𝑧)(𝑧 + (1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺)  and 𝑓̅
′ = 𝛽𝑓𝐵
′ + (1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺′ . 

















𝑞𝐶′′(𝑓̅ − 𝑞𝑓̅′) 𝛽[𝑛𝐶′′(𝑓̅ − 𝑞𝑓̅′) + 𝑓𝐵
′′(𝑞𝐵(𝑝 − 𝐶
′) + 𝑘 − 𝐹)] (1 − 𝛽)[𝑛𝐶′′(𝑓̅ − ?̅?𝑓̅′) + (1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺
′′(𝑞𝐺(𝑝 − 𝐶
′) + 𝑘 − 𝐹)]
0 𝑓𝐵
′′ −(1 − 𝑧)𝑓𝐺 ′′








The above formula is symmetric to the equation (138) and can be solved by following 
the same process.  
 
B6 
Similarly, calculating the first order condition of (103) with respect to 𝑘 yields: 
(
−𝑞𝐶′′(𝑓 − 𝑞𝑓′) −𝑓′′[𝑞(𝑝 − 𝐶′) + 𝑘 − 𝐹] − 𝑛𝐶′′(𝑓 − 𝑞𝑓′)



















−𝑞𝐶′′(𝑓 − 𝑞𝑓′) −𝑓′′[𝑞(𝑝 − 𝐶′) + 𝑘 − 𝐹] − 𝑛𝐶′′(𝑓 − 𝑞𝑓′)



















𝑛(𝑝 − 𝐶′)(𝑓′ − 𝑞𝑓′′) − 𝑛𝑓′′(𝑘 − 𝐹) − 𝑛2𝐶′′(𝑓 − 𝑞𝑓′)
𝑓′′[𝑞(𝑝 − 𝐶′) + 𝑘 − 𝐹]2 + 𝑛𝐶′′(𝑘 − 𝐹)(𝑓 − 𝑞𝑓′)
> 0
𝑄𝐶′′(𝑓 − 𝑞𝑓′) − 𝑓′[𝑞(𝑝 − 𝐶′) + (𝑘 − 𝐹)]

















−𝑛𝑞2(𝑝 − 𝐶′)𝑓′′ − 𝑛(𝑘 − 𝐹)(𝑓′ + 𝑞𝑓′′)
𝑓′′[𝑞(𝑝 − 𝐶′) + 𝑘 − 𝐹]2 + 𝑛𝐶′′(𝑓 − 𝑞𝑓′)(𝑘 − 𝐹)









Consider the production vector for services which solves the system (96). This solution 
can then be used to define the ensuing total production of services denoted by ?̂?(𝑝, 𝑘).75 
The critical price 𝑝0 is implicitly a function of 𝛼 which is determined by solving: 
 𝑝0?̂?(𝛼, 𝑝, 𝑘) − 𝐶 (?̂?(𝛼, 𝑝, 𝑘)) − (𝑘 − 𝐹)?̂?(𝛼, 𝑝, 𝑘) = 0 (148) 








− (𝑘 − 𝐹)
𝜕?̂?
𝜕𝛼
?̂? + (𝑝 − 𝐶′)
𝜕?̂?
𝜕𝑝











> 0. Moreover, the system (96) implies that 𝐶′ − 𝑝0 > 0. Following the same 
procedures from (100) to (102), it can be proved that ?̂? + (𝑝 − 𝐶′)
𝜕?̂?
𝜕𝑝




thus verifying the claim. 
  
                                                 




Chapter 5. Conclusion and Further Research 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
This thesis has investigated the optimal provision of a primary care incentive within a 
health insurance scheme when medical service providers are motivated by patients’ 
health benefits and have private knowledge about their degree of altruism as well as their 
patients’ severity of illness. The main objective has been to provide some new insights 
which improve our understanding of, respectively, the implementation of cost-
containing instruments, the optimal design of incentive contracts, and their impact on 
PCPs’ choices of medical service supply and patient enrolment.  
In this chapter, I review the main contributions of each of the three main chapters of this 
thesis and synthesise the central themes of these research projects. I also discuss the 
limitations of both the research contained in this thesis and the broader research area. 
Finally, I briefly summarize several avenues for future research that have been discussed 
in the previous chapters. 
The purpose and contribution of Chapter 2 was to provide an authoritative account of 
the recently developed literatures of the optimal design of primary care physicians’ 
incentive contracting. To do that, I define and introduce stylised models of physician 
altruism, which is an essential feature of primary healthcare providers (Arrow, 1963). 
More importantly, I discuss the optimal design of physician payment for altruistic 
primary care providers in the presence of moral hazard or adverse selection. Chapter 2 
highlights several inconsistencies between the assumptions and predictions of 
theoretical models, and the results reported in experimental and empirical studies. 
I show that the earlier literature focuses mainly on deriving the optimal prospective and 
cost reimbursement system that induces physicians’ “first best” cost-reduction or quality 
enhancing efforts. These studies captured the moral hazard problem as physicians’ non-
contractible efforts. I show that studies in this literature do not discuss the alternative 
approach of modelling moral hazard. Furthermore, the implementation of cost-
reimbursement or cost-sharing might be impossible or very costly. As a result, the 
optimal design of more sophisticated physician payment systems such as fee-for-service 
or capitation should be examined. 
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The more recent literature has extended the discussions by further considering 
physicians’ or patients’ unknown heterogeneities and showed that the optimal PCP 
compensation system should offer a menu of contracts. However, this prediction is 
inconsistent with both theories and real-world applications as using a menu of contracts 
requires the satisfaction of “single-crossing property” (often difficult to be achieved) 
and may create a two-tier healthcare system. Moreover, when physicians are offered a 
menu of contracts and make their choices, the regulator can distinguish each physician’s 
type from the choice he made. As a result, there is no guarantee that the regulator would 
not exploit information regarding the different types of health service provider in the 
design of physician payment. Lastly, offering physicians a menu of contracts may 
incentivise them to cream-skim low-cost patients. 
The above difficulties indicate that using a single physician payment could be a better 
alternative (Allard et al., 2014; Choné and Ma, 2011; Liu and Ma, 2013; Makris and 
Siciliani, 2013), though not all physicians’ incentives could be aligned and some 
physicians might have informational rent. To align these incentives, studies have 
investigated introducing a single physician remuneration scheme, a cost control policy 
such as quantity rationing, or an expenditure cap. However, this literature only includes 
a few studies with models that can be easily generalized in many ways. First, the 
analytical frameworks do not consider essential features of the healthcare market; 
physicians have been assumed to be profit-driven while facing no financial constraints. 
The models also do not consider information asymmetries between the regulator, 
patients and physicians. Second, the types of physician and patient involved are assumed 
to be homogenous. Third, healthcare providers are not constrained by non-negative 
profit conditions. Finally, these models focus on modelling one particular type of quotas 
and expenditure cap at a global level. 
Section 2.4 discusses empirical studies relating to the aforementioned topics. I have 
shown that the assumption of physician altruism is well supported by a variety of 
empirical evidence. Accordingly, altruism is an essential feature in the modelling of 
physician behaviour. I have also shown that the single physician payment system has 
been used more frequently than a menu of contracts. Under the commonly used FFS or 
CAP, I have shown that the theoretical predications that FFS (CAP) drives 
overproduction (underproduction) and price increase drives service quality do not 
always consistent with empirical observations. Moreover, I have presented the 
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respective real-world applications of capitation, quantity rationing as well as revenue 
restriction. I have found that imposing these policies might help in limiting health 
spending growth and enhancing resource allocation efficiency, though these effects 
cannot be always guaranteed. 
Research in this thesis further develops the analytical frameworks analysing physicians’ 
decisions on the supply of service and patient enrolment under different types of cost 
control policies. These frameworks generate predications of physicians’ health service 
supply decisions which are consistent with different types of empirical observations. 
Moreover, results from my studies reflect some of the most important impacts of 
imposing the respective cost control policies in the healthcare market. 
Chapter 3 contributes to the literature by providing a stylised model of primary care 
physician incentive contracting, which focuses on comparing the impact of introducing 
different cost control policies in the presence of information asymmetry. To do this, I 
have made a few adjustments to the stylised model discussed in the literature. Most 
importantly, I assume the physician can choose per patient quantity of service provided 
only and capture the moral hazard problem by introducing a random element associated 
with patient benefits after treatment. This prevents the regulator inferring the physician 
or patient type from the quantity of service provided and therefore the physician’s utility. 
Moreover, I assume the provided medical service intensities can be contracted upon, as 
physicians are paid on a FFS basis. Finally, I consider the design of payment under a 
publicly funded health insurance scheme. The objective function of the regulator 
therefore not only includes patients’ benefits but also providers’ net financial surpluses. 
Overall, the analysis based on the model sharpens our understanding of how cost control 
policies affect physicians’ decisions on health service supply and social well-being. 
My model demonstrates that the asymmetric information, especially the unknown 
heterogeneities of physicians–prevents the single FFS system achieving resource 
allocation efficiency. Moreover, current trends such as population ageing and 
technological innovations drive up price and health expenditure, exacerbating the 
inefficiencies. My numerical findings show that quantity rationing, revenue cap and 
capitation can be introduced to enhance efficiency, as these instruments directly restrict 
highly motivated physicians’ over-production while price can be raised to reduce less 
motivated physicians’ underproduction. In particular, imposing a negative capitation on 
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FFS improves social well-being the most as it exploits the knowledge of doctors, extracts 
PCPs’ informational rents and aligns heterogeneous PCPs’ incentives. These findings 
are shown to be consistent with the results derived from contract theory and the empirical 
observations discussed in Chapter 2, although the intuitions are different. 
Chapter 4 further develops the previous contribution by allowing physicians to select 
the size of their practice while introducing a fixed cost associated with enrolling each 
patient. This generalization, however, requires that the payment system to be designed 
to ensure the whole population has access to healthcare. The model developed in Chapter 
4 allows us to analyse to what extent the physician willing to trade-off the size of his 
practice and service quality provided per patient, especially when the physician’s profit 
is binding. In consistent with Chapter 3, the model shows that the FFS system fail to 
align heterogeneous doctors’ incentives because of moral hazard and adverse selection; 
the more altruistic physicians select too many patients but offer too low a level of quality 
whereas the less altruistic physicians provide excessive level of quality but enrol too few 
patients. In contrast to Chapter 3 and most studies in the literature, I show the physician 
does not increase health service intensity/quality provided per patient with a fee-for-
service price. This is result is consistent with some empirical observations that the 
physician does not respond to price variations (Madden et al., 2005; Yip, 1998; 
Zuckerman et al., 1998).  
The model also shows that, to ensure the whole population has access to healthcare, the 
fee-for-service price has to be set sufficiently high, which inevitably leads to excessive 
provision of health services. Similar to Chapter 3, my numerical findings suggest that 
quantity rationing, expenditure cap and capitation can still be imposed on a FFS system 
to enhance efficiency. This is because cost-control instruments force the low altruistic 
providers to reduce service quality provided per patient but increases the number of 
patients treated. Meanwhile, by adjusting price downward, high altruistic providers are 
incentivised to reduce their practice size and to improve medical service quality. In 
particular, imposing a capitation less than fixed costs or a revenue cap per patient in a 
FFS system leads to a higher welfare improvement than using quantity rationing. Overall, 
capitation is considered as the best remuneration mechanism as it is more tolerant of 
potential mistakes that could be made by the regulator as compared to the revenue cap. 
The result capitation is superior to other cost control instruments is consistent with the 
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result I obtained in Chapter 3, reflecting that my previous findings can be further 
generalized in the current framework with less restrictions. 
 
5.2 Future Studies 
To conclude the thesis, I will briefly reflect on some promising directions for future 
research. The important role that professional ethics play in guiding physicians’ 
behaviour and different types of efficiencies caused by information asymmetries have 
incentivised economists to extend the classical model to capture these essential features 
of the healthcare market (Arrow, 1963; Ellis and McGuire, 1986). These models have 
been applied to the study of physician incentive contracting, thereby improving the 
theory’s predictive capacity. 
Chapters 3 and 4 have discussed several possible extensions to my analysis. First, it 
would be interesting to see whether my current findings can be further generalized. For 
instance, it should be considered whether introducing more than two types of physicians 
or patients and multi-dimensional adverse selection or if allowing physicians to choose 
the types of patients to be treated will change my findings. Second, it is worth 
investigating how different cost control policies affect PCPs’ decisions on the level of 
cost-reduction, quality enhancing efforts to be provided, as well as their specialised care 
referral decisions. Third, my thesis focuses mainly on comparing the impact of imposing 
three specific cost control policies on the FFS system. As a result, physicians’ behaviour 
under other popular payment systems such as salary, menu of contracts and other cost 
control policies such as global budgets or pay-for-performance have not been discussed. 
Fourth, it would also be interesting to see how physicians’ risk averse preferences would 
alter their medical service supply and patient enrolment decisions. Finally, patients in 
reality also play a role in deciding the supply of health service. Accordingly, 
investigating the optimal design of patients’ insurance scheme and how it affects their 
demand of service along with the optimal design of physician payment mechanism while 
how it affects physicians’ supply of health service better reflects what happens in reality. 
This thesis also offers some directions for empirical studies. First, it would be interesting 
to see whether my findings hold up to empirical scrutiny. This includes testing the 
significance of physicians’ supply and patient enrolment decisions as well as the optimal 
design of physician payment systems in response to variations of price, the respective 
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cost control policy, and exogenously given parameters (e.g. the fraction of less healthy 
individuals and technology factors etc.). Second, econometricians can estimate the 
percentage that ageing or technology innovation contributes to price, insurance premium 
or health expenditure growth respectively. Moreover, variations of fee-for-service price, 
the level of insurance premium and health expenditure over the next few years can also 
be forecasted. Finally, laboratory experiments can be performed to test physicians’ (i.e. 
as the subjects of experiments) decisions on patients’ enrolment and intensity of service 
provided under different cost control policies as well as welfare generated by using 
respective cost control policies as discussed in Chapter 4. 
Based on theoretical and empirical extensions of this thesis, researchers can also 
recommend potential policy adjustments in the future. For instance, they can provide 
qualitative recommendations such as (1) whether cost-containment methods should be 
introduced, and (2) which specific cost control policies should be used. Researchers can 
also offer quantitative policy recommendations. Specifically, they can recommend the 
specific level of quota, budget cap or capitation that the regulator should impose. 
Furthermore, they can also estimate the potential costs and benefits of using a particular 
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